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“How selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing
from it, except the pleasure of seeing it”. Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
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Abstract
In the majority of developed countries the agricultural sector has long been shaped by agri-
cultural policies that provide financial support to farmers, enabling them to adapt to changing
economic, social and environmental conditions within which they operate. To evaluate these
policies and draw recommendations on their design and scope, their impact on farmers’ be-
haviour is regularly scrutinised. The thesis fits into this perspective, first by analysing the
linkage between agricultural subsidies and farm technical efficiency, and then by investigating
the potential effects of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ provision of ecosystem services.
Technical efficiency assesses whether farmers use their production factors in the most efficient
way; i.e., if they are able to get the maximum achievable output for a given input level, or
to use a minimum level of input to produce a given level of output. The analysis of the
subsidy-efficiency nexus is crucial to inform policy-makers on what extent agricultural subsidies
affect the efficiency of the use of agricultural production factors. A major issue of the existing
literature in this field is the existence of a plethora of empirical applications in which subsidies
are often treated in an ad hoc way, due to the absence of clear conceptual guidance. Potentially,
this may generate erroneous results. A second issue is that the existing literature is almost
exclusively based on a static view of agricultural production decisions. However, the static
analysis can only provide a limited view on the subsidy-efficiency nexus since agricultural
production decisions are dynamic in nature. In this context, the first objective of the thesis is to
improve the understanding on how public subsidies impact farm technical efficiency. To do that,
after reviewing the theory regarding the effect of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ production
decisions in the second chapter of the thesis, a meta-analysis of the empirical findings on the
subsidy-efficiency relationship is carried out in the third chapter, and a dynamic model is
developed and estimated for French data in the fourth chapter.
In numerous developed countries decoupled subsidies have become the cornerstone of agricul-
tural support policies. The literature regarding their impact on farmers’ behaviour is plentiful,
but an area has received little attention: the multitasking nature of farming activities. Hence,
as a second objective, the thesis aims at investigating the potential effects of decoupled sub-
sidies on farmers’ provision of ecosystem services, despite these subsidies not being designed as
9
such. To address this question, borrowing from the multitasking agency theory, a theoretical
model is developed and empirically tested on French data in the fifth chapter of the thesis.
The thesis reaches three main conclusions. Firstly, modelling approaches which treat subsidies
as additional outputs or which use the subsidy rate (i.e. the ratio of subsidies to farm revenue) as
proxy for subsidies, could generate misleading results on the subsidy-efficiency nexus. Secondly,
the (detrimental) effect of subsidies on farm technical efficiency is smaller when dynamic aspects
are taken into account. Finally, decoupled subsidies could raise farmers’ incentives to provide
environmental services and ecologically sound productions.
Keywords: Agricultural policy; public subsidies; farms; production decisions; technical effi-
ciency; dynamic efficiency; multitasking agency theory.
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Résumé
Subventions publiques et décisions de production des agriculteurs: Une analyse
microéconomique
Dans la majorité des pays développés, le secteur agricole a longtemps été façonné par le soutien
financier octroyé dans le cadre des politiques agricoles, soutien permettant aux agriculteurs de
s’adapter à l’évolution des conditions économiques, sociales et environnementales dans lesquelles
ils évoluent. Pour évaluer les politiques et formuler des recommandations sur leur conception
et leur portée, leur impact sur le comportement des agriculteurs est régulièrement examiné. La
thèse s’inscrit dans cette perspective, d’abord en analysant le lien entre subventions publiques
et efficacité technique des exploitations, puis en examinant les effets potentiels des subventions
découplées sur la fourniture de services écosystémiques par les agriculteurs.
L’efficacité technique évalue si les agriculteurs utilisent leurs facteurs de production de manière
la plus efficace possible; i.e., s’ils sont en mesure d’obtenir l’output maximum réalisable pour
un niveau d’input donné, ou d’utiliser un niveau minimum d’input pour produire un niveau
donné d’output. L’analyse du lien entre subventions et efficacité technique est cruciale pour
informer les décideurs sur la manière dont les subventions publiques affectent l’efficacité de
l’utilisation des facteurs de production dans le secteur agricole. Un problème majeur de la
littérature existante dans ce domaine est qu’il existe une pléthore d’applications empiriques
où les subventions sont souvent traitées de manière ad hoc, en raison de l’absence de cadre
conceptuel clair. Potentiellement, cela peut conduire à des conclusions erronées. Un second
problème est que la littérature existante est presqu’exclusivement basée sur une vision statique
des décisions de production des agriculteurs. L’analyse statique ne peut fournir qu’une vision
limitée du lien entre subventions et efficacité puisque les décisions de production des agriculteurs
sont essentiellement dynamiques.
Dans ce contexte, le premier objectif de la thèse est d’améliorer la compréhension de l’impact
des subventions publiques sur l’efficacité technique des exploitations. Pour ce faire, après avoir
examiné la théorie sur l’effet des subventions découplées sur les décisions de production des
11
agriculteurs dans le deuxième chapitre de la thèse, une méta-analyse des résultats empiriques
sur la relation entre subventions et efficacité technique est réalisée dans le troisième chapitre,
afin de contrôler les effets qui seraient dus aux méthodes utilisées, et un modèle dynamique est
développé et estimé sur des données françaises dans le quatrième chapitre.
Les subventions découplées sont devenues le principal instrument de politiques agricoles dans
beaucoup de pays développés. La littérature concernant leur impact sur le comportement des
agriculteurs est abondante. Cependant, peu de travaux analysent leur rôle dans le cadre d’une
agriculture multifonctionnelle. Par conséquent, le deuxième objectif de la thèse est d’étudier
les effets potentiels des subventions découplées sur la fourniture de services écosystémiques par
les agriculteurs. Pour aborder cette question, en empruntant aux approches multitâches de la
théorie de l’agence, un modèle théorique est développé et testé empiriquement sur des données
françaises dans le cinquième chapitre de la thèse.
La thèse arrive à trois conclusions principales. Tout d’abord, les approches de modélisation
qui traitent les subventions comme des outputs supplémentaires ou qui utilisent le taux de
subvention (rapport entre subventions et revenu) comme proxy, peuvent générer des résultats
trompeurs sur le lien entre subventions et efficacité technique des exploitations. Deuxièmement,
l’effet (négatif) des subventions sur l’efficacité technique des exploitations est plus faible lor-
sque les aspects dynamiques sont pris en compte. Enfin, les subventions découplées peuvent
augmenter les incitations des agriculteurs à fournir des services écosystémiques.
Mots clés : Politiques agricoles; subventions publiques; exploitations; décisions de production;
efficacité dynamique; théorie de l’agence multitâches.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Background
There is a long tradition of government interventions in the agricultural sector, particularly in
most developed countries, to implement policies that provide financial support (public subsidies)
to farmers. For instance, agricultural support policies in the United States (US) and the
European Union (EU) began respectively in the 1930s and the 1960s. In the last two decades,
the EU spent around €50 billion annually on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); and
this amount represents approximately 40% of the EU budget (Greer, 2013; Anania and Pupo
D’Andrea, 2015). Similarly, the US Farm Bill costs annually around €65 billion, in which
agricultural subsidies absorb approximately 20% (Johnson, 2007; Johnson and Monke, 2014).
Since their inception, these policies have been subject to a continuous reform process to adapt
to changing economic, social and environmental conditions within which farms operate. In this
perspective, a number of policy instruments have been introduced; and their impact on farmer’s
production decisions is regularly scrutinised since they often generate unintended consequences
(Grant, 2007). In essence, the analysis of their impact on farmers’ behaviour is needed to guide
their design, their assessment, or to modify their scope. As such, the linkage between public
subsidies and farmers’ behaviour occupies a central role in agricultural production economics
and agricultural policy analysis.
The major reforms of the agricultural support policies consist in a movement from market
price supports to coupled direct payments (production-related supports) and decoupled dir-
ect payments to farmers. Along with the direct payment schemes, farmers were also en-
couraged to engage voluntarily in environmentally friendly farming practices through agri-
environmental schemes (AES); but it is well known that the degree of uptake is globally low
(Guillem and Barnes, 2013; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2013). The market price supports and the
production-related supports have been criticised because they influence production decisions
17
without providing adequate price signals. The market price support policies guarantee a min-
imal ﬁxed price for certain commodities, and thus encourage overproduction and extensive use
of resources. The production-related subsidies provide incentives to expand the production of
the more subsidised products, and may also provide incentives for extensive resources use. To
avoid such effects, production distorting subsidies have been gradually replaced by decoupled
subsidies that are granted to farmers without production requirements. In turn, coupled direct
payments have not completely disappeared in the EU, since the reforms allow keeping a part
of them for some speciﬁc farming systems (Rizov et al., 2013; Matthews, 2015).
Overall, theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that, even when decoupled, public
subsidies could have direct and indirect inﬂuence on farmers’ behaviour (e.g. Hennessy, 1998;
Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Just and Kropp, 2013). To enlighten agricultural policy makers
and various stakeholders, a clear understanding of the inﬂuence of public subsidies requires
an examination of the different aspects of farmers’ behaviour. In this sense, a vast amount
of literature ﬁnds evidence for causal links between public subsidies and farmers’ decisions to
remain in the agricultural sector (Guyomard et al., 2004; Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Ahearn,
2005; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Brady et al., 2009 ; Douarin and Latruffe, 2011); the type
and the level of production (Guyomard et al., 1996 ; Antón and Le Mouël, 2004; Breen et al.,
2005; Serra et al., 2006); the use of production factors, such as land and labour (Tranter et al.,
2007; Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010 ; Dupraz and Latruffe, 2015; Lobley and Butler, 2010);
investments (Vercammen, 2007; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Serra et al., 2009; Latruffe et al.,
2010; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2011; Kallas et al., 2012); the allocation of family labour to off-farm
activities (Woldehanna et al., 2000 ; El-Ostra et al., 2004; Serra et al., 2005; Ahearn, 2005;
Ahearn, 2006); farm performance (Serra et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2010; Kumbhakar and Lien,
2010; Latruffe et al., 2012; Sipiläinen et al., 2014); and farmers’ risk attitude (Hennessy, 1998;
Sckokai and Antón, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Sckokai and Moro; 2006; Koundouri et
al., 2009; Féménia et al., 2010). In this thesis a particular attention is paid to farm performance,
and mainly farm technical efficiency.
Technical efficiency assesses whether farmers use their production factors in the most efficient
way; i.e., if they are able to get the maximum achievable output for a given input level, or
to use a minimum level of input to produce a given level of output. Therefore, the analysis
of the impact of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency is of crucial interest for policy
makers, since it could provide information on the extent to which agricultural subsidies affect the
efficiency of the use of agricultural production factors. In the literature investigating the impact
of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency, it is generally recognised that public subsidies
are detrimental to the agricultural sector in the way that they reduce farms’ technical efficiency.
This conclusion is essentially drawn from empirical results (e.g. Giannakas et al., 2001; Rezitis
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et al., 2003; Emvalomatis et al., 2008; Bojnec et Latruffe, 2009; Bakucs et al., 2010; Zhu et Oude
Lansink, 2010; Zhu et al., 2011; Kumbhakar et al., 2009; Kumbhakar et al., 2014; Sipiläinen et
al., 2014). Nevertheless, some empirical studies have shown that positive associations between
public subsidies and farm technical efficiency may also exist (e.g. Hadley, 2006; Kumbhakar
and Lien, 2010). Even though these mixed results can be explained theoretically (Serra et al.,
2008; Zhu et al., 2010; Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010), a closer look at the existing literature on
the subsidy-efficiency link reveals the need for new research. First, given the absence of clear
conceptual guidance on how to incorporate subsidies in a production efficiency framework, there
exists a plethora of models in which the effect of subsidies on efficiency is often treated in an
ad hoc way (McCloud and Kumbhakar, 2008). Potentially, this may generate confusing results.
Thus, to avoid erroneous understanding on the subsidy-efficiency nexus, it is useful to assess
the consistency of the underlying empirical results reported in the literature. In particular,
it is important to examine whether the empirical ﬁndings are sensitive to the way subsidies
are modelled. Another issue of this literature is that it is almost exclusively based on a static
view of farmers’ production decisions. This gap has to be ﬁlled since agricultural production
decisions are dynamic in nature (Gardebroek and Oude Lansink, 2008; Serra et al., 2011a). To
our knowledge, the paper by Skevas et al. (2012) is the only paper which analyses the subsidy-
efficiency nexus in a dynamic framework. However, this paper uses a deterministic two-stage
DEA approach relying on a “separability condition” (Simar and Wilson, 2011), which states
that the input-output set is not inﬂuenced by public subsidies. This assumption is likely to be
very restrictive, since it is theoretically demonstrated that public subsidies may inﬂuence the
input-output space (see Hennessy, 1998; Serra et al., 2006).
The stream of literature that examines the impact of public subsidies on farmers’ behaviour via
their effect on farmers’ risk attitude concludes that decoupled payments may change farmers’
risk aversion through a wealth effect (by increasing farmers’ income) and an insurance effect (by
stabilising farmers’ income). In this respect, they could drive production decisions by reducing
farmers’ risk aversion to engage in risky production activities or by altering their choices in terms
of output production and input use. Based on a review of literature, Bhaskar and Beghin (2009)
mention that these effects are relatively small (see also Serra et al., 2011b). However, Just and
Kropp (2013) have theoretically and empirically demonstrated that, even in the absence of risk
aversion, decoupled payments are potentially production distorting in a similar magnitude as
production-related subsidies. Their idea is that since some farming activities are not eligible to
decoupled payment schemes, this may generate production distortions because farmers have no
incentives to respond to market signals if prices (or demand) for non-eligible products increase.
In other words, under the decoupled payment schemes, farmers are constrained to produce (if
they decide to produce) certain eligible commodities even if the latter are less proﬁtable than
non-eligible ones. These ﬁndings suggest that the impact of decoupling on farmers’ behaviour
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remains an open debate.
In the debate on the impact of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ production decisions, an area
that has received little attention is the multitasking nature of farming activities: in addition to
food production, farming activities are expected to ensure production of environmental services
to society. Although some studies support that adoption of environmentally friendly farming
practices could be driven by farmers’ environmental attitudes (environmental consciousness)
(Anderson, 1990; McCann et al., 1997; Guillem and Barnes, 2013; Karali et al., 2014), many
others report that ﬁnancial incentives also play a crucial role in determining farmers’ pro-
environmental behaviour (Gasson and Potter, 1988; Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1997;
Crabtree et al., 1998; Macdonald and Johnson, 2000; Wilson and Hart, 2000; Mann, 2003; Fish
et al., 2003; Kiptot et al., 2007; Karali et al., 2014). In a similar vein, Kollmuss and Agyeman
(2002) point out that even people with high environmental awareness tend to adopt low-cost
pro-environmental behaviours. This coincides with the idea of Espinoza-Goded et al. (2013)
who state that farmers are reluctant to follow pro-environmental behaviours given high ﬁxed
costs associated with them. Additionally, Mann (2003) and Karali et al. (2014) explain pro-
environmental behaviours of the vast majority of Swiss farmers by the fact that direct payments
allow farmers to cover the underlying costs. In turn, the thesis explores the extent to which
environmentally friendly farming practices could be driven by decoupled payments.
1.2 Objectives and research questions
The ﬁrst objective of the thesis is to improve the understanding on how public subsidies impact
farmers’ production decisions, with a speciﬁc attention on farm technical eﬃciency. As a
second objective, the thesis intends to investigate the potential effects of decoupled subsidies
on farmers’ provision of productive and environmental services. The thesis addresses three
speciﬁc research questions:
• Is there unambiguous evidence on the subsidy-efficiency nexus in the existing
empirical literature? if not, are there methodological aspects that can explain
the discrepancies?
The thesis aims at scrutinising the empirical literature that assesses the impact of public
subsidies on farm technical efficiency. The ﬁrst objective is to undertake a systematic
review of this literature to provide an overview of the effects reported and to identify the
different analytical approaches used. The second objective is to investigate the incidence
of analytical choices made by authors (such as the way subsidies are modelled, the type of
subsidy considered, the subsidy proxy used, the method employed to compute technical
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eﬃciency, the econometric strategy, and the geographical area covered by the study) on
the effect (positive, negative, or null) of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency. The
analyses allow us to derive stylised facts and to separate structural effects from method-
speciﬁc effects.
• Are there any gains in understanding the subsidy-efficiency nexus by moving
from static to dynamic modelling?
The thesis explores whether dynamic aspects associated with investment decisions im-
prove the understanding on how public subsidies impact farm technical efficiency.
• Does the multitasking nature of farming activities improve our understanding
of the effects of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ provision of productive and
environmental services?
Borrowing from the multitasking agency theory, we provide new theoretical and empirical
rationales for the possible incentive effect of decoupled subsidies.
1.3 Analytical approaches
Qualitative and quantitative approaches are used to answer the three research questions out-
lined above. For the ﬁrst question, a meta-regression analysis (MRA) approach is used. The
MRA is a quantitative method that allows synthesising and evaluating available evidence on
a particular research question, in an objective way (Stanley and Jarell, 1989; Becker and Wu,
2007; Borenstein et al., 2009). In essence, it is similar to the well-known regression techniques
in which an outcome variable is predicted according to a set of regressors. In MRA, the out-
come variable is the effect estimated by a set of primary studies on a given research question,
and the regressors are mainly the characteristics of the primary studies that may inﬂuence the
estimated effects (Thompson and Higgins, 2002). In other words, the MRA allows investigating
the extent to which heterogeneity of ﬁndings from multiple primary studies can be related to
the characteristics of these studies (Harbord and Higgins, 2008).
Concerning the second question, using insights from the well established stochastic frontier
approach (SFA) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Cuesta et al., 2009; Serra et al., 2011b), the
subsidy-efficiency nexus is examined using a dynamic stochastic frontier model and the static
counterpart of this model is used as a baseline for comparisons. The SFA allows estimating a
frontier of best production practices that envelop the data while assuming the existence of an
idiosyncratic error term. Speciﬁcally, the thesis develops a dynamic stochastic frontier model
that is an extension of the hyperbolic distance function introduced by Cuesta et al. (2009) in
which intertemporal production decisions are modelled through investment decisions. A similar
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approach has been used in Serra et al. (2011b) using a directional distance function. The main
difference between the directional distance function and the hyperbolic distance function is
that the latter is based on the multiplicative homogeneity property of Shephard’s (1953; 1970)
distance function, while the former is characterised by the translation property which is the
additive analogue of the multiplicative homogeneity property (see Färe et al., 2005; Cuesta and
Zofío, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2009, for more details). The stochastic frontier approach used in the
thesis models public subsidies neither as inputs nor as outputs, but as contextual drivers that
may inﬂuence the efficiency with which inputs are transformed into outputs.
As regards the last question, borrowing from the multitasking agency theory (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991), the thesis develops a theoretical model which is then empirically tested using
an extended version of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner, 1962; Rood-
man, 2011) and a structural model in line with Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Laukkanen and
Nauges (2014). As stated in Macdonald (1984), agency theory “focuses on utilisation of com-
pensation rules (incentives) with which one player, the Principal, seeks to motivate another, the
Agent, to choose his activities in a way advantageous to the Principal”. In contrast to the basic
agency theory which concentrates on the realisation of a single task, the multitasking agency
theory initiated by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) assumes that either the Principal has sev-
eral different tasks for the Agent to perform, or that the Agent’s main task is multidimensional.
In this case, when effort on one task raises the cost of effort on other tasks, the Agent will focus
his effort on measurable and compensated tasks at the expense of others. This situation raises
the problem of multitasking which refers to a challenge for the Principal to design incentive
systems that allow avoiding this kind of substitution between tasks. The multitasking issue
could appear in agricultural production decisions. Farmers are expected to produce ecologically
sound outputs and ecosystem services. Therefore, if farmers are paid for a given measurable
environmental service, they would neglect the other services or the production of ecologically
sound outputs depending on the costs to produce them.
The theoretical model developed in the thesis highlights that a mixed payment system (with
more decoupled subsidies) could reduce the multitasking issue in farming activities. In this
model, the Principal is a social planner (the government), that gives some incentives to an Agent
(the farmer) to choose some speciﬁc ecosystem services (production or environmental services)
through a contract. The Principal is assumed to maximise a social welfare function. The Agent
(the farmer) is assumed to maximise a strictly concave and continuously differentiable utility
function where the arguments are the proﬁt generated by the production process, the subsidies,
and a parameter that captures farmer’s benevolence. In this model, we derive some testable
propositions on the optimal compensation scheme in the contract (subsidies structures, i.e.
coupled and decoupled) and the farmer choice regarding the different ecosystem services at the
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farm level. To test the theoretical model, an extended SUR model is used (see Roodman, 2011).
This model accounts for continuous, dichotomic and polytomic decision variables. Additionally,
some aspects of the theoretical model are empirically tested using a structural model in line
with Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Laukkanen and Nauges (2014).
1.4 Data used
For the meta-regression analysis, data collected from a systematic review of studies assessing
the relationship between public subsidies and technical eﬃciency in the agricultural sector,
were used. The search of papers on this issue was conducted ﬁrst through the main compu-
terised databases such as Econlit, Web of Science (WoS), Web of Knowledge (WoK), JSTOR,
Econpapers, Science Direct, RepEc (IDEAS) and Google Scholar, combining in several search
formulae the following keywords: ‘subsidies’ or ‘support’, alone or with ‘public’, ‘government’,
‘CAP’, ‘Single Farm Payment’, ‘pillar 1’, ‘pillar 2’, ‘agricultural’, ‘EU’, or ‘farm bill’; together
with ‘eﬃciency’, technical eﬃciency’, ‘economic eﬃciency’, ‘farm eﬃciency’, ‘productive eﬃ-
ciency’, ‘farm performance’ or ‘economic performance’. This literature search was completed
by exploring the reference lists of the papers obtained through the ﬁrst search. Published and
unpublished studies is included in the meta-analysis if they provided suﬃcient information on
the data used, the estimated effect, and their analytical method. The basic dataset contained
195 observations (that is, 195 distinct results about the effect of subsidies) extracted from a set
of 68 studies which were carried out during the period 1986 to 2014.
Regarding the other empirical applications, accounting data of a sample of farmers in the French
region Meuse is used. This region is located in north-west France in the main administrative
region of Lorraine. The original dataset available covers the period from 1992 to 2011 and
contains 12,455 (farm-year) observations. These data concern farmers who have voluntarily
enrolled in a regional accounting office so as to be guided in their management practices. The
Meuse data are very similar to FADN data; in fact, they are used to produce FADN1 data,
but they are a bit more detailed than FADN data (they contain a few more variables). This
database mainly contains information on farm production structure, farm ﬁnancial results, and
agricultural subsidies. This includes utilised agricultural area, labour, intermediate inputs,
capital and investments, crop production, and livestock production. Similarly to all farms in
France and in the EU, the sampled farms received subsidies from the EU Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Farms were entitled to receive subsidies that took various forms: (i) Single Farm
Payments (SFP) which are lump-sum subsidies per hectare of land used whatever the type of
production on this land, even if there is no production, on the condition that the farmer complies
1The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is a widely-used dataset for evaluating farming activities
in the European Union and the impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy
23
with environmental cross compliance requirements; (ii) subsidies coupled to production, in the
way that the farm receives direct payments for every hectare of a speciﬁc crop (e.g. wheat) and
every head of a speciﬁc livestock (e.g. beef cattle); (iii) agri-environmental subsidies received
for voluntary implementation of agri-environmental friendly practices on the farm (i.e. AES);
(iv) investment subsidies; (v) lump-sum subsidies as a compensation for being located in a less
favourable area.
1.5 Main contributions
The main contributions of the thesis to the existing literature are threefold.
• From a methodological point of view, the thesis draws recommendations that could be
helpful in further studies on farm technical eﬃciency and subsidies. For example, the
thesis recommends that investigating the effect of subsidies on farmers’ technical efficiency
should rely on a careful modelling of subsidies. The meta-regression analysis shows that
when subsidies are modelled as outputs, a positive subsidy-efficiency nexus is commonly
found. This positive association is potentially erroneous because modelling subsidies
as outputs artiﬁcially inﬂates the value of total outputs, while there is no corresponding
change in input use. Additionally, it shows that when subsidies are proxied by the subsidy
rate (i.e., the ratio between the total subsidies received by farmers and farm revenue or
farm output in values) the subsidy-efficiency nexus is commonly negative. This approach
may also lead to misleading results because it corresponds, in a sense, to the regression of
a given variable on its inverse, since the variable generally used as output in the subsidy-
efficiency analysis is farm revenue.
• From an empirical point of view, the thesis highlights that, in comparison with the dy-
namic framework, the commonly used static framework overestimates the marginal effects
of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency. This ﬁnding may be interesting for policy
makers, since it reveals that the (negative) impact of public subsidies on technical effi-
ciency is smaller when dynamic aspects are taken into account. However, even though the
estimated effects are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, the underlying marginal effects estimated
are negligible. This suggests that the marginal effects of the subsidies on farm technical
efficiency should be calculated, instead of interpreting only the sign and the signiﬁcance
of the effects, which is a common practice in the existing empirical literature.
• From a theoretical perspective, the thesis provides new rationale for the potential effects
of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ provision of productive and environmental services.
Particularly, by considering the multitasking nature of farming activities, it shows that
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subsidising farmers with decoupled payments could raise their incentives to provide en-
vironmental services and ecologically sound production. In a sense, this result suggests
that the technical eﬃciency framework, which generally indicates that public subsidies are
detrimental to the agricultural sector’s performance, could mask some interesting virtues
of the decoupled payments.
1.6 Outline
The thesis is organised into six chapters including this general introductory chapter and a
concluding chapter. The thesis is a compilation of four articles presented in chapter form.
Chapter 2 provides a succinct formal review of the mechanisms through which decoupled
subsidies inﬂuence farmers’ production decisions and discusses their implementation in applied
production analysis. Chapter 3 presents a meta-regression analysis of the empirical ﬁndings
reported in the literature on the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus. Chapter 4 examines the implications
of a dynamic framework for analysing the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus, by developing and estimating
a dynamic stochastic frontier model in addition to the static counterpart. In chapter 5 the
thesis develops and tests a theoretical model based on the multitasking agency theory in order
to investigate the role of decoupled subsidies on the provision of environmental services. The
last chapter draws some concluding comments, along with a summary of the main ﬁndings of
the thesis, the limits and some suggestions for further research.
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Chapter 2
Coupled subsidies, production decisions,
and productive efficiency: A synthetic
theoretical and methodological review
2.1 Introduction
To avoid production distortions due to coupled subsidies, decoupled payments have become one
of the key instruments of recent agricultural policies, since they have been presented as produc-
tion neutral supports. However, based on the intuition that any agricultural policy instrument
may inﬂuence farmer’s behaviour (Cahill, 1997), the neutrality of the decoupled payments is
being questioned. Consequently, a growing body of literature explores the mechanisms through
which decoupled payments may impact production decisions. Theoretically, identiﬁed mech-
anisms can be grouped under four categories, namely, risk-related effects when farmers have
non-neutral risk preferences and face uncertainty related to output and/or prices, static ef-
fects under liquidity constraints, dynamic effects related to investment decisions, and effects
related to labour decisions (allocation of family labour to off-farm activities) (Antón, 2001).
This chapter intends to provide a succinct formal review of these mechanisms and discuss their
implementation in applied production analysis. The appealing feature of the chapter is that it
jointly treats the theoretical and the empirical literature on subsidisation-production decisions
nexus. Thus it contributes to a global understanding of the inﬂuence of decoupled subsidies
on production decisions. Its theoretical part is built mainly on the paper by Moro and Sckokai
(2013), but it describes some mathematical aspects more explicitly.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the theoretical models.
Section 2.3 presents the empirical models. Section 2.4 draws some concluding remarks.
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2.2 Theoretical models
2.2.1 Risk-related effects
Agricultural production is a risky process, since production decisions are subject to market
risk due to price volatility and production risk due to unforeseen weather conditions. Thus
agricultural price can be represented as
⇠
p ⇠
(
p, σ2p
)
and output production can be seen as
⇠
y ⇠
(
y, σ2y
)
, where the variances
(
σ2y , σ
2
p
)
are indicators of riskiness. A risk neutral producer
abstracts from price and output volatility. Hence, under risk neutrality and decoupled pay-
ments, production theory assumes that producers act to maximise their expected proﬁt given
the existing production technology:
max
x
pi = py − wx+ S
s.t (x, l, y) 2 T
(2.1)
where pi denotes expected proﬁt; p stands for mean output price, y is the mean output, x is a
vector of variable inputs with related prices w, l are ﬁxed or quasi-ﬁxed inputs, S denotes the
amount of decoupled payments received, and T stands for the existing production technology.
The production technology is represented by a production function y = f (x; l). For each
variable input j, the ﬁrst order condition (FOC) is as follows:
∂f
∂xj
=
wj
p
(2.2)
Expression [2.2] indicates that the risk neutral farmer chooses the set of inputs x that maximises
his expected proﬁt, such that the value of the input marginal productivity
⇣
p ∂f
∂xj
⌘
is equal to the
input price (wj). Hence under this framework, input choice and thus production choice is not
inﬂuenced by decoupled payments. However, the explanatory power of the previous framework
is quite limited, since studies on producers’ attitude toward risk have generally found that
farmers are risk-averse (See Makki et al., 2004, for a comprehensive discussion).
If farmers have non-neutral risk preferences U, they maximise the expected utility of their
proﬁt given the existing production technology. In the presence of uncertainty, the predom-
inant approach to representing production technologies is the stochastic production function
introduced by Just and Pope (1978; 1979): y = f (x; l) + g (x; l) ξ, with ξ ⇠ N (0, 1). In
the Just-Pope formulation, the ﬁrst component f (.) is the mean production function and the
second component g (.) is the output variance function. The output variability is assumed to
depend on input use. Here we abstract from market risk, since as pointed out by Pope and
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Kramer (1979), for many sectors of an economy (particularly those involving biological growth)
production risk may overcome market risk. Hence, the risk-averse producer’s problem in the
presence of uncertainty is given by:
max
x
E [U (pi)] = max
x
E [U (py − wx+ S)] (2.3)
= max
x
E [U (pf (x, l) + pg (x; l) ξ − wx+ S)]
Where U is a proper von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (Moro and Sckokai, 2013).
Using the chain rule, the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) associated with the optimal choice of
inputs is given by:
E

U
0
(pi)⇥ p
∂f (.)
∂xj
+ p
∂g (.)
∂xj
ξ − w
]
= 0 (2.4)
Taking the expectations and then dividing by E
⇥
U
0
(pi)
⇤
, the FOCs in [2.4] becomes:
∂f (.)
∂xk
=
wk
p
−
∂g (.)
∂xj
⇥
E
⇥
U
0
(pi) ξ
⇤
E [U 0 (pi)]
(2.5)
=
wk
p
− θ (.)
∂g (.)
∂xj
Where θ (p, w, S) =
E
h
U
0
(pi)ξ
i
E[U 0 (pi)]
is an additional term in the FOCs which represents the risk
attitude of the producer and thus captures the impact of risk on the optimal choice of inputs.
Consequently, denoting α = (w, p, σy, S) the vector of the parameters of the input choice
x = x (α), the FOCs can be seen as an implicit function, and can be rewritten as follows:
ψj (x (α) ;α) =
∂f
∂xj
=
wj
p
− θ (.)
∂g (.)
∂xj
(2.6)
Expression [2.6] indicates that the input marginal productivity is an implicit function of input
prices w, output price p, output variability σy, and decoupled subsidies S. The impact of
α = (w, p, σy, S) on input use is given by totally differentiating expression [2.6] with respect to
α = (w, p, σy, S):
∂ψ
∂α
+
∂ψ
∂x
⇥
∂x
∂α
= 0 (2.7)
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This implies that ∂x
∂α
= −
(
∂ψ
∂x
)−1 (∂ψ
∂α
)
, where ψ is the vector of the j FOCs, and ∂ψ
∂x
denotes the
Hessian matrix of the optimisation problem and it is thus negative. It follows that the effect
of decoupled subsidies on input use is given by:
∂x
∂S
=
✓
∂ψ
∂x
◆
−1✓
∂ψ
∂S
◆
(2.8)
Expression [2.8] highlights that decoupled subsidies may impact input use. However, from this
expression it is difficult to draw expectations on the sign of the impact, since it depends on the
magnitude of the risk-aversion, the risk-input nexus, and the signs of the non-diagonal elements
of the Hessian matrix (interaction of input uses). That is why the theoretical literature uses a
simpliﬁed framework of one input and one output to conduct the comparative statics (see Serra
et al., 2006). In this line, for univariate framework the sign of ∂x
∂S
depends mainly on the sign
of ∂ψ
∂S
, since ∂ψ
∂x
< 0. Using the chain rule from expression [2.6], ∂ψ
∂S
is given by:
∂ψ
∂S
= −
∂θ
∂pi
⇥
∂pi
∂S
⇥
∂g
∂x
(2.9)
From expression [2.9], it follows that ∂x
∂S
< (>) [=] 0 under DARA(IARA)[CARA]1 preferences
for a risk-increasing input. Likewise, for a risk-reducing input ∂x
∂S
> (<) [=] 0DARA(IARA)[CARA]
preferences. Notice that considering both market and production risk and assuming cov (p, y) =
0, Serra et al. (2006) found that for a risk-reducing input the impact of decoupled subsidies is
ambiguous. One should also notice that the assumption cov (p, y) = 0 may not hold in market
equilibrium. Thus, as in Hennessy (1998), one can conclude that decoupled payments are not
production neutral. In the presence of uncertain production conditions, they inﬂuence produc-
tion decisions of a risk-averse farmer by inducing wealth effect or insurance effect. The wealth
effect holds under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences. That is, under DARA
preferences, decoupled subsidies impact production decisions by increasing farmers’ wealth and
thus by decreasing their absolute risk-aversion coefficient. The insurance effect holds under con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences. That is, under CARA preferences, decoupled
subsidies inﬂuence production decisions in the sense that they reduce income variability.
2.2.2 Static effects under liquidity constraints
In the static context, decoupled payments may inﬂuence production decisions through a liquid-
ity effect, even in the absence of risk aversion. This is an important channel to theoretically
1DARA: decreasing absolute risk aversion; CARA: constant absolute risk aversion; IARA: Increasing abso-
lute risk aversion
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understand how decoupled subsidies impact production decisions, given that farmers often face
binding credit constraints (Lee and Chambers, 1986; Swinnen and Gow, 1999; Blancard et
al., 2006; Latruffe et al., 2010) and that decoupled payments may induce a relaxation of such
constraints (Vercammen, 2007; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). Ciaian and
Swinnen (2009) argue that if decoupled subsidies are received at the beginning of the growing
season, they can be used directly to pay for variable inputs; but if they are received at the
end of the season, they can serve as collateral for short-term credits at the beginning of the
growing season. Formally, the static effects of decoupling without risk aversion can be analysing
using the expenditure-constrained proﬁt-maximisation model developed by Lee and Chambers
(1986) and extended by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009). Alternatively, this can be also analysed
using the indirect production function approach which describes output maximisation given
the existing technology and the available budget for purchasing variable inputs (Kumbhakar
and Bokusheva, 2009). Under the expenditure-constrained proﬁt-maximisation framework, the
producer problem can be expressed as follows:
max
x
pi = py − wx : wx = E, (x, l, y) 2 T (2.10)
where wx = E denotes the binding expenditure constraint faced by the producer, with E the
budget available for purchasing variable inputs. The production technology is represented by
a production function y = f (x; l). From expression [2.10], the ﬁrst order conditions for the
variable inputs x are given by: p∂f
∂x
= (1 + λ)w, where λ > 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier.
Consequently, it follows that the value of the marginal productivity of the variable inputs is
higher than their marginal prices. This implies that producers can increase input use to increase
their production and thus increase their proﬁt. However, if producers face binding expenditure
constraints and the credit market is imperfect, they do not have the possibility to use the
optimal quantity of inputs. Hence, in the presence of decoupled subsidies, which can directly
or indirectly serve to alleviate credit constraints (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009), the producer
problem becomes:
max
x
pi = py − wx+ S : wx = E + ρS (2.11)
where ρ 2]0, 1] indicates the extent to which decoupled subsidies are used to remove or reduce
credit constraints. The Lagrangian for the problem is given by:
L = py − wx+ S + λ (E + ρS − wx) = pf (x, l)− wx+ S + λ (E + ρS − wx) (2.12)
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The FOCs are given by:
∂L
∂x
= p
∂f (.)
∂x
− w − λw = 0 (2.13)
∂L
∂λ
= E + ρS − wx = 0
Solving the FOCs [2.13], the use of the inputs can be written as a function of the exogenous
variables:
x⇤ = x (E, S, p, w) (2.14)
Expression [2.14] indicates that decoupled subsidies may inﬂuence input use, even in the absence
of risk aversion.
2.2.3 Dynamic effects through investment decisions
Given the stochastic and dynamic nature of the agricultural production process, it may be use-
ful to examine the inﬂuence of decoupled payments on production decisions using a stochastic
dynamic analytical framework. The stochastic dynamic framework is suitable, since it accounts
for intertemporal choices, or for the link between current production decisions and future pro-
duction possibilities. Intuitively, in a long-run perspective, decoupled subsidies may inﬂuence
farmers’ production decisions by impacting their capacity to invest or to adopt innovations
(Hennessy, 1998; Sckokai and Moro, 2009). In this line, dynamic effects of decoupled payments
on production decisions are commonly investigated through investment decisions. Considering
the dual model of investment developed by Sckokai (2005), the intertemporal problem of a pro-
ducer who maximises his discounted utility over an inﬁnite horizon, under equation of motion
for capital is given by:
J
(
r, pi0, p¯, w, c, S, σ
2
pi, k
)
= max
I,x,y
1ˆ
0
e−rtU
(
pi, σ2pi
)
s.t.
.
k = (I − δk) (2.15)
where U (.) denotes the farmer’s utility function; its arguments are the farm’s wealth pi =
pi0 + py − wx − ck + S and its variance σ2pi which accounts for production and market risks.
While r is the discount rate; k is the units of capital stock;
.
k denotes the derivative of capital
path with respect to time; I stands for the gross investment in capital; and δ represents the
depreciation rate of the capital. Regarding the deﬁnition of the farm’s wealth, pi0 represents the
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initial wealth; c is the rental price of the capital; S stands for the decoupled payments; and y
represents the output produced. The output production function is given by: y = f (x, k, I)+ξ,
where ξ is the usual idiosyncratic error term. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
associated to the optimisation programme [2.15] can be stated as follows:
rJ (.) = max
I,x,y
{U (.) + Jk (I − δk)} (2.16)
where Jk stands for the ﬁrst derivative of J with respect to capital. The ﬁrst derivatives of the
HJB equation with respect to output and input prices yield the following system of equations
for respectively investment demand, output supply, and variable input demand:
.
k (r, pi0, p¯, w, c, S, σ
2
pi, k)
y (r, pi0, p¯, w, c, S, σ
2
pi, k)
x (r, pi0, p¯, w, c, S, σ
2
pi, k)
(2.17)
Expression [2.17] shows that, in a long-run perspective, investment and production decisions
are inﬂuenced by decoupled payments.
2.2.4 Potential effects on labour decisions
Given its wealth effect, public subsidies (mainly decoupled subsidies) may also inﬂuence farmers’
labour decisions. A comprehensive literature review on this issue can be found in Dupraz and
Latruffe (2015). But here, brieﬂy, we can mention that:
• Agricultural subsidies can make farming more proﬁtable than off-farm activities of farm-
ers. In this sense, they may allow preserving or increasing the working time allocated to
agricultural activities. This effect is predicted mainly for coupled subsidies (El-Osta et al.,
2004; Ahearn et al., 2006). In turn, the decoupled subsidies should, a priori, reduce farm
work in favour of leisure, because they increase the income of farm households without
requiring production activities (El-Osta et al., 2004). However, it must be noticed that
empirical results are rather mixed (Ahearn et al., 2006; Mattas et al., 2008; Petrick and
Zier, 2011; Dupraz et Latruffe, 2015).
• The effect on technical efficiency is ambiguous. Family labour that would be allocated to
off-farm activities could be replaced by hired labour that could be paid through public
subsidies, and the technical efficiency would thus not change. However technical efficiency
would be reduced if hired labour is not as efficient as family labour; this may occur
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because, as indicated in Dupraz and Latruffe (2015), family labour and hired labour are
not necessarily substitutes. Family labour is allocated essentially to management tasks
while hired labour is rather allocated to technical tasks.
2.3 Empirical models
From an empirical point of view, the analysis of the impact of decoupling on production process
is a challenging task, since there is no uniﬁed framework on this issue (Moro and Sckokai,
2013). A number of different approaches have been proposed. These approaches include several
partial and general equilibrium models (Burﬁsher et al., 2000; Roe et al., 2002; Gohin, 2006),
linear programming setup (Breen et al., 2005; Shrestha et al., 2007), and several econometric
frameworks (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005; Serra et al., 2005; Sckokai and Moro, 2006; McCloud
and Kumbhakar, 2008; Kallas et al., 2012; Mary, 2013; Rizov et al., 2013). Regarding the
theoretical framework reviewed in the previous section (which is mainly at farm level), Moro
and Sckokai (2013) argue that the econometric approaches are suitable. Hence, here we consider
the econometric approaches by emphasising the modelling of production decisions under the
conventional production theory and under the productivity and efficiency framework.
2.3.1 Production decisions modelling under traditional production
theory
The conventional production theory assumes that producers are successful optimisers. Also,
assuming that producer’s input use decisions result from an optimisation programme, in the
static context the impact of decoupled subsidies on the production process is commonly invest-
igated (i) indirectly through the estimation of the farmer’s risk-aversion coefficient (Hennessy,
1998; Koundouri et al., 2009), (ii) directly by using regression techniques to relate decoupled
payments to crop acreage decisions, land acquisition, farmers’ labour-leisure decisions, value
of farm’s outcome, ﬁnancial structure and other farm’s characteristics (Adams et al., 2001;
Dewbre and Mishra, 2002; El-Ostra et al., 2004; Goodwin and Mishra, 2005; Girante et al.,
2008; Key and Roberts, 2009; O’Donoghue and Whitaker,2010; Weber and Key, 2012), and
(iii) by estimating elasticity of production and input use with respect to decoupled subsidies
using structural equation models (Serra et al., 2005; Serra et al., 2006; Serra et al., 2011). In
the dynamic context, the impact of decoupled subsidies on output, producer’s input use de-
cisions and investment decisions, is investigated using dynamic systems of structurally related
equations (Coyle, 2005; Vercammen, 2007; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Serra et al., 2009; Kallas
et al., 2012).
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2.3.2 Production decisions modelling using productivity and
efficiency framework
Based on the fact that producers are not always successful optimisers, another stream of lit-
erature investigates the impact of subsidies on farm production through its effects on farm
productivity and efficiency. In this stream of literature, subsidies are treated mainly as con-
textual drivers, that is as factors which are neither input nor output but that form part of the
backdrop of production decisions. Nonetheless, given the absence of clear theoretical guidance
on how to model contextual drivers, some empirical studies model the effects of subsidies in an
ad hoc fashion (McCloud and Kumbhakar, 2008). The most commonly used frameworks in the
existing empirical literature include the parametric Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and
the nonparametric two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
In the SFA framework the relationship between public subsidies and efficiency is examined
by estimating a frontier of best production practices while assuming that deviations from this
frontier may not be entirely under the control of the decision-makers. This approach supposes
the existence of a convoluted error term which can be split into an idiosyncratic error and non-
negative error reﬂecting technical inefficiency. In this framework, the impact of public subsidies
on farm technical efficiency is estimated by specifying a likelihood function which accounts for
the dependence of the inefficiency component on subsidies (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The
potential drawback of this framework is that the estimation relies heavily on the choice of
functional forms for the frontier as well as speciﬁc distributional assumptions for the inefficiency
component (Kumbhakar et al., 2007). In the two-stage DEA approach, efficiency scores are
estimated in the ﬁrst stage without accounting for subsidy effects and then these scores are
regressed on subsidies in the second stage. This approach is troublesome since it relies on a
“separability assumption” which states that the input-output set is not inﬂuenced by subsidies
(Daraio and Simar, 2007; Simar and Wilson, 2011). On this basis, it contrasts with theoretical
studies which state that subsidies may inﬂuence the input-output space (see Hennessy, 1998;
Serra et al., 2006). This implies that the two-stage DEA setting leads to the problem of omitting
variables in the ﬁrst stage, and thus in the second stage the disturbance terms are correlated
with the regressors. To address this issue, the conditional efficiency framework (Daraio and
Simar, 2007; Simar and Wilson, 2011; De Witte and Kortelainen, 2013) could be used.
Regarding the theoretical framework reviewed above and following Morroni (2006) who indic-
ates that environmental conditions (contextual drivers) can be seen, among others, as individual
capabilities, degree of uncertainty, equipment availability, institutional and market conditions,
it follows that the conditional efficiency framework (Daraio and Simar, 2007; De Witte and
Kortelainen, 2013) is a suitable setup for analysing the impact of decoupled payments on farm
productive efficiency. The conditional efficiency framework is in line with expressions [2.5] and
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[2.14], since it allows accounting for the inﬂuence of public subsidies on production decisions
without treating them as input or as output. More speciﬁcally, this framework explicitly as-
sumes that public subsidies may inﬂuence the choice and the level of input use (Minviel and
De Witte, 2015a).
To account for the fact that subsidies may inﬂuence the input-output space, alternative mod-
elling frameworks treat subsidies as input (e.g. Kroupová and Malý, 2010; Malá et al., 2010;
Trnková et al., 2012) or as output (e.g. Rasmussen, 2010; Silva and Marote, 2013). In some
papers that treat subsidies as output there is no explicit justiﬁcation (e.g., Silva et al., 2004;
Hadley, 2006). However, in Rasmussen (2011) there are the following arguments : “If a farmer
buys one hectare of land with the sole purpose of generating subsidy in the form of single
payment, these subsidies have to be considered as a product (an output) in line with other
products like grain, meat or milk. The reason is that if we consider an additional hectare of
land without any change in production, then we will say that productivity decreases. This
result is wrong from the point of view of the farmer, because for him the additional hectare
of land generates outputs in the form of subsidy”. If this argument is true, only a part of the
subsidies should be considered as output. Another argument is that the subsidies are used as
proxy for non-market output produced by farms (e.g. Jan et al., 2012 ; Mamardashvili and
Schmid, 2013). Another justiﬁcation used for modelling subsidies as output is that they are like
additional incomes for farmers (e.g. Soares et al., 2002 ; Banga, 2014). An economic argument
against the modelling of subsidies as output is that they are not an output generated by the
classic agricultural production technology. In papers where subsidies are modelled as inputs,
it is argued that subsidies are used as explanatory drivers, in order to analyse their direct
inﬂuence on output. Notice that this approach goes against the basic microeconomic theory of
the producer, according to which the production function includes only inputs actually used in
a technological process.
It must be stressed that from a methodological standpoint, treating subsidies as input or as
output may create a modelling artefact. On the one hand, when subsidies are modelled as
output they artiﬁcially inﬂate output production and tend to erroneously provide positive
subsidy-eﬃciency nexus (Minviel and Latruffe, 2014). On the other hand, subsidies should not
be modelled as input, since the theoretical framework reviewed above does not treat subsidies as
input. Additionally, as stated by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) and Latruffe and Minviel (2014),
decoupled subsidies are generally used to purchase parts of conventional inputs (land, labour,
capital, intermediate inputs) included in the efficiency model. Thus modelling subsidies as
input results in double counting.
Another approach, which could be linked to expression [2.6], is the framework proposed by
Sipiläinen and Kumbhakar (2008) and McCloud and Kumbhakar (2008). In this framework,
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subsidies are modelled as facilitating inputs, i.e., as factors that may alter marginal productiv-
ity of conventional inputs (e.g. labour, capital). The concept of facilitating input has been
introduced by Guan et al. (2006) and is deﬁned as factors “ which help to create favourable
growing conditions in preparing land, sowing and planting, applying fertilisers, harvesting”. In
a similar vein, Henderson and Parmeter (2015) employ the concept of “conditioning variables”.
The argument used to model subsidies as facilitating inputs is that “they may have technological
effects. In fact, they could inﬂuence the actual production technology by affecting the response
rates and the shapes of isoquants. For example, input speciﬁc productivity may decrease or
increase if the input is used less or more effectively. Consequently, they inﬂuence indirectly the
output by changing the marginal productivity of inputs (as they inﬂuence their use)”. As in the
case of estimating a complete system of structural equations, treating decoupled subsidies as
facilitating inputs allows modelling producers’ behaviour as well as the technology available to
them. In this view and regarding expressions [2.5] and [2.14], not only subsidies but also prices
should be treated as facilitating inputs. Except for Bokusheva et al. (2012) and Minviel and
De Witte (2015b), the approach treating subsidies as facilitating inputs has not been followed
in the literature. One possible reason may be that it departs from the basic microeconomic
production theory. Indeed, we learned from basic microeconomics that output is only function
of inputs.
In line with expression [2.17] and based on the fact that producers are not always successful
optimisers, another promising avenue is to examine the impact of decoupled subsidies on pro-
ductive efficiency using a stochastic dynamic framework. As previously stated, a stochastic
dynamic framework may allow accounting for intertemporal production decisions.
As mentioned above, another stream of literature investigates the impact of decoupled subsidies
on production activity through its impact on the total factor productivity (TFP). To do so,
two mainstream approaches are used. The ﬁrst approach uses a two-step procedure, which
consists in estimating the TFP in the ﬁrst step using DEA, SFA, or the Olley and Pakes
(1996) production setup without accounting for subsidy effects, and then the estimated TFP is
regressed on decoupled subsidies and other potential determinants (Guan and Oude Lansink,
2006; Kazukauskas et al., 2010; Mary, 2013). This two-step procedure is potentially biased due
to omitted variable issue in the ﬁrst step. The second approach is a modiﬁed version of the
Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity framework, which explicitly accounts for subsidy effects in
the ﬁrst step, then in the second step a simple correlation analysis is sufficient (see Rizov et al.,
2013). Likewise, a modiﬁed version of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) production setting can
be used (see Kazukauskas et al., 2014). Similarly, the framework of Wooldridge (2009) can also
be modiﬁed to examine the impact of decoupled payments on farm aggregated productivity.
Importantly, the framework proposed by Wooldridge (2009) is built upon shortcomings of the
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Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin framework (see Ackerberg et al., 2006; Ackerberg et al.,
2007).
Productivity is often estimated as Solow’s (1957) residual, i.e., as the gap between observed
output and output predicted by ordinary least squares estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production
function. By so doing, a simultaneity issue arises because of potential correlations between input
quantities and productivity shocks which are observable or predictable by farmers but not by
econometricians. In fact, farmers could respond to positive productivity shocks (e.g. high
quality of land or expected rainfall) by using more inputs to expand their outputs. Likewise,
they could respond to negative productivity shocks by using less inputs. Olley and Pakes (1996)
introduce an estimator that uses investments as proxies for unobservable productivity shocks.
More precisely, they assumed that demand for investments is a strictly increasing function
of the productivity shocks and capital stock; in turn, they suggest to invert this function to
express the productivity shocks as an unknown function of investments and capital. The Olley-
Pakes estimator is a two-step procedure where coeﬃcients for variable inputs are estimated in
the ﬁrst step, and the coeﬃcient on capital is estimated in the second step. Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) propose a modiﬁed version of the Olley-Pakes estimator, that uses intermediate
inputs as proxies, to circumvent the issue of discontinuous investments. However, Ackerberg
et al. (2006) and Ackerberg et al. (2007) show that variable inputs (such as labour) are
also function of the productivity shocks. Consequently, their underlying parameters cannot be
correctly identiﬁed because of collinearity issues. In addition, Wooldridge (2009) argue that
the two-step estimators are ineﬃcient for two reasons: (i) they do not account for correlations
in the errors across equations, and (ii) they do not eﬃciently account for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity in the errors. To address theses issues, Wooldridge (2009) propose a GMM
(generalised method of moments) single step estimator.
2.3.3 Decoupled payments and productive efficiency under risk and
uncertainty
In the empirical literature two main frameworks are available for analysing productive eﬃciency
under risk and uncertainty. The ﬁrst one is an extension of the Just-Pope production risk model
to account for technical eﬃciency and producers’ attitude toward risk (Battese et al., 1997;
Kumbhakar, 2002). The second framework relies on the state-contingent production theory
(Chambers and Quiggin, 2000; O’Donnell et al., 2010; Nauges et al., 2011; Chambers et al.,
2015).
Battese et al. (1997) and Kumbhakar (2002) extend the Just-Pope production function for
integrating technical eﬃciency. However, the extension suggested by Kumbhakar (2002) is
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more ﬂexible since it allows explaining technical eﬃciency. The formulation of Kumbhakar
(2002) can be expressed as follows:
y = f (x; β) + g (x;α) ν − h (z; γ) u (2.18)
where y is the observed output quantities; x is a vector of inputs; f (.) is the mean production
function (frontier); g (.) denotes the output variability function; ν ⇠ N (0, 1) is a homoskedastic
error term representing production uncertainty; u ⇠ N+ (µ, σ2u) is a non-negative error term
capturing technical ineﬃciency; h (.) is a scaling function for u; and β, α and γ are unknown
parameters to be estimated. The mean function f (.) describes the maximal attainable produc-
tion for a given input level, the variance function g (.) captures the relationship between inputs
and output variability, and the scaling function incorporates technical ineﬃciency determinants.
The variable z stands for decoupled payments as well as other contextual drivers. More import-
antly, expression [2.18] can be very useful for capturing complementarity and substitutability
between input use and subsidies if the input vector x is included into h (.). The functions f (.),
g (.), and h (.) can be estimated simultaneously by maximising the log-likelihood function of
expression [2.18]. Interestingly, expression [2.18] is equivalent to the well-known heteroskedastic
stochastic frontier (Wang, 2002; Jaenicke et al., 2003; Hadri et al., 2003).
In contrast to the traditional stochastic representation of production technologies in which
uncertainty is confounded with statistical noises (O’Donnell et al., 2010), the state-contingent
production theory explicitly models uncertain production conditions through a set of states of
nature. In the context of eﬃciency measurement, this may facilitate differentiating inefficiency
from effects due to heterogeneous production environments (Chambers et al., 2015). In this line,
following Chambers et al. (2015), De Witte and Kortelainen (2013) and Daraio et al. (2007),
one can subsume the state-contingent approach and the robust conditional efficiency setting
to investigate the subsidy-efficiency nexus. In addition, under the state-contingent production
theory, the impact of decoupled payments on farm’s productive efficiency can be investigated
using a nonparametric structural setting. That is, one can estimate the stochastic production
frontier using nonparametric instrumental variables (NPIV) method by allowing for a normal-
half normal convoluted error term and by using subsidies as instrument and as determinant of
technical inefficiency.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In the jargon of the World Trade Organization (WTO), decoupled payments have been concep-
tualised as green-box subsidies, i.e., as government payments that are production neutral and
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thus preclude trade distortion of agricultural markets. From basic microeconomic theory, farm-
ers’ decisions about what and how to produce depend on the returns and the costs of producing
additional units (marginal returns and marginal costs). On this basis, although decoupled sub-
sidies raise farm total revenues, they could not inﬂuence farmers’ production decisions since
they do not change per-unit net returns of production. However, based on advanced theoret-
ical reasoning, various mechanisms through which decoupled subsidies may impact production
decisions have been identiﬁed. This chapter reviews these mechanisms. It underlines that de-
coupled subsidies are production neutral only if producers do not face binding credit constraints
and/or are risk neutral. In fact, the review shows that the main mechanisms through which
decoupled subsidies could impact production decisions include a wealth and an insurance effect
which may involve (i) risk-related effects when farmers have non-neutral risk preferences and
face uncertainty related to output and/or prices, (ii) static effects under liquidity constraints,
(iii) dynamics effect related to investment decisions, and (iv) effects related to labour decisions
(allocation of family labour to off-farm activities).
Empirically, these effects could be analysed using partial and general equilibrium models, math-
ematical programming methods, and econometric techniques. However, methodologically, the
econometric approaches seem to be suitable given their ability to account for incentive effects
generated by decoupled payments at farm-level. Hence, if farmers are assumed to operate un-
der the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs), the impact of decoupled payments on their production
decisions can be analysed by jointly estimating a system of structurally related equations of de-
cisions (output supply and input use). In the same vein, using standard regression techniques,
decoupled payments can be related to crop acreage decisions, land acquisition, and farmers’
labour-leisure decisions. These investigations can be done in static as well as in dynamic frame-
works.
However, relaxing the assumption that all producers operate under the FOCs, the inﬂuence
of decoupled payments on production activities can be examined using structural productivity
models, parametric productive efficiency models, and conditional efficiency models. To account
for risk and uncertainty, these models could be estimated under the state-contingent production
framework, or using an extension of the Just-Pope production risk model. Overall, it must be
stressed that analytical approaches that do not have sound theoretical grounds (e.g. modelling
subsidies as inputs or as outputs) may generate misleading results.
48
Bibliography
[1] Ackerberg, D. A., Benkard, C. L., Berry, S., Pakes, A. (2007). Econometric tools for
analysing market outcomes. In: Heckman, J.J., Leamer, E.E. (eds.), Handbook of Eco-
nometrics, Elsevier, pp. 4171-4276.
[2] Ackerberg, D. A., Caves, K., Frazer, G. (2006). Structural identiﬁcation of production
functions. Mimeo, UCLA Department of Economics.
[3] Adams, G., Westho, P., Willott, B., Robert E., Y. I. (2001). Do "decoupled" payments
affect U.S. crop area? Preliminary evidence from 1997-2000. American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, 83(5): 1190-1195.
[4] Ahearn, M. C., El-Osta, H., Dewbre, J. (2006). The impact of coupled and decoupled
government subsidies on off-farm labour participation of U.S farm operators. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(2): 393-408.
[5] Antón, J. (2001). Decoupling: a conceptual overview. Working paper, OECD, Paris,
France.
[6] Banga, R. (2014). Impact of green box subsidies on agricultural productivity, production
and international trade. Working Paper, No. RVC-11, Unit of Economic Cooperation and
Integration among Developing Countries, UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland.
[7] Battese, G. E., Coelli, T. J. (1995). A model for technical ineﬃciency effects in a stochastic
frontier production function for panel data. Empirical economics, 20(2): 325-332.
[8] Battese, G. E., Rambaldi, A. N., Wan, G. (1997). A stochastic frontier production func-
tion with flexible risk properties. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 8(3): 269-280.
[9] Blancard, S., Boussemart, J.-P., Briec, W., Kerstens, K. (2006). Short- and long-run
credit constraints in French agriculture: a directional distance function framework using
expenditure-constrained profit functions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
88(2): 351-364.
49
[10] Bokusheva, R., Kumbhakar, S.C., Lehmann, B. (2012). The effect of environmental reg-
ulations on Swiss farm productivity. International Journal of Production Economics, 136
: 93-101.
[11] Breen, J. P., Hennessy, T. C., Thorne, F. S. (2005). The effect of decoupling on the
decision to produce: an Irish case study. Food Policy, 30(2): 129-144.
[12] Bursher, M. E., Robinson, S., Thierfelder, K. (2000). North American farm programmes
and the WTO. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(3): 768-774.
[13] Cahill, S. A. (1997). Calculating the rate of decoupling for crops under CAP/oilseeds
reform. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 48(3): 349-378.
[14] Chambers, R. G., Quiggin, J. (2000). Uncertainty, production, choice and agency: the
state-contingent approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[15] Chambers, R.G., Serra, T., Stefanou, S.E. (2015). Using ex ante elicitation to model
state-contingent technologies. Journal of productivity analysis, 43: 75-83.
[16] Ciaian, P., Swinnen, J. F. (2009). Credit market imperfections and the distribution of
policy rents. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(4): 1124-1139.
[17] Coyle, B. (2005). Dynamic econometric models of crop investment in Manitoba under
risk aversion and uncertainty. Working paper, OECD, Paris, France.
[18] Daraio, C., Simar, L. (2007). Advanced robust and nonparametric methods in eﬃciency
analysis: Methodology and applications. Springer, New York.
[19] Darolles, S., Fan, Y., Florens, J.-P., Renault, E. (2011). Nonparametric instrumental
regression. Econometrica, 79(5): 1541-1565.
[20] De Witte, K., Kortelainen, M. (2013). What explains the performance of students in
a heterogeneous environment? Conditional eﬃciency estimation with continuous and
discrete environmental variables. Applied Economics, 45(17): 2401-2412.
[21] Dewbre, J., Mishra, A. (2002). Farm household incomes and US government programme
payments. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Econom-
ics Association, Long Beach, California, USA.
[22] Dupraz, P., Latruffe, L. (2015). Trends in family labour, hired labour and contract work
on French ﬁeld crop farms: The role of the Common Agricultural Policy. Food Policy, 51:
104-118.
50
[23] El-Osta, H. S., Mishra, A. K., Ahearn, M. C. (2004). Labour supply by farm operators
under decoupled farm program payments. Review of Economics of the Household, 2(4):
367-385.
[24] Girante, M. J., Goodwin, B. K., Featherstone, A. (2008). Farmers’ crop acreage decisions
in the presence of credit constraints: Do decoupled payments matter? Paper presented
at the American Agricultural Economics Association annual meeting, Orlando, USA.
[25] Gohin, A. (2006). Assessing CAP reform: sensitivity of modelling decoupled policies.
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57(3): 415-440.
[26] Goodwin, B. K., Mishra, A. K. (2005). Another look at decoupling: additional evidence on
the production effects of direct payments. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
87(5): 1200-1210.
[27] Goodwin, B. K., Mishra, A. K. (2006). Are "decoupled" farm program payments really
decoupled? An empirical evaluation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(1):
73-89.
[28] Guan, Z., Oude Lansink, A. (2006). The source of productivity growth in Dutch agri-
culture: a perspective from finance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(3):
644-656.
[29] Guan Z., Oude Lansink, A., van Ittersum, M., Wossink, A. (2006). Integrating agro-
nomic principles into production function specification: a dichotomy of growth inputs
and facilitating inputs. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(1): 203-214.
[30] Hadley, D. (2006). Patterns in technical eﬃciency and technical change at the farm-level
in England and Wales, 1982-2005. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57: 81-100.
[31] Hadri, K., Guermat, C., Whittaker, J. (2003). Estimating farm eﬃciency in the presence
of double heteroskedasticity using panel data. Journal of Applied Economics, 6(2): 255-
268.
[32] Henderson, D.J. Parmeter, C.F. (2015). Applied nonparametric econometrics. Cambridge
University Press, New York.
[33] Hennessy, D. A. (1998). The production effects of agricultural income support policies
under uncertainty. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80(1): 46-57.
[34] Horowitz, J. L. (2011). Applied nonparametric instrumental variables estimation. Econo-
metrica, 79(2): 347-394.
51
[35] Jaenicke, E. C., Frechette, D. L., Larson, J. A. (2003). Estimating production risk and
ineﬃciency simultaneously: an application to cotton cropping systems. Journal of Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics, 28(3): 540-557.
[36] Jan, P., Lips, M., Dumondel, M. (2012). Total factor productivity change of Swiss dairy
farms in the mountain region in the period 1999 to 2008. Review of Agricultural and
Environmental Studies, 93(3): 273-298.
[37] Just, R. E., Pope, R. D. (1978). Stochastic speciﬁcation of production functions and
economic implications. Journal of Econometrics, 7: 67- 86.
[38] Just, R. E., Pope, R. D. (1979). Production function estimation and related risk consid-
erations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 61(2): 276-284.
[39] Kallas, Z., Serra, T., Gil, J. M. (2012). Effects of policy instruments on farm investments
and production decisions in the Spanish cop sector. Applied Economics, 44(30): 3877-
3886.
[40] Kazukauskas, A., Newman, C., Sauer, J. (2014). The impact of decoupled subsidies on
productivity in agriculture: A cross-country analysis using microdata. Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 45(3): 327-336.
[41] Kazukauskas, A., Newman, C. F., Thorne, F. S. (2010). Analysing the effect of decoupling
on agricultural production: evidence from Irish dairy farms using the Olley and Pakes
approach. German Journal Agricultural of Economics, 59: 144-157.
[42] Key, N., Roberts, M. J. (2009). Nonpecuniary beneﬁts to farming: Implications for supply
response to decoupled payments. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(1): 1-
18.
[43] Koundouri, P., Laukkanen, M., Myyrä, S., Nauges, C. (2009). The effects of EU agricul-
tural policy changes on farmers’ risk attitudes. European Review of Agricultural Econom-
ics, 36(1): 53-77.
[44] Kroupová, Z., Malý, M. (2010). Analysis of agriculture subsidy policy tools: application
of production function. Politiká Ekonomie, 6: 774-794.
[45] Kumbhakar, S. C. (2002). Speciﬁcation and estimation of production risk, risk preferences
and technical eﬃciency. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(1): 8-22.
[46] Kumbhakar, S.C., Park, B., Simar, L., Tsionas, E. (2007). Nonparametric stochastic
frontiers: a local likelihood approach. Journal of Econometrics, 137: 1-27.
52
[47] Kumbhakar, S. C., Bokusheva, R. (2009). Modelling farm production decisions under an
expenditure constraint. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 36(3): 343-367.
[48] Kumbhakar, S. C., Lien, G. (2010). Impact of subsidies on farm productivity and eﬃ-
ciency. In: The Economic Impact of Public Support to Agriculture. Springer, New York,
pp. 109-124.
[49] Latruffe, L., Davidova, S., Douarin, E., Gorton, M. (2010). Farm expansion in Lithuania
after accession to the EU: The role of CAP payments in alleviating potential credit
constraints. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(2): 351-365.
[50] Latruffe, L., Minviel, J. J. (2014). Impact of subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency: a
comparison of alternative modelling frameworks. Unpublished manuscript, INRA, UMR
SMART- LERECO, Rennes, France.
[51] Lee, H., Chambers, R. G. (1986). Expenditure constraints and proﬁt maximisation in US
agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(4): 857-865.
[52] Levinsohn, J., Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using inputs to control
for unobservables. The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2): 317-341.
[53] Makki, S.S., Somwaru, A., Vandeveer, M. (2004). Decoupled payments and farmers’
production decisions under risk. Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting. US
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report,
pp. 33-39.
[54] Malá, Z., Červena, G., Antouškova, M. (2010) Analysis of the impact of common agricul-
tural policy on plant production in the Czech republic. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et
Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 59(7): 237-244.
[55] Mamardashvili, Ph., Schmid, D. (2013). Performance of Swiss dairy farms under provision
and public goods. Agricultural Economics-Czech, 59(7): 300-314.
[56] Mary, S. (2013). Assessing the impacts of pillar 1 and 2 subsidies on TFP in French crop
farms. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64(1): 133-144.
[57] Mattas, K., Arﬁni, F., Midmore, P., Schmitz, M., Surry, Y. (2008). Impacts of CAP reform
on rural employment: a multi-modeling cross country approach. Paper Presented in the
109th EAAE Seminar “The CAP after the Fischler Reform: National Implementations,
Impact Assessment and the Agenda for Future Reforms”, Viterbo, Italy.
53
[58] McCloud, N., Kumbhakar, S.C. (2008). Do subsidies drive productivity? A cross-country
analysis of Nordic dairy farms. In: Chib, S., Griﬃths, W., Koop, G., Terrel, D. (eds.), Ad-
vances in econometrics: Bayesian econometrics, 23. Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley,
pp. 245-274.
[59] Minviel, J. J., De Witte, K. (2015a). Measuring the impact of public subsidies on farm
technical eﬃciency: a nonparametric conditional eﬃciency approach. Paper presented at
the 13th International Conference on Data Envelopment Analysis, Brunswick, Germany.
[60] Minviel, J. J., De Witte, K. (2015b). Subsidization and productive eﬃciency: evidence
from French farms using non-neutral frontier methods. Paper presented at the 29th In-
ternational Conference of Agricultural Economists, Milan, Italy.
[61] Minviel, J. J., Latruffe, L. (2014). Meta-regression analysis of the impact of agricultural
subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency. Paper presented at the 8th North American Pro-
ductivity Workshop, Ottawa, Canada.
[62] Moro, D., Sckokai, P. (2013). The impact of decoupled payments on farm choices: con-
ceptual and methodological challenges. Food Policy, 41: 28-38.
[63] Morroni, M. (2006). Knowledge, Scale and Transactions in the theory of Firm. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[64] Nauges, C., O’Donnell, C. J., Quiggin, J. (2011). Uncertainty and technical eﬃciency
in Finnish agriculture: a state-contingent approach. European Review of Agricultural
Economics, 38: 449-467.
[65] Newey, W. K. and Powell, J. L. (2003). Instrumental variable estimation of nonparametric
models. Econometrica, 71(5): 1565-1578.
[66] Newey, W. K., Powell, J. L., and Vella, F. (1999). Nonparametric estimation of triangular
simultaneous equations models. Econometrica, 67(3): 565-603.
[67] O’Donnell, C. J., Chambers, R. G., Quiggin, J. (2010). Eﬃciency analysis in the presence
of uncertainty. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 33(1): 1-17.
[68] O’Donoghue, E. J., Whitaker, J. B. (2010). Do direct payments distort producers’ de-
cisions? An examination of the farm security and rural investment act of 2002. Applied
economic perspectives and policy, 32(1): 170-193.
[69] Olley, G. S., Pakes, A. (1996). The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry. Econometrica, 64(6): l263-l297.
54
[70] Petrick, M., Zier, M. (2011). Regional employment impacts of Common Agricultural
Policy measures in eastern Germany: a difference-in-differences approach. Agricultural
Economics, 42: 183-193.
[71] Pope, R. D., Kramer, R. A. (1979). Production uncertainty and factor demands for the
competitive ﬁrm. Southern Economic Journal, 46(2): 489-501.
[72] Rasmussen, S. (2010). Scale eﬃciency in Danish agriculture: An input distance-function
approach. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 37(3): 335-367.
[73] Rasmussen, S. (2011). Data for analysing productivity changes in Danish agriculture
1990-2007. Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. FOI
Documentation.
[74] Rizov, M., Pokrivcak, J., Ciaian, P. (2013). CAP subsidies and productivity of the EU
farms. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64(3): 537-557.
[75] Roe, T., Somwaru, A., Diao, X. (2003). Do direct payments have intertemporal effects
on US agriculture? In: Government Policy and Farmland Markets: The Maintenance of
Farmer Wealth, Moss, C., Schmitz, A. (eds.). Iowa State Press, Ames, Iowa, pp. 115-140.
[76] Sckokai, P. (2005). Modelling the impact of agricultural policies on farm investments
under uncertainty: the case of the CAP arable crop regime. Working paper, OECD,
Paris, France.
[77] Sckokai, P., Moro, D. (2006). Modelling the reforms of the common agricultural policy
for arable crops under uncertainty. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(1):
43-56.
[78] Sckokai, P., Moro, D. (2009). Modelling the impact of the CAP single farm payment on
farm investment and output. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 36(3): 395-423.
[79] Serra, T., Goodwin, B. K., Featherstone, A. M. (2011). Risk behaviour in the presence
of government programmes. Journal of Econometrics, 162(1): 18-24.
[80] Serra, T., Stefanou, S., Gil, José, M., Featherstone, A. (2009). Investment rigidity and
policy measures. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 36(1): 103-120.
[81] Serra, T., Zilberman, D., Goodwin, B. K., Featherstone, A. (2006). Effects of decoupling
on the mean and variability of output. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 33(3):
269-288.
55
[82] Serra, T., Zilberman, D., Goodwin, B. K., Hyvonen, K. (2005). Replacement of agricul-
tural price supports by area payments in the European Union and the effects on pesticide
use. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(4): 870-884.
[83] Shrestha, S., Hennessy, T., Hynes, S. (2007). The effect of decoupling on farming in
Ireland: A regional analysis. Irish Journal of Agricultural and Food Research, 46: 1-13.
[84] Silva E., Arzubi A., Berbel J. (2004). An application of Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) in Azores dairy farms. New Medit, 3: 39-43.
[85] Silva, E., Marote, E. (2013). The importance of subsidies in Azorean dairy farms’ eﬃ-
ciency. In: Mendes, A. B., L. D. G. Soares da Silva, E., Azevedo Santos, J. M., (eds.),
Eﬃciency measures in the agricultural sector. Springer, Dordrecht, pp.157-166.
[86] Simar, L., Wilson, P.W. (2011). Two-stage DEA: caveat emptor. Journal of Productivity
Analysis, 36: 2005-2018.
[87] Sipiläenen, T., Kumbhakar, S.C. (2008). Effects of direct payments on farm performance:
the case of dairy farms in Northern EU countries. Paper presented at ‘The Economic Im-
pact of Public Support to Agriculture’, II AIEA2-USDA International Meeting, Bologna,
Italy.
[88] Soares, E., Berbel, J., Arzubi, A. (2001). Análisis no paramétrico de eﬃciencia en las
explotaciones lecheras de las Azores a partir de datos RICA-A. Proceedings of the IV
Congreso National de Economía Agraria. Pamplona, Spain.
[89] Solow, R.M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 39(3): 312-320.
[90] Swinnen, J., Gow, H. (1999). Agricultural credit problems and policies during the trans-
ition to a market economy in central and eastern Europe. Food Policy, 24(1): 21-47.
[91] Trnková, G., Malá, Z., Vasilenko, A. (2012). Analysis of the effects of subsidies on the
economic behaviour of agricultural businesses Focusing on animal production. Agris on-
line Papers in Economics and Informatics, 4(4): 115-126.
[92] Vercammen, J. (2007). Farm bankruptcy risk as a link between direct payments and
agricultural investment. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 34(4): 479-500.
[93] Wang, H.-J. (2002). Heteroskedasticity and non-monotonic eﬃciency effects of a stochastic
frontier model. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18(3): 241-253.
56
[94] Weber, J. G., Key, N. (2012). How much do decoupled payments affect production?
An instrumental variable approach with panel data. American journal of agricultural
economics, 94(1): 52-66.
[95] Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). On estimating ﬁrm-level production functions using proxy
variables to control for unobservables. Economics Letters, 104(3): 112-114.
57
58
Chapter 3
Effect of public subsidies on farm
technical efficiency: A meta-analysis of
empirical results1
Abstract
Predicting and investigating the impact of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency are
becoming critical issues in applied agricultural policy analysis. This chapter presents a
meta-analysis of empirical results on this issue, based on data gathered from a systematic
literature review. We find that, in the empirical literature, subsidies are commonly neg-
atively associated with farm technical efficiency. Meta-regression estimation results show
that the direction (significantly negative, significantly positive or non-significant) of the
observed effects is sensitive to the way subsidies are modelled in the empirical studies, and
to the period of publication.
3.1 Introduction
Given successive reforms of agricultural policies and pressures on public budgets, investigating
the link between public subsidies and farm technical eﬃciency has become a central research
question in production economics. Technical eﬃciency refers to the capacity of a farm to make
eﬃcient use of the existing technology, that is, either to produce at the maximum level with a
given set and level of inputs, or to use the minimum level of inputs to produce a speciﬁc level of
output. In general, public subsidies do not aim explicitly at improving technical eﬃciency, but
instead aim at increasing production, supporting farmers’ income, or favouring the production
1This chapter has been written in collaboration with Laure Latruffe (INRA, UMR SMART, Rennes, France).
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of speciﬁc outputs including environmental outputs. However, if subsidies have the side effect
of decreasing farm technical eﬃciency, this may lead to the question of whether a more effective
way of supporting farms might exist.
Theoretical results on this subsidy-eﬃciency link are ambiguous. On the one hand, subsidies
may reduce farmers’ effort (Martin and Page, 1983) or change their risk attitudes (Serra et al.,
2008), which might result in a reduction of technical eﬃciency. More generally, a negative im-
pact of subsidization on technical eﬃciency may result from a wealth (income) effect, that is to
say, income stabilisation resulting from subsidies may distort farmers’ incentives to produce ef-
ﬁciently. Farmers’ efforts in farming activities may be reduced if a larger part of their income is
guaranteed by subsidization. Subsidization may enable farmers to smooth their wealth without
adopting eﬃcient production strategies. On the other hand, subsidies may help farmers over-
come ﬁnancial constraints that impede eﬃcient restructuring or modernisation, and thus may
increase technical eﬃciency by improving the farm’s productive capacity through replacement
investment or net investment in advanced technologies (Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010). Also,
one may expect no signiﬁcant effect (that is, null effect) of subsidies on technical eﬃciency, since
this is not the primary aim of the subsidization policy. Consequently, several authors, such as
Serra et al. (2008), Kumbhakar and Lien (2010) and Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010), argue that
investigating this issue is essentially empirical. However, ﬁndings from empirical studies also
seem inconclusive. Signiﬁcant effects, both positive and negative, of subsidies on farm tech-
nical eﬃciency may be found, along with no signiﬁcant effects. The empirical studies differ not
only in the context of the study (for example: country, period, types of farm considered), but
also in the data used (for example: number of farms, cross-sectional or panel data) and in the
methodology employed (for example: a parametric or non-parametric approach). Hence, one
may wonder whether the direction of the subsidy-eﬃciency relationship found in the empirical
literature is random, or whether it is consistently related to the characteristics of the studies.
In this context, this chapter aims to shed light on the relationship between public subsidies and
farm technical eﬃciency by undertaking a meta-analysis of results obtained in existing empirical
studies. The meta-analytical framework consists of a set of statistical and econometric methods
which allows outcomes from empirical studies carried out on a particular research question to be
synthesised and their heterogeneity to be investigated (Glass, 1976; Stanley and Jarell, 1989).
If there is a consistent link between the direction of the relationship found in the studies and
certain characteristics of the studies, this may help draw methodological recommendations, so
that future research provides reliable ﬁndings for policy recommendations.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we present an overview of the possible ways
of investigating the relationship between farm technical eﬃciency and subsidies which have
been applied in the existing empirical literature. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we present the data
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and methodology, respectively. In Section 3.5 we describe and discuss the main results. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 Overview of the ways of estimating the link between
farm technical efficiency and subsidies
Various estimation strategies can be found in the literature dealing with the eﬃciency-subsidy
link. There are two main competing approaches: the non-parametric framework where the
main method is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA); and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
which is a parametric framework. Both approaches allow farm speciﬁc eﬃciency scores to be
computed. These are strictly positive scalars bounded by one, with one being a fully eﬃcient
farm.
DEA relies on programming methods to construct a linear frontier from the best performing
farms in the sample at hand. The DEA model may have an output orientation meaning that
it is searched for the possible output increase that farmers could implement without changing
the level of use of inputs. Researchers may prefer to assume an input orientation, where the
possible input decrease – keeping output the same – is searched for. The main advantages of
DEA are that it can handle a multi-output multi-input context, and it does not necessitate
speciﬁcation assumptions. In DEA, the inﬂuence of subsidies is investigated in two stages: in
the ﬁrst stage, technical eﬃciency is computed with DEA; and in the second stage a regression
(Ordinary Least Squares, truncated, Tobit, or quantile) is applied to the eﬃciency scores.
In contrast to DEA, SFA relies on econometrics and therefore necessitates speciﬁcations re-
garding the production function and the distribution of error terms. However, one advantage
of SFA is that it accounts for potential noise through its double error term (random noise and
ineﬃciency), while in the DEA case any deviation from the eﬃcient frontier is due to ineﬃ-
ciency. Bayesian methods can be used to provide more accurate inference results, for example
accounting for regularity conditions. In the SFA case, the computation of eﬃciency and the
effect of subsidies on eﬃciency are estimated in a single stage. More information on eﬃciency
estimation can be found in Coelli et al. (2005).
A further approach for investigating the eﬃciency-subsidy link relies on simple correlation
analysis or on comparing the means of different sub-samples on the basis of the farms’ eﬃciency
scores calculated with either DEA or SFA.
As mentioned above, different types of data may be used. One possibility is to use cross-sectional
data, where farms are observed in one speciﬁc year. Panel data can also be used, where the
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same farms are observed in adjacent years. Some studies investigate the relationship between
farm technical eﬃciency and subsidies in a speciﬁc year only, while other studies consider longer
periods which, in some instances, enable any change in the way subsidies are allocated to farms
to be captured. Although various levels of observations can be found in the eﬃciency literature,
only studies using individual data, that is to say farm level data, are found in the literature
dealing with the subsidy-eﬃciency issue.
Regarding subsidies, the subsidization policy depends on the context of the study. However, in
general one can observe that the total value of subsidies received by farms can be decomposed
into several components, such as subsidies for implementing investment on the farm, or subsidies
for production activities. The latter can be disaggregated into several types, such as input
subsidies, output subsidies or coupled subsidies (that is, subsidies coupled with production),
decoupled subsidies (that is, lump-sum payments), environmental subsidies (that is, subsidies
favouring environmentally-friendly practices such as organic farming), and subsidies provided to
farms located in diﬃcult situations. An example of the latter is from the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) where farms located in the so-called Less Favoured
Areas (LFA) receive speciﬁc subsidies per hectare of area in LFA. Regarding coupled and
decoupled subsidies, and taking again the example of the EU, over the past decades the CAP
has gradually moved from coupled subsidies to decoupled subsidies. In the mid-1990s, partially
decoupled payments were introduced in the form of direct payments received per hectare of
speciﬁc crop planted or per head of speciﬁc livestock bred. More recently, the decoupled Single
Farm Payment has been implemented.
When investigating the relationship between farm technical eﬃciency and subsidies, the sub-
sidies considered may be given as the total value received by the farm. However, this might
capture size effects. Some studies circumvent this issue by relating the subsidies considered to
a size variable (such as the value of farm revenue, or the farm area in hectares, or the number
of farm livestock units), or by calculating them as a share of all subsidies received by farms. A
ﬁnal point to note regarding the methodologies used in the empirical literature on the subsidy-
eﬃciency link relates to the way in which subsidies are modelled. In general, subsidies are used
as contextual factors, that is to say as explanatory variables to eﬃciency. Subsidies may also
be considered as an additional output to the traditional farm outputs used in the eﬃciency
calculation. This is not, however, a correct method for accounting for subsidies, since it implies
that, for a similar input use, farms receiving subsidies produce more in value than farms not
receiving subsidies. Such an approach does not reﬂect the real production process of farms.
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3.3 Data
The data used in our meta-analysis consist of 195 observations (that is, 195 distinct results
about the effect of subsidies) extracted from a set of 68 studies which were carried out during
the period 1986 to 2014. The studies were collected from a systematic review of the exist-
ing empirical literature on the links between public subsidies and farm technical eﬃciency.
The search for papers was conducted through the main scientiﬁc databases such as Econlit,
Web of Science (WoS), Web of Knowledge (WoK), JSTOR, Econpapers, Science Direct, RepEc
(IDEAS) and Google Scholar, combining in several search formulae the following keywords:
‘subsidies’ or ‘support’, alone or with ‘public’, ‘government’, ‘CAP’, ‘Single Farm Payment’,
‘pillar 1’, ‘pillar 2’, ‘agricultural’, ‘EU’, or ‘farm bill’; together with ‘eﬃciency’, technical ef-
ﬁciency’, ‘economic eﬃciency’, ‘farm eﬃciency’, ‘productive eﬃciency’, ‘farm performance’ or
‘economic performance’. The literature search was completed by exploring the reference lists
of the papers obtained through the search of the databases. One important potential bias in
meta-analyses is publication bias, which refers to the fact that studies that are more likely
to be submitted and published in journals, as well as those cited, are those where results are
signiﬁcant and interesting (Coursol and Wagner, 1986; Hedges, 1992; Begg, 1994; Sterne et
al., 2000; Dickersin, 2005). In addition, it has been documented that certain studies remain
unpublished because of theoretical or ideological divergences, or conﬂicts of interest between
researchers (Sterling, 1959; Mahoney, 1977). On the one hand, it may be viewed as a quality
guarantee that studies which do not comply with theoretical beliefs are not published in recog-
nised journals. On the other hand, at least in this array of literature, theory is not frozen, as
can be seen from recent suggestions of a possible positive relationship between subsidies and
farms’ technical eﬃciency (e.g. Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010; Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010).
Therefore, meta-analyses based only on literature published in journals may be biased. Given
this, and as recommended (e.g. Cook et al., 1993; MacLean et al., 2003; Rothstein et al., 2005;
Sterne et al., 2008), we introduce some unpublished studies in our meta-analysis.
Table 3.4 (in the appendix at the end of this chapter) provides an overview of the empirical
studies on the relationship between public subsidies and farm technical eﬃciency. Various
points should be noted. The ﬁrst concerns the geographical coverage: developing and emerging
countries are not widely covered by the existing literature. Only India (Charyulu and Biswas,
2010; Dung et al., 2011), China (Thian and Wan, 2000; Li et al., 2012) and Brazil (Taylor
et al., 1986) have been the focus of such an assessment. Within industrialised countries, it is
worth noting that the majority of studies cover Europe. Despite some of the earliest studies
being on Canada (Giannakas et al., 2001) and the United States (Lachaal, 1994), there are
only four more studies on the United States (Lambert and Bayda, 2005; Serra et al., 2008;
Chidmi et al., 2011; Zaeske, 2012). In Europe, one publication has focused on Switzerland
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(Ferjani, 2008), two on Norway (Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010; Kumbhakar et al., 2012) and two
on Russia (Sotnikov, 1998; Sedik et al., 2000). The EU appears to be largely covered but it is
not covered in terms of the variety of authors. In fact, some authors have applied their model
to several EU countries in a single publication (Latruffe et al., 2008; McCloud and Kumbhakar,
2008; Fogarasi and Latruffe, 2009; Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010; Latruffe et al., 2012; Zhu et
al., 2012) or to several production sectors in the same country (Karagiannis and Sarris, 2002;
Guyomard et al., 2006; Hadley, 2006; Kleinhanss et al., 2007; Emvalomatis et al., 2008; Caroll
et al., 2009; Fogarasi and Latruffe, 2009; Desjeux and Latruffe, 2010).
A second point concerns the production coverage. Most of the studies concentrate on the crop
and dairy sectors, followed by beef cattle, sheep and pig. Some studies cover speciﬁc crops
(cereals, oilseeds and protein-seeds (COP), cereals, wheat, corn, rice, alfalfa, tobacco, cotton,
olive, fruits, vegetables, horticulture) and one study is applied to poultry. Crop production
other than ﬁeld crops is studied in countries with speciﬁc production conditions (rice in China;
olives in Greece and Spain; alfalfa, tobacco, cotton in Greece).
A third point concerns the period covered. When looking at the dates of publications, the
pioneer papers are by Taylor et al. (1986) for Brazil, Lachaal (1994) for the United States
and Sotnikov (1998) for Russia, who explicitly focused on the effect of public support (credit
subsidization, farm subsidies, output subsidies, respectively) on technical eﬃciency. A few
papers followed in the early 2000s, namely Brümmer and Loy (2000), Sedik et al. (2000),
Giannakas et al. (2001), and Karagiannis and Sarris (2002), but most of the assessment started
in the mid-2000s, and has increased in the past ten years. Papers have mostly covered periods
ranging from the early 1990s to the most recent data available in the 2010s. This corresponds to
a period when micro-economic data became more widely available, and when decision-makers
increased their demand for policy evaluations.
A ﬁnal point concerns the subsidy variables used. Various variables are used in the literature,
dealing with total subsidies received by farms, or speciﬁc subsidies such as production subsidies,
investment subsidies, environmental subsidies, organic subsidies, or output subsidies (that is,
subsidies coupled to output). The subsidies are proxied with either: the total amount per farm;
the average amount per hectare of land or livestock head; a so-called subsidy rate, which is a
ratio relating the subsidies considered to a farm ﬁnancial performance indicator (output value,
revenue, income); or a ratio of the subsidies considered to the total subsidies received by the
farm (the payment ratio). Alternatively, a dummy is used to capture whether the farm was the
beneﬁciary of subsidies or whether there has been a change in policy.
The last column of table 3.4 shows that the most common ﬁnding on this issue is an inverse
relationship. When non-signiﬁcant relationships are not considered, the effect of subsidies on
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technical eﬃciency is signiﬁcantly negative for 71% of the models, and signiﬁcantly positive for
29%. When taking into account the cases where subsidies have no signiﬁcant effect, which is
also a result in itself, then the effect is signiﬁcantly negative for 60% of the models, signiﬁcantly
positive for 24% of the models, and non-signiﬁcant for 16%. At ﬁrst sight, there is no obvious
consistency in the results. For example, contradictory results are found for a given production
sector with a similar subsidy variable (e.g. Hadley, 2006, and Iraizoz et al., 2005, for the beef
production sector). Also, among studies in which the subsidy rate is, on average, similar, a sig-
niﬁcantly positive impact and a signiﬁcantly negative impact of support on technical eﬃciency
can be found; contrast Kumbhakar and Lien (2010) and Kumbhakar et al. (2012), both for
Norwegian cereal farms but using a different proxy for subsidies. Table 3.1 provides additional
statistics regarding the estimated impact for the studies listed in table 3.4. Table 3.1 shows
that, among studies considering total subsidies (instead of various categories of subsidies), the
share of observations reporting a signiﬁcantly negative effect of subsidies on technical eﬃciency
is higher than the share reporting a signiﬁcantly positive or a non-signiﬁcant effect. The same
ﬁnding is observed among studies modelling subsidies as a subsidy ratio per farm income.
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Table 3.1 Share of observations depending on the sign of the estimated effect
Share of the 195 observations (%) reporting
Significantly negative
estimated effect
Null (non-significant)
estimated effect
Significantly positive
estimated effect
All 195 observations 54 22 24
Depending on:
The type of subsidies used
Total subsidies 29 6 7
Input subsidies 2 1 1
Environmental subsidies 6 3 4
LFA subsidies 4 2 1
Investment subsidies 1 2 4
Coupled subsidies 8 2 4
Decoupled subsidies (including direct
payments and Single Farm Payment)
46 20 20
The subsidy proxy used
Value of subsidies per farm 10 8 11
Subsidy rate 35 4 2
Subsidies per hectare 5 2 5
Subsidies per animal
Subsidy dummy 4 8 6
The type of farms considered
Crop farms 21 9 7
Dairy farms 18 7 12
Other livestock farms 7 6 6
Notes: The estimated effect refers to the effect of subsidies on technical efficiency found in the primary studies.
3.4 Empirical models
We explore here econometrically the heterogeneity of the direction of the subsidy effect in em-
pirical studies by using categorical models. More precisely, we use probit models to investigate
the determinants of the sign of the coeﬃcient associated with the subsidy variable. Firstly, we
consider the three possible directions by estimating an ordered probit model with three cat-
egories ordered as follows: the ﬁrst outcome of the ordinal dependent variable is a signiﬁcantly
negative effect; the second outcome is a null (that is to say, non-signiﬁcant) effect; and the
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third outcome is a signiﬁcantly positive effect. The dependent variable yi for the i -th study
thus takes the value j=1, 2 or 3, and is associated with an underlying latent variable2 y⇤i , such
that:
y⇤i = βxi + ξi
yi =
8>>><
>>>:
1 if y⇤i < δ1
2 if δ1 < y
⇤
i < δ2
3 if y⇤i > δ2
(3.1)
where xi is a 1×p vector of moderator variables explaining the observed effects; β are the
parameters to be estimated; and ξi is a standard normal shock. δ1 and δ2 are the cutpoints or
threshold parameters to be estimated from the data. They help to match the latent variable
to the observed variable, and to estimate the probability associated with each observed effect.
Given the moderator variables, the probability that yi = j| j 2 (1, 2, 3) is given by:
Prob (yi = 1) = φ (δ1 − βxi)
Prob (yi = 2) = φ (δ2 − βxi)− φ (δ1 − βxi)
Prob (yi = 3) = 1− φ (δ2 − βxi)
(3.2)
where φ (.) stands for the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribu-
tion. While the signs of the estimated parameters β can give an indication of whether the
latent variable y⇤i increases from outcomes 1 to 3 when the determinant increases (or when
the determinant takes the value one in the case of a dummy variable), marginal effects can
help compare the effect of the determinants. More precisely, marginal effects, calculated for
each determinant and each alternative k, show the percentage increase in the probability of the
alternative k when the determinant increases by one unit (or takes the value one in the case of
a dummy variable).
Secondly, since the ordering of the outcomes is not a natural one (although it is logical to
order from a negative to a positive outcome), we also estimate binary probit models to conﬁrm
or disconﬁrm ﬁndings obtained with the ordered probit model. In the ﬁrst binary probit
model that we estimate, we assume that only signiﬁcantly negative effects of subsidies on
farms’ technical eﬃciency are not considered desirable by policy-makers, and thus we group
2This variable does not have the traditional meaning of latent variables (as in biology or behavioural studies).
Here, it only allows modelling the probability of observing a positive, negative, or null effect, conditionally to
the moderator variables.
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significantly positive effects and null effects together. Hence, the binary dependent variable
is equal to one for significantly positive or null effects, and equal to zero for (undesirable)
significantly negative effects (reference category). Finally, for comparison purposes, we also
estimate a binary probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to one for significantly
positive effects, and equal to zero for significantly negative effects (reference category). The
full sample of 195 observations is here reduced to 153 observations (the observations with non-
significant effects are excluded). The probability of obtaining the considered outcome with
respect to the reference outcome is given by:
Prob (yi = 1|xi, β) =
ˆ
−xiβ
−1
φ (z) dz (3.3)
where φ (z) denotes the standard normal density.
For a given empirical study, the estimated models are assumed to be independent if they consist
of estimations for different countries, different regions, or different farming systems. However,
in the estimation procedure, to control for intra-study auto-correlation due to the fact that
multiple observations are drawn from a given paper, we use cluster-robust inference. In this
approach, which has been used in meta-regressions (see Barrio and Loureiro, 2010; Choumert
et al., 2013), the standard errors are clustered by each primary study.
As explained above, we investigate whether the direction of the effect depends on the charac-
teristics of the primary study such as the analytical method employed to investigate the impact
and the context of the study. More precisely, the following explanatory variables xi are used in
our three probit models: (i) One dummy captures the way subsidies are modelled: subsidies as
additional output in the eﬃciency calculation (Subsidies as output). (ii) The type of subsidy
considered in the primary study is included via eight dummies: Total subsidies, Input sub-
sidies, Environmental subsidies, LFA subsidies, Investment subsidies, Coupled subsidies, Direct
payments, and Single Farm Payment. (iii) Two dummies are included to capture which proxy
of the subsidies is used, namely Subsidy per revenue and Subsidy per hectare. (iv) The influ-
ence of the estimation strategy followed in the primary studies is tested through five dummies:
Parametric estimation, that is to say SFA; one dummy representing whether Bayesian tech-
niques have been used for SFA estimation (Bayesian estimator); two dummies for the way the
eﬃciency score calculated with DEA in the first stage is explained (Quantile regression; Tobit
regression); and whether the output-orientation (as opposed to input-orientation) is assumed
for the calculation of technical eﬃciency with DEA (DEA output-orientation). (v) The type of
data used is considered through the dummy Panel data. (vi) The geopolitical location of the
farms considered in the primary study is included in the meta-regression since it is expected
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that policy incentives and room for manoeuvre may differ depending on the farm location. This
is done via the dummy EU-area equal to one for studies on EU countries and zero otherwise,
and the dummy North America equal to one for studies on North American countries and zero
otherwise. (vii) The influence of the publication period and of the publication status on the
direction of the subsidy effect is investigated through two dummies: Publication period and
Publication status. The former takes the value one for papers published in 2003 or before.
This dummy is aimed at capturing scientific progress in the technical eﬃciency literature, and
investigates the potential effect on findings regarding the eﬃciency-subsidy relationship. The
latter dummy captures whether the studies are articles published in academic journals.
As mentioned above, we believe that modelling subsidies as an additional output in the pro-
duction process is not correct. For this reason, all three models (the ordered probit and the two
binary probit models) are also estimated excluding the observations relying on such a modelling
approach, thus reducing the full sample of 195 observations to a sub-sample of 150 observa-
tions (and in the case of the second probit model where observations reporting non-significant
effects are excluded, the sample is reduced from 153 to 122 observations). The definition and
descriptive statistics for the moderator variables for both the full sample and the sub-sample
are presented in Table 3.2. It can be noted that there is a large array of the types of sub-
sidy considered but most of the models used total subsidies (44%). Regarding the modelling
strategy, almost one quarter of the models (23%) include subsidies as additional output in the
eﬃciency calculation, and most of the models (76%) use parametric estimation. Concerning
the publication status, one half of the models are in journal publications (51%).
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Table 3.2. Meta-analysis moderator variables and descriptive statistics
Full sample Sub-sample
Variables Description Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
Significantly negative = 1 for significantly negative effect, 0 otherwise 0.54 0.49 0.62 0.49
Null (non-significant) = 1 for null effect, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39
Significantly positive = 1 for significantly positive effect, 0 otherwise 0.24 0.43 0.2 0.40
Significantly positive or
null
= 1 for significantly positive or null effect, 0 otherwise 0.46 0.49 0.38 0.49
Moderator variables
Subsidies as output = 1 if subsidies are modelled as output, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 0
Total subsidies = 1 for total subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.50
Input subsidies = 1 for input subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.21
Environmental subsidies = 1 for environmental subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29
LFA subsidies = 1 for LFA subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18
Investment subsidies = 1 for investment subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
Coupled subsidies = 1 for coupled subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35
Direct payments = 1 for direct payments, 0 otherwise 0.8 0.40 0.83 0.38
Single Farm Payment = 1 for Single Farm Payment, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33
Subsidies per revenue = 1 for the amount of subsidies per revenue, 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
Subsidies per hectare = 1 for the amount of subsidies per hectare of land, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33
Parametric estimation = 1 for parametric estimation in the case of SFA, 0 otherwise 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43
Bayesian estimator = 1 for Bayesian estimation in the case of SFA, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24
Quantile regression = 1 for quantile estimation in the second stage following DEA, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18
Tobit regression = 1 for Tobit estimation in the second stage following DEA, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
DEA output-orientation =1 for DEA output-oriented model, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33
Panel data = 1 for panel data, 0 otherwise 0.87 0.33 0.92 0.29
EU area = 1 for EU member states, 0 otherwise 0.82 0.38 0.78 0.41
North America = 1 for North American countries, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19
Publication period =1 for papers published in 2003 or before, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34
Publication status = 1 for articles published in journals, 0 otherwise 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50
Number of observations 195 150
Notes: SD= Standard deviation
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3.5 Results and discussion
Estimation results for the ordered probit model and for the two binary probit models for the
full sample are presented in Table 3.3. The results for the models for the sub-sample excluding
observations modelling subsidies as output are not shown. The likelihood ratio and R-squared
statistics in Table 3.3 indicate that all three models have a high goodness-of-fit. In addition, the
percentages of correctly predicted observations for the two binary probit estimations suggest
that both models are well behaved. However, in the estimation of the ordered probit model, the
second threshold parameter (Cut2) is not statistically significant, suggesting that the second
and the third categories (namely non-significant and significantly positive effects) could be
collapsed into one single category, as in the case of our first probit model. In the estimation
of the ordered probit model in the sample excluding observations treating subsidies as output,
none of threshold parameters is statistically significant, suggesting that the ordered structure
is not appropriate.
The estimates of the meta-regression analysis for the full sample in Table 3.3 highlight several
main findings3 from the empirical literature on the relationship between public subsidies and
farms’ technical eﬃciency. Firstly, when subsidies are modelled as an additional output in the
calculation of technical eﬃciency, the probability of obtaining a significantly negative effect
of subsidies on technical eﬃciency decreases, and the probability of obtaining a significantly
positive effect increases. The intuition is that modelling subsidies as output tends to virtually
inflate the output value, while there is no associated increase in input use. Hence, farms with
larger subsidies are considered to be producing more output with the same level of inputs. As
explained above, this approach is not a correct way of modelling a production process. This
meta-regression finding may explain some of the contrasting findings reported in the literature.
For instance, using the classical SFA framework and modelling subsidies as output, Hadley
(2006) found a significantly positive impact of subsidies on technical eﬃciency for beef farms
in England and Wales, while using the same framework but considering subsidies as contextual
variables only, Iraizoz et al. (2005) found a significantly negative impact for Spanish beef farms.
Another example is the contrasting results reported by Areal et al. (2012) and Mamardashvili
and Schmid (2013) for environmental subsidies and dairy farms.
Secondly, aggregating all subsidies received by farmers into a total subsidy variable may hide
effects attributed to specific subsidies, while modelling each type of subsidy separately appears
to be an appealing way to isolate their effect. For example, results regarding the ordered
3Notice that many variables are non-significant. This suggests that the direction of the effect is not system-
atically influenced by these variables. In fact, we have estimated the models by permuting the variables using
the method of “ClustOfVar” (a method which allows grouping together variables which are strongly related or
variables which bring the same information) (Chavent et al., 2012), but their significance remains unchanged.
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probit in Table 3.3 show that in the literature, total subsidies are ambiguously related, in
a non-significant or significantly negative or positive, way to farms’ technical eﬃciency, while
investment subsidies and coupled subsidies are significantly positively related to farms’ technical
eﬃciency. However, this finding is not confirmed by the two binary probit models. What is
shown by all three models (ordered and binary probit models) in Table 3.3 is that using the
proxy of subsidies per revenue decreases the probability of obtaining a significantly positive
or non-significant effect on farm’s technical eﬃciency. This finding is also confirmed by both
binary probit models run for the sub-samples excluding observations considering subsidies as
output.
Thirdly, the subsidy proxy used influences the result. More precisely, all models (whether
for the full sample or the sub-samples excluding observations considering subsidies as output)
consistently show that using the ratio of subsidies per farm revenue as the subsidy proxy,
increases the probability of obtaining a significantly negative effect on farms’ technical eﬃciency.
This may be one of the reasons behind the discrepancy highlighted above regarding the findings
by Kumbhakar and Lien (2010) and Kumbhakar et al. (2012) for Norwegian cereal farms. While
the former found a significantly positive impact using the amount of subsidies received by the
farm, the latter found a significantly negative impact using the subsidy rate.
Fourthly, in terms of methodologies, one finding is highlighted by the ordered probit model
and the binary probit where significantly positive effects are compared to the reference of
significantly negative effects in Table 3.3: using panel data increases the probability of obtaining
a significantly negative effect of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency compared to using cross-
sectional data.
Fifthly, results from all models for the full sample in Table 3.3 as well as results from binary
probit models for the sub-sample excluding observations modelling subsidies as output, show
a negative effect of the dummy regarding the publication period. This indicates that studies
published in 2003 or before were more likely to obtain a significantly negative effect of subsidies
on farms’ technical eﬃciency than later studies.
Finally, an additional result highlighted by the estimates is that the variable EU area has
a negative effect on the probability of obtaining a significantly positive effect (and on the
probability of obtaining a non-significant effect) of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency. This
suggests that studies applied to EU member states are more likely to report a negative effect
of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency compared to other regions in the world.
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Table 3.3 Ordered probit and binary probit estimates for the meta-regression
Ordered probit Ordered probit : Marginal effects Binary probit
Estimates
Negative effect
(j=1)
Null effect
(j=2)
Positive effect
(j=3)
Positive or null
effect vs.
negative effect
Positive effect
vs. negative
effect
Intercept 1.13 (0.79) 1.20 (1.46)
Subsidies as output 0.89 (0.30)*** -0.34 (0.11)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0 .10) ** 1.11 (0.30) *** 1.66 (0.52)***
Total subsidies 0.20 (0.36) -0.08 (0.14) 0.03 (0.06) 0.04 (0. 08) 0.23 (0.41) 0.33 (0.62)
Input subsidies 0.49 (0.69) -0.19 (0.26) 0.06 (0.04) 0.14 (0.23) 0.75 (0.74) -1.23 (1.01)
Environmental
subsidies -0.44 (0.45) 0.16 (0.16) -0.08 (0.08) -0.08 (0.07) -0.63 (0.44) -0.42 (0.70)
LFA subsidies -0.48 (0.52) 0.18 (0.17) -0.09 (0.11) -0.08 (0.06) -0.27 (0.68) 0.13 (0.96)
Investment subsidies 1.10 (0.65)* -0.38 (0.18)** 0.05 (0.07) 0.34 (0.26) 1.15 (0.81) 1.74 (1.06)*
Coupled subsidies 0.92 (0.43)** -0.35 (0.14)** 0.07 (0.03) ** 0.27 (0.15)* 0.69 (0.46) 1.07 (0.57)*
Direct payments -0.63 (0.45) 0.24 (0.17) -0.08 (0.04)** -0.17 (0.13) -0.22 (0.43) -0.49 (0.62)
Single Farm Payment -0.30 (0.54) 0.12 (0.19) -0.06 (0.11) -0.06 (0.08) -0.13 (0.54) -0.28 (0.79)
Subsidies per revenue -2.00 (0.39)*** 0.63 (0.09)*** -0.27 (0.06)*** -0.38 (0.06)*** -2.32 (0.47)*** -2.72 (0.69)***
Subsidies per hectare 0.13 (0.41) -0.05 (0.16) 0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.10) 0.06 (0.43) 0.48 (0.64)
Parametric estimation 0.33 (0.37) -0.13 (0.14) 0.06 (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 0.72 (0.41)* 1.55 (0.96)
Bayesian estimator 0.70 (0.69) -0.27 (0.24) 0.06 (0.03)** 0.21 (0.25) -0.08 (0.59) 0.68 (0.75)
Quantile regression -0.89 (0.68) 0.29 (0.16)* -0.17 (0.12) -0.12 (0.05)** -1.21 (0.60) -0.67 (0.74)
Tobit regression -0.53 (0.53) 0.19 (0.17) -0.10 (0.11) -0.09 (0.06) -0.17 (0. 58) 0.32 (0.81)
DEA
output-orientation -0.21 (0.50) 0.08 (0.19) -0.04 (0.09) -0.04 (0.09) -0.11 (0.53) 0.43 (0.82)
Panel data -0.73 (0.35)** 0.28 (0.13)** 0.07 (0.02) *** -0.21 (0.12)* -0.50 (0. 40) -1.59 (0.74)**
EU area -0.46 (0.33) 0.18 (0.12) -0.06 (0.03)** -0.12 (0.09) -0.57 (0.32)* -0.97 (0.44)**
North America 0.01 (0.66) -0.004 (0.26) 0.002 (0.11) 0.002 (0.15) -0.41 (0.70) -0.38 (0.71)
Publication period -1.27 (0.36)*** 0.39 (0.07)*** -0.23 (0.06) *** -0.16 (0.03)*** -1.53 (0.45)*** -1.74 (0.62)***
Publication status -0.17 (0.35) 0.07 (0.09) -0.03 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.29) -0.16 (0.50)
Cut1 -1.78 (0.79)**
Cut2 -0.87 (0.73)
Likelihood ratio 165.61*** 105.38*** 108.21***
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.39 0.49
% of correctly predicted obs. 82.05 85.62
Number of obs. 195 195 153
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%
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3.6 Conclusion
Predicting and investigating the impact of public subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency are
becoming critical issues in applied policy analysis. However, theoretical results on this issue
are ambiguous and empirical findings in the literature are inconclusive. In this context, the ob-
jective of this chapter is to identify factors that could explain the heterogeneity of the observed
empirical results.
In the empirical literature, the overall effect of agricultural subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency
is significantly negative, but for 46% of the results provided in the existing studies, the effect
is null (non-significant) or even significantly positive.
The meta-analysis of the sign of the effect reveals that when subsidies are modelled as output
in the eﬃciency calculation, their effect on technical eﬃciency is commonly found to be posit-
ive. Using such a modelling approach may, however, give an erroneous view of subsidies’ real
influence on technical eﬃciency since there is no input increase associated with the additional
output. In addition, proxying the subsidies considered by the ratio of the subsidies to farm rev-
enue increases the probability of obtaining a significantly negative effect of subsidies on farms’
technical eﬃciency. This probability is also increased, as evidenced by the meta-analysis, by
using the ratio of
subsidies to farm revenue instead of other subsidy proxies. A methodological recommendation
is therefore that investigating the effect of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency should rely on
a careful modelling of subsidies, and that, when possible, sensitivity analyses based on several
modelling strategies should be carried out.
The other main finding highlighted by our meta-regression is that the period of publication
(whether in journals or not) of the studies affects the direction of the subsidy-eﬃciency link
obtained. More precisely, we find that studies published in 2003 or before are more likely
to have reported a negative effect of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency than more recent
studies. One reason may be the policy periods considered in the studies: earlier studies have
mechanically focused on periods when decoupled subsidies were not fully on the governments’
agenda, or farms were under less pressure from macro-economic conditions (such as price volat-
ility). However, we have controlled for these two suggestions by testing in the meta-regression
for the effect of specific types of subsidy and by including several dummy variables capturing
the periods covered by the studies (not shown in the final specification used here). Another
reason may be scientific progress in terms of methodologies. We find that the direction of
the subsidy-eﬃciency link is robust to several methodological aspects included in our meta-
regression, but there may be other methodological advances that we have not been able to
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capture in our meta-regression. A recommendation is therefore to continue to investigate the
impact of subsidies on farms’ technical eﬃciency using advanced techniques and multiple case
studies, so that policy-makers are provided with tailored and more up-to-date findings.
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Table 3.4 Overview of the empirical studies on the link between subsidies and farm 
technical efficiency 
       
Reference Study 
period 
Location of 
the sample 
Production 
sector 
Sample 
size 
Impact variable used Effect of the 
impact 
variable 
Type of subsidies Subsidy relative to: 
Studies using DEA followed by a second-stage regression 
Bojnec and Latruffe 
(2013) 
2004-2006 Slovenia Crop, 
livestock 
1784 Total operational 
subsidies 
Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm output value) 
- 
Boussemart et al. 
(2012) 
2005-2008 France Crop  3337 Decoupled payment Subsidies per hectare + 
Charyulu and Biswas 
(2010) 
2009 India Crop 46 Input and investment 
subsidies 
Dummy 0 
Desjeux and Latruffe 
(2010) 
1990-2006 France Crop 32781 Investment subsidies Subsidies per hectare + 
     Coupled subsidies Subsidies per hectare - 
     Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per hectare - 
     Decoupled payment Subsidies per hectare - 
Desjeux and Latruffe 
(2010) 
1990-2006 France Dairy 20410 Investment subsidies Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
+ 
     Coupled subsidies Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
+/- 
     Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
+ 
     Decoupled payment Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
+ 
Desjeux and Latruffe 
(2010) 
1990-2006 France Beef cattle  10003 Investment subsidies Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
0 
     Coupled subsidies Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
- 
     Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per livestock 
unit 
- 
Ferjani (2008) 1990-2001 Switzerland 
(valley)  
Crop, 
livestock 
12426 Direct payments Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Ferjani (2008) 1990-2001 Switzerland 
(hill)  
Crop, 
livestock 
6968 Direct payments Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Ferjani (2008) 1990-2001 Switzerland 
(mountains)  
Crop, 
livestock 
3713 Direct payments Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin)  
- 
Fogarasi and Latruffe 
(2009) 
2001-2004 France Dairy 2716 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Fogarasi and Latruffe 
(2009) 
2001-2004 Hungary Dairy 128 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output) value 
- 
Fogarasi and Latruffe 
(2009) 
2001-2004 France Crop 3644 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output) value 
- 
Fogarasi and Latruffe 
(2009) 
2001-2004 Hungary Crop 1112 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output) value 
- 
Fousekis et al. (2001) 2009 Greece  Sheep 101 Not indicated Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total farm income) 
- 
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Gaspar et al. (2007) 2004-2005 Spain  Crop, 
livestock 
69 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to income) 
- 
Guyomard et al. (2006) 1995-2002 France  Crop  5800 CAP direct payments  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue)  
- 
Guyomard et al. (2006) 1995-2002 France  Beef cattle  816 CAP direct payments Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Guyomard et al. (2006) 1995-2002 France  Dairy  2144 CAP direct payments Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Lambert and Bayda 
(2005) 
1995-2001 United States  Crop  378 Total subsidies Value per farm 0 
Latruffe et al. (2013) 2001 Hungary  Livestock 192 Not indicated Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2008) 2005 Romania  Crop  319 Subsidies for crop 
output 
Subsidies per hectare + 
     Subsidies for seeds and 
pesticides purchase 
Subsidies per hectare - 
Li et al. (2012) 2010 China Crop 99 Public agricultural 
subsidies 
Subsidies per hectare - 
     Investment subsidies Dummy + 
Nastis et al. (2012) 2008 Greece Alfalfa  40 CAP subsidies Subsidy rate 
(subsidies to output 
value) 
- 
Sedik et al. (2000) 1991-1995 Russia  Crop  350 Total subsidies  Subsidy rate 
(subsidies to farm 
revenue) 
- 
Skevas et al. (2012) 2003-2007 The 
Netherlands  
Crop  703 Crop subsidies Value per farm - 
Studies using parametric (SFA) estimation  
Areal et al. (2012) 2000-2005 England  Dairy  25000 Environmental 
payment  
Dummy - 
     Set-aside payment Dummy + 
Bakucs et al. (2010) 2001-2005 Hungary Crop, 
livestock 
3210 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to  output value) 
- 
Barnes et al. (2010) 1989-2008 England, 
Wales 
Crop, dairy, 
livestock 
 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin)  
-/0 
Bojnec and Ferto 
(2011) 
2004-2008 Slovenia Crop, 
livestock 
3353 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Bojnec and Ferto 
(2013) 
2004-2008 Slovenia Crop, 
livestock 
1451 Total subsidies  Value per farm - 
Bojnec and Latruffe 
(2009) 
1994-2003 Slovenia Crop, 
livestock 
130 Production subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to revenue) 
- 
Brümmer and Loy 
(2000) 
19987-1994 Germany Dairy 5093 Farm  credit program 
as investment subsidies 
Dummy - 
Caroll et al. (2009) 1996-2006 Ireland  Dairy  3593 Decoupled subsidies Dummy - 
Caroll et al. (2009) 1996-2006 Ireland  Cattle rearing 2087 Decoupled subsidies Dummy 0 
Caroll et al. (2009) 1996-2006 Ireland  Cattle 
finishing  
2164 Decoupled subsidies Dummy 0 
Caroll et al. (2009) 1996-2006 Ireland  Sheep 890 Decoupled subsidies Dummy 0 
Caroll et al. (2009) 1996-2006 Ireland  Cereals  1016 Decoupled subsidies Dummy 0 
Chidmi et al. (2011) 2004-2008 United States  Dairy 1151 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
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Dinar et al. (2007) 1996 Greece  Crop, 
livestock 
265 Total subsidies Value per farm 0 
Dung et al. (2011) 2009-2010 India  Crop  362 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Emvalomatis  et al. 
(2008) 
1996-2000 Greece  Crop  3614 Compensatory 
payments  
Value per farm - 
Emvalomatis et al. 
(2008) 
1996-2000 Greece  Cotton  1117 Compensatory 
payments  
Value per farm - 
Giannakas et al. (2001) 1987-1995 Canada Wheat  100 Government income 
transfer   
Subsidy rate (subsidies  
to total farm income) 
- 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Dairy 10597 Total subsidies  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
+ 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Sheep 4765 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Beef cattle  2846 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
+ 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Poultry  578 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
0 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Pig  1459 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
0 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Cereals 4772 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Other crops  6461 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Hadley (2006) 1982-2002 England  Mixed 
farming 
7435 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to gross margin) 
- 
Iraizoz and Muniz 
(2004) 
1989-1999 Spain  Livestock  398 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Iraizoz et al. (2005) 1989-1999 Spain  Beef cattle  2594 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2005) 
1991-1995 Greece Tobacco  1481 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Wheat 1480 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Mixed crops 1485 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Cotton  1475 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Olive  1481 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Fruits  1470 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Vegetables  1400 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and Sarris 
(2002) 
1991-1995 Greece Horticulture  1400 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Karagiannis and 
Tzouvelekas (2005) 
1989-1992 Greece Sheep  178 Total subsidies Value per farm 0 
Kroupová and Malý 
(2010) 
2004-2008 Czech 
Republic 
Crop  715 Total subsidies  Subsidies per hectare - 
Kumbhakar and Lien 1991-2006 Norway  Cereals 1512 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
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(2010) 
Kumbhakar et al. 
(2012) 
2004-2008 Norway  Cereals 687 Coupled subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total farm net 
income) 
- 
    687 Environmental 
payments 
Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total farm net 
income) 
- 
Lachaal (1994) 1972-1992 United States  Dairy  / Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Lakner (2009) 1995-2005 Germany  Dairy  1348 Agri-environmental 
subsidies  
Value per farm - 
Lambarraa and Kallas 
(2009) 
2000-2004 Spain  Olive  315 LFA subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies to total 
subsidies)  
- 
Lambarraa et al. (2009) 1995-2003 Spain  COP  9852 Policy reform (Agenda 
2000) 
Dummy - 
Latruffe et al. (2008) 2000-2004 Czech 
Republic 
Dairy  431 Operational and 
investment  subsidies 
Value per farm - 
Latruffe et al. (2008) 2000-2004 Hungary Crop, 
livestock 
3210 Operational subsidies  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2008) 2000-2004 Slovenia Crop  130 Production subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Belgium  Dairy 5017 Total subsidies  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Denmark   Dairy 8004 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 France  Dairy 21514 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Germany  Dairy 30085 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Ireland   Dairy 7578 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Italy  Dairy 32120 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Luxembourg  Dairy 3821 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 The 
Netherlands   
Dairy 5017 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Portugal   Dairy 9040 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Spain  Dairy 22642 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 United 
Kingdom  
Dairy 13119 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to output value) 
- 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Belgium  Dairy 5017 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   0 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Denmark   Dairy 8004 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   - 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 France  Dairy 21514 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   + 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Germany  Dairy 30085 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   + 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Ireland   Dairy 7578 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   0 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Italy  Dairy 32120 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   + 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Luxembourg  Dairy 3821 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   0 
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Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 The 
Netherlands   
Dairy 5017 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   0 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Portugal   Dairy 9040 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   0 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 Spain  Dairy 22642 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   + 
Latruffe et al. (2012) 1990-2007 United 
Kingdom  
Dairy 13119 Decoupled subsidies   Dummy   + 
Malá (2011) 2004-2008 Czech 
Republic 
Crop  390 Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per hectare - 
Malá (2011) 2004-2008 Czech 
Republic 
Crop  390 Other subsidies Subsidies per hectare 0 
Mamardashvili and 
Schmid (2013) 
 Switzerland 
(plain) 
Dairy 1362 Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per animal + 
Mamardashvili and 
Schmid (2013) 
 Switzerland 
(hill) 
Dairy 2504 Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per animal + 
Mamardashvili and 
Schmid (2013) 
 Switzerland 
(mountain) 
Dairy 1958 Environmental 
subsidies 
Subsidies per animal + 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
COP  309 Total subsidies 
Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
COP  309 Coupled subsidies Value per farm 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
COP  309 
Environmental 
subsidies Value per farm 
0 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
COP  309 LFA subsidies Value per farm 
0 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Dairy 3879 Total subsidies Value per farm 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Dairy 3879 Coupled subsidies Value per farm 
+ 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Dairy 3879 
Environmental 
subsidies Value per farm 
+ 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Dairy 3879 LFA subsidies Value per farm 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Beef cattle 806 Total subsidies 
Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Beef cattle 806 Coupled subsidies Value per farm 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Beef cattle 806 
Environmental 
subsidies Value per farm 
+ 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Beef cattle 806 LFA subsidies Value per farm 
0 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Pig 1487 Total subsidies 
Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Pig 1487 Coupled subsidies Value per farm 
- 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Pig 1487 
Environmental 
subsidies Value per farm 
+ 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Pig 1487 LFA subsidies Value per farm 
0 
Manevska-Tasevska et 
al. (2013) 1998-2008 
Sweden 
Pig 1487 Investment subsidies Value per farm 
0 
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McCloud and 
Kumbhakar (2008) 
1997-2003 Denmark  Dairy  2709 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
McCloud and 
Kumbhakar (2008) 
1997-2003 Finland  Dairy  1844 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
McCloud and 
Kumbhakar (2008) 
1997-2003 Sweden  Dairy  2053 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Piesse and Thirtle 
(2000) 
1985-1991 Hungary  Cereals  819 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Rasmussen (2010) 1985-2006 Denmark Crop, 
livestock  
41926 Total subsidies Value per farm 0 
Rezitis et al. (2003) 1993-1997 Greece Crop, 
livestock  
482 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Sauer and Park (2009) 2002-2004 Denmark Dairy 168 Organic subsidies Value per farm + 
Serra et al. (2008) 1998-2001 United States  Crop  2196 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Sipiläinen et al. (2014) 1998-2001 Finland Dairy 6341 Policy change Dummy 0 
Sipiläinen et al. (2014) 1998-2001 Norway Dairy 5926 Policy change  Dummy 0 
Sotnikov (1998) 1990-1995 Russia  Crop, 
livestock 
450 Output subsidy Value per farm - 
Thian and Wan (2000) 1983-1996 China  Indica rice  346 Investment subsidies Value per farm + 
Thian and Wan (2000) 1983-1996 China  Japonica rice  224 Investment subsidies Value per farm 0 
Thian and Wan (2000) 1983-1996 China Wheat 335 Investment subsidies Value per farm + 
Thian and Wan (2000) 1983-1996 China  Corn   288 Investment subsidies Value per farm + 
Zaeske (2012) 1985-2005 United States  Crop  240 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Germany Dairy 12458 Coupled subsidies  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total income) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 The 
Netherlands 
Dairy 3223 Coupled subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total income) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Sweden  Dairy 3341 Coupled subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to total income) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Germany Dairy 12458 Livestock  subsidies  Payment ratio 
(subsidies to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 The 
Netherlands 
Dairy 3223  Livestock subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Sweden  Dairy 3341 Livestock subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Germany Dairy 12458 Input  subsidies  Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 The 
Netherlands 
Dairy 3223  Input  subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2012)    1995-2004 Sweden  Dairy 3341 Input  subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
- 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010)    
1995-2004 Germany COP 4755 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 1995-2004 The COP 1966 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies - 
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(2010)    Netherlands to farm revenue) 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010)    
1995-2004 Sweden COP 1009 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Zhu et al. (2011)   1995-2004 Greece Olive  2492 Total subsidies Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
- 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010)    
1995-2004 Germany COP 4755 Crop subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010)    
1995-2004 The 
Netherlands 
COP 1966 Crop subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
 
Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010)    
1995-2004 Sweden COP 1009 Crop subsidies Payment ratio 
(subsidies  to total 
subsidies) 
 
Studies using correlation or comparative analysis  
Douarin and Latruffe 
(2011) 
2001-2002 Lithuania  Crop  147 Total subsidies Subsidies per hectare - 
Galanopoulos et al. 
(2011) 
2011 Greece Sheep, goats 106 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Gaspar et al. (2009) 2004-2005 Spain  Livestock  69 Total subsidies Value per farm - 
Kleinhanss et al. 
(2007) 
1999; 2000 Spain  Pig  255;249 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Kleinhanss et al. 
(2007) 
1999; 2000 Spain  Beef cattle  1435;1543 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Kleinhanss et al. 
(2007) 
1999; 2000 Spain  Sheep and 
goats   
553;679 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Kleinhanss et al. 
(2007) 
1999; 2000 Germany   Pig  355;355 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Kleinhanss et al. 
(2007) 
1999; 2000 Germany  Beef cattle  604;604 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Quero (2006) 2002 Spain  Beef cattle  50 Livestock premium  Subsidy rate (subsidies 
to farm revenue) 
 
- 
Soares et al. (2001) 1996 Spain  Dairy  122 Coupled subsidies  Value per farm + 
Taylor et al. (1986) 1982 Brazil  Crop  433 Credit subsidies  Value per farm 0 
Theodoridis et al. 
(2012) 
2007-2010 Greece  Sheep  58 Total subsidies Value per farm + 
Chapter 4
Dynamic stochastic analysis of the farm
subsidy-efficiency link: Evidence from
France1
Abstract
The existing literature on the subsidy-efficiency nexus is almost exclusively static and thus
ignores the intertemporal nature of production decisions. To contribute to this literature,
this chapter aims at shedding light on the relationship between public subsidies and farm
technical efficiency, using a dynamic stochastic framework. This framework is applied to
a sample of French farms over the period 1992-2011. The results indicate that public
subsidies impact negatively farm technical efficiency. For comparison purposes, we also
estimate the static counterpart of the dynamic model. As in the dynamic case, we find a
negative link between public subsidies and farm technical efficiency; but the results suggest
that the static model over-estimates the inefficiency scores and the marginal effects of
public subsidies. However, for our sample of French farms, the estimated marginal effects
are relatively small.
4.1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), in quest of a symbiosis between agricultural support policies
and farming sustainability, the financial support to farmers has been gradually moved away
from market price supports to coupled direct payments (production-related payments) and
decoupled direct payments to farmers (European commission, 2011). Compared to the market
1This chapter has been written in collaboration with Timo Sipiläinen (University of Helsinki, Department
of Economics and Management, Helsinki, Finland).
91
price supports and the production-related payments, the decoupled payments were intended to
have no influence on farmers’ production decisions. However, Hennessy (1998) has theoretically
demonstrated that the decoupled payments could alter farmers’ production decisions through
an income-stabilising effect. In addition, Ciaian and Swinnen (2009) mention that decoupled
subsidies could influence farmers’ production decisions by reducing production constraints in
allowing farmers to cover operating costs, or in serving as collateral to credit access for credit
constrained farmers.
Hence, due to the potential influence of any kind of subsidies on farmers’ behaviour, a growing
body of literature examines their impact on farmers’ production decisions, in order to enlighten
policy makers. The current chapter is rooted in this literature with a particular attention on the
subsidy-eﬃciency link. The investigation of the subsidy-eﬃciency link is of crucial importance
from a survival perspective of the agricultural sector (Shee and Stefanou, 2015). Indeed, it could
inform policy makers on the extent to which subsidies drive the optimal use of resources and the
competitiveness of farmers in the long-run (see European commission, 2009; Latruffe, 2010).
In this view, it is worth mentioning that farms’ survival depends mainly on farmers’ ability to
make eﬃcient decisions over time (Choi et al., 2006). In this respect, an important issue of
the existing studies on the subsidy-eﬃciency link is that they are almost exclusively based on
a static view of the decision-making process2 . Although the static framework provides useful
insights for theoretical and empirical studies on eﬃciency analysis, it ignores some relevant
practical aspects. Particularly, it ignores the time interdependence of production decisions
(Serra et al., 2011), and thus provides only a limited view of productive eﬃciency (Sengupta,
1999). As a result, a dynamic framework seems to be necessary for analysing the subsidy-
eﬃciency link. Along with the dynamic setting, the stochastic production conditions in which
farms operate must be acknowledged.
The dynamic eﬃciency literature is mainly built upon the adjustment cost framework (see
Tsionas, 2006; Stefanou, 2009). More concretely, it relies on the principle that eﬃciency im-
provement requires adjustment decisions and thus incurs decision-makers to support adjustment
costs for quasi-fixed inputs, or variable input reallocation costs (see Tsionas, 2006; Choi et al.,
2006; Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou, 2007; Stefanou, 2009; Serra et al., 2011; Emvalomatis,
2012). This suggests that production decisions for improving current technical eﬃciency level
depend on adjustment costs of quasi-fixed inputs, or on the level of variable input realloca-
tion costs. In this case, public subsidies could help farmers to support adjustment costs for
quasi-fixed inputs or variable input reallocation costs, if they face binding credit or liquidity
2To our knowledge the paper by Skevas et al. (2012), is the only exception. However, this paper uses a two-stage
approach which is questionable (Simar and Wilson, 2011). The two-stage approach assumes that the input-output set is
not influenced by subsidies. This assumption contrasts with theoretical studies which state that subsidies may influence
the input-output space (see Hennessy, 1998; Serra et al., 2006).
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constraints (see Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). Nonetheless, it is also re-
cognised that adjustment decisions are generally postponable and can be influenced by the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of the decision-makers (Pindyck, 1993; Lence,
2000). The EIS can be thought here as an indicator of the willingness of decision-makers to
smooth their wealth over time (see Weil, 2002) through adjustment decisions. In this respect,
since subsidies could help farmers to smooth their wealth over the states of nature and over
time, they could distort the timing of adjustment decisions by distorting the EIS, and thus
cause persistent technical ineﬃciency.
In this context, this chapter aims at shedding light on the relationship between public subsidies
and farm technical eﬃciency, using a dynamic stochastic framework. The main novelty of
the chapter lies in estimating the link between public subsidies and technical eﬃciency in a
dynamic stochastic framework. The appealing feature of this framework is that it enables
recovering the stochastic and dynamic nature of the agricultural production process. The
next section provides a succinct review of the existing literature on the parametric dynamic
eﬃciency analysis. Section 4.3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4.4 introduces the
methodological framework and describes the data used. Section 4.5 presents the empirical
results. Section 5.6 draws concluding remarks.
4.2 Related literature
The dynamic eﬃciency concept is built upon the notions of intertemporal production technology
and adjustment decisions for which figure 4.1 provides some insights.
Figure 4.1 Intertemporal production technology
Figure 4.1 shows that, in period t, variable inputs xt and quasi-fixed inputs kt are transformed
by the production process P 0t into output yt and quasi-fixed inputs kt+1 which may include
gross investments It. These new quasi-fixed inputs kt+1 and new variable inputs xt+1 constitute
the main inputs for the production process P 0t+1 in the subsequent period t+ 1. In this setup,
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the intertemporal links are built upon the path of the quasi-fixed inputs. The path of these
inputs is governed by the physical depreciation rate of capital δ and investment decisions It.
As previously stated, quasi-fixed input adjustment costs and variable input reallocation costs
represent the core grounds of dynamic eﬃciency analysis (see, Choi et al., 2006; Stefanou,
2009; Serra et al., 2011). Adjustment or transition costs can be seen as transaction costs or
reorganisation costs. Concretely, on the one hand, adjustment costs are additional costs that
have to be supported by firms beyond acquisition costs (Stefanou, 2009). These costs may
include credit costs, contractual costs, and learning or training costs. On the other hand,
all variable inputs may not be instantaneously and costlessly reallocated to improve eﬃciency
(Choi et al., 2006). This implies that, reallocation of variable inputs may require transition costs
including learning or training costs and information search. It may also require a reorganisation
or restructuring of the production activity, which may need adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs
(Choi et al, 2006). Public subsidies could help farmers to support these costs, if they face
binding credit constraints (see Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009 and Latruffe et al., 2010). But they
may also distort economic pressures to adjust input use, since they could help farmers to smooth
their wealth over the states of nature and over time.
In the econometric3 literature, dynamic eﬃciency analysis is carried out using either reduced-
form or structural dynamic models. The reduced-form dynamic models are mainly extensions
of the standard stochastic frontier model through an autoregressive process of order 1 [AR
(1)] for the ineﬃciency component (See Ahn et al., 2000; Tsionas, 2006; Emvalomatis, 2012;
Galán et al., 2015). The dynamic structure of the reduced-form model relies on the AR (1)
process for the ineﬃciency component which allows capturing ineﬃciency persistence. That is,
it captures the part of the ineﬃciency that is transmitted from one period to the next. The
ineﬃciency persistence is assumed to be related to high adjustment costs, sluggish adjustments,
or uncertainty over future production conditions. From this viewpoint, Emvalomatis (2012)
argues that the reduced-form dynamic models may allow capturing some dynamic aspects
of firm’s behaviour. However, since reduced-form dynamic models do not model explicitly the
dynamic structure of the decision making process, explicit structural models may be preferable.
In the meantime, the existing parametric structural dynamic eﬃciency models include (i) the
dynamic models developed by Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) and Rungsuriyawiboon
and Hockmann (2015) based on the shadow cost approach and (ii) the dynamic model de-
veloped by Serra et al. (2011) based on the distance function approach. Basically, the shadow
cost approach consists in relating actual observed costs to shadow (or behavioural) costs ob-
tained from an optimisation programme. The connection is established through a distortion
3For the purpose of our analysis, we abstract from non-parametric dynamic efficiency models, since they are essen-
tially deterministic (see Nemoto and Goto, 1999, 2003; Ouellette and Yan, 2008).
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factor which captures departure from optimal values (the shadow cost approach is readily avail-
able in Stefanou and Saxena, 1988). The model by Rungsuriyawiboon and Hockmann (2015)
is an extension of the one developed by Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) which allows
accounting for multiple quasi-fixed factors. However, as stated by Serra et al. (2011) and re-
cognised by Rungsuriyawiboon and Hockmann (2015), one issue of the shadow cost approach is
that it does not specify the production technology directly. The structural model developed by
Serra et al. (2011) is a dynamic directional input distance function derived from an intertem-
poral cost minimisation programme, given the duality between input distance functions and
cost functions. Since distance functions may provide a complete characterisation of a produc-
tion technology (Chambers et al., 1998), it appears that, to date, the more suitable parametric
approach for dynamic eﬃciency analysis is the distance function approach developed by Serra
et al. (2011). As such, in this chapter we follow a distance function approach.
4.3 Conceptual framework
We derive a dynamic eﬃciency model, based on the dynamic dual model of production decisions
under uncertainty (Sckokai and Moro, 2009) and the duality between profit maximising input-
output combinations and distance functions (Chambers et al., 1998). Indeed, following Sckokai
and Moro (2009), we assume that farmers are risk averse and act so as to maximise an inter-
temporal utility function over an infinite horizon. The utility function is assumed to be concave
and continuously differentiable. The farmers are further assumed to make decisions by drawing
information from two state variables. The first state variable is a flow of capital services defined
as net investments in quasi-fixed inputs k. The second state variable is a Gaussian random profit
shock (ξ) due to the fact that the production process operates under uncertainty regarding input
price, output price, and climatic effects. This disturbance is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed over time, with zero mean and variance σ2ξ . In addition we assume that,
for making their decisions, producers assimilate the variance of the random profit shock and
the variance of their profit, σ2ξ = σ
2
pi. As a result, the discounted value of the utility of the
farmers is given by:
J (.) = max
xt,It
ˆ
1
0
e−rtU
(
pi, σ2pi
)
s.t. k˙ = (I − δk) (4.1)
In this setup, r is the interest rate; t is the indicator of time; U (.) is the utility function; k˙
is the derivative of the capital path with respect to time; I is the gross investment; δ is the
constant depreciation rate of the capital; and k is the unit of capital stock. The utility function
depends on the expected wealth of the farm pi = pi0 + p¯y − wx − ck + S and its variance σ
2
pi.
In the definition of the wealth, pi0 is the initial wealth of the farm, y = f (x, k, I) + ε gives
95
the intertemporal output production function of the farm, with a variance σ2y , p is the market
price of the output, which is a random variable with mean p¯ and variance σ2p, implying that
σ2pi = f
(
σ2p, σ
2
y
)
; w is the price of the variable inputs x; c is the rental price of the capital; and
S are the public subsidies.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the producer’s programme is given by:
rJ (.) = max
xt,It
{U (.) + Jk (I − δk)} (4.2)
Where rJ stands for the value of the stream of utility of farmers, and Jk denotes the shadow
value of the capital. The first derivatives of [4.2] with respect to output and input prices
yield the following system of equations for respectively output supply, investment demand, and
variable inputs demand (Sckokai and Moro, 2009):
y = U−1pi
h
rJp − Jkpk˙
i
k˙ = J−1kc [rJc + kU
−1
pi ]
x = U−1pi
h
rJw − Jkwk˙
i (4.3)
In this setup, a subscript denotes a first derivative, while a double subscript denotes a second
derivative. If we assume that producers are technically eﬃcient, in the sense that their input-
output combinations are all optimal, their production decisions could be characterised by es-
timating expression [4.3]. However, since they do not always succeed in optimising their pro-
grammes (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003), it is important to account for suboptimality or
ineﬃciency in their production decisions. Following Chambers et al. (1998) and Serra et al.
(2011), this can be done using distance functions.
Chambers et al. (1998) argue that distance functions may provide a complete characterisation
of a production technology and allow modelling technical eﬃciency. Indeed, using duality
theory, Chambers et al. (1998) show that profit-maximising input-output combinations can be
represented by a directional technology distance function. On this basis, expression [4.3] could
be alternatively defined using a dynamic directional technology distance function4.
The dynamic directional technology distance function enables a simultaneous examination of
output expansion, variable inputs contraction, and investment expansion. However, as pointed
out by Serra et al. (2011), it may be quite diﬃcult to account for the effect of exogenous drivers,
4In a similar way, Serra et al. (2011) derive a dynamic directional input distance function from intertemporal cost
minimisation programme.
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such as public subsidies, in a dynamic directional distance function. This may be related to the
complex structure of the empirical model. To circumvent this issue, we define a simpler dynamic
distance function, namely dynamic enhanced hyperbolic distance function, following Cuesta et
al. (2009). The main difference between the directional distance function and the hyperbolic
distance function is that the latter is based on the multiplicative homogeneity property of the
Shephard’s (1953; 1970) distance function, while the former is characterised by the translation
property which is the additive analogue of the multiplicative homogeneity property (see Färe
et al., 2005; Cuesta and Zofío, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2009, for more details).
Borrowing from Cuesta et al. (2009), the dynamic enhanced hyperbolic distance function can
be expressed as follows:
DE (y, x, , k, I) = inf {φ >: (y/φ, xφ, kφ, I/φ) 2 T} (4.4)
where T represents all possible input-output combinations. The term hyperbolic reflects the
hyperbolic path followed by the distance function toward the production frontier. As in Cuesta
and Zofío (2005) and Cuesta et al. (2009), the range of the dynamic enhanced hyperbolic
distance function is 0 < DE (y, x, k, I)  1.
In expression [4.4], the dynamic links are mainly built upon the modelling of investment de-
cisions, which allow accounting for adjustment decisions. In a sense, the modelling of invest-
ment decisions also allows accounting for adjustments of variable inputs. Indeed, as previously
mentioned, in the dynamic world, technical eﬃciency analysis involves adjustments of variable
inputs as well as adjustments of quasi-fixed inputs. In this line, it may be remarked from ex-
pression [4.3] that the variable inputs choice x is a function of the adjustments of the quasi-fixed
inputs k˙. This suggests the existence of a mapping between the adjustment of x and k˙. On
this basis, we may assume that the adjustment of all inputs depends on the adjustment of the
quasi-fixed inputs.
4.4 Methodology and data
4.4.1 Methodology
To estimate the dynamic enhanced hyperbolic distance function defined in [4.4], we chose a
stochastic translog specification since it complies with the almost homogeneity property of the
hyperbolic distance functions (Cuesta and Zofío, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2009). For a case of Q
outputs y, N variable inputs x, P quasi-fixed inputs k, H gross investments I, and M fixed
inputs l, the stochastic translog specification is given by:
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Where υit is a symmetric error term representing the usual statistical noise and unexpected
stochastic change in production environment; i denotes individual indices; and t represents
time indices. Following Cuesta et al. (2009), this hyperbolic distance function must be almost
homogeneous of degrees 1, -1, -1, 1. This property states that if the set of outputs is increased by
a given proportion, the set of variable inputs is reduced by the same proportion, the set of quasi-
fixed inputs is reduced by the same proportion, and the set of gross investments is increased
by the same proportion, then the distance function will increase by that same proportion
(see Cuesta and Zofío, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2009, for more details). The almost homogeneous
property is the multiplicative analogue of the translation property used in Serra et al. (2011).
This property is required for econometric estimation, since the dependent variable in expression
[4.5] is a latent variable.
Choosing the q0−th output for normalising in order to satisfy the almost homogeneity condition,
we get the following empirical specification:
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Where y⇤q,it =
yq,it
yq0,it
; x⇤n,it = xn,it⇥yq0,it ; k
⇤
p,it = kp,it⇥yq0,it ; I
⇤
q,it =
Ih,it
yq0,it
. Furthermore, denoting
lnDEit := uit ≥ 0, moving it to the right-hand side of the equation [4.6], and assuming that it
is a function of exogenous drivers zit including public subsidies, we get the following empirical
model:
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Where uit ∼ |N (0, σ
2
u)| is a non-negative error term reflecting technical ineﬃciency. The
econometric estimation of distance functions may be subject to endogeneity issues (see Atkinson
et al., 2003; Färe et al., 2005; Sauer and Latacz-Lohmann, 2014). Hence to provide consistent
estimates for our model, we follow Sauer and Latacz-Lohmann (2014) by regressing each right-
hand side variable in [4.5] on its lagged value and on all other regressors. This generates
fitted values that are then used to estimate expression [4.7]. Additionally, before applying the
normalisation procedure to comply with the almost homogeneity property, each variable in
expression [4.5] is divided by its geometric mean. This allows interpreting the estimated first-
order parameters as elasticities at the sample mean and avoiding convergence issues (Cuesta et
al., 2009).
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4.4.2 Data description
The data used are extracted from the database of the French region Meuse from 1992 to 2011,
and concern farmers who are voluntary enrolled in a regional accounting oﬃce so as to be guided
in their management practices. These data are very similar to European Farm Accountancy
Data Network (FADN); in fact, they are used to produce FADN data, but they are a bit more
detailed than FADN data (they contain a few more variables). The original sample contains
12,455 observations. In our analysis, we consider only farms which stay in the sample for at
least five5 years. Additionally, we remove observations with missing values and use lagged
values to account for endogeneity as indicated in section 4.4.1. Hence, the final dataset used
is an unbalanced panel with 9,760 observations on 1,005 French farms. Our dataset includes
information on farm production structure, farm financial results, and agricultural subsidies.
The empirical applications are conducted using two outputs, one variable input, one quasi-
fixed input, two fixed inputs, and some contextual factors. The intertemporal links are modelled
using gross investment in capital.
The two outputs include crop and livestock production values measured in Euros. The variable
input is defined as the value of intermediate inputs in Euros. The quasi-fixed input is the value
of the farm capital in Euros. The total labour used (composed of 93% of family labour) in annual
working units (AWU) which are full-time yearly equivalents, and the utilised agricultural area
(UAA) in hectares, are assumed to be fixed inputs. The contextual factors include the total
subsidy received by farmers (excluding investment subsidies) on a per hectare basis; a financial
variable defined as the ratio of debt to assets; and a time trend variable. Since our dataset covers
three reforms (or regimes) of the European Common Agricultural policy (CAP), we use dummy
variables for capturing the effects of these reforms. In fact, initially, the CAP was based on
market price supports which provide a minimum price (guaranteed prices) for commodities. In
1992, the CAP has undergone a first reform (the MacSharry reform) which initiates a reduction
in the price support scheme in favour of direct payments to farmers, coupled to production
decisions. In 2000, the CAP has undergone a second reform (the Agenda 2000) which pursues
the reduction of the guaranteed prices in favour of an increase in the direct payments. The
third reform of the CAP (the Luxembourg reform), adopted in 2003 and implemented in France
in 2006, introduces a decoupling of the direct payments, but some payments are still linked to
production. Hence, for the MacSharry reform, we create a dummy equal to one for the period
1992-1999, and zero otherwise. Concerning the Agenda 2000, we create a dummy equal to one
for the period 2000-2005, and zero otherwise. As regards the Luxembourg reform, we create
a dummy equal to one for the period 2006-2011, and zero otherwise. However, the use of the
5We assume that 2 or 3 years are insufficient to estimate a dynamic model. So, to take at least 4 years to
estimate the model, it is necessary to choose farms that stay at least 5 years in the sample, because we use
lagged variables to treat the endogeneity problem.
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dummy variables for the periods of the implementation of the reforms could not necessarily
reflect the causal effects of the reforms, given unobservable drivers that could affect production
decisions in these periods. To circumvent this issue, we use, in preference, variables obtained
from the interaction of the subsidy variable and the reform indicators.
All monetary values are expressed in 1992 constant Euros, using specific price indices from the
French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Summary statistics for
the main variables used are presented in table 4.1. Notice that monetary values for inputs and
outputs are widely used in eﬃciency analysis due to their availability. However, one should keep
in mind that eﬃciency scores estimated using monetary values reflect a mixture of technical
and allocative eﬃciency. To attenuate price effects, we have deflated the monetary values;
but this procedure does not necessarily convert them to real physical quantities. However, as
mentioned in Sipiläinen and Oude Lansink (2005) and Zhu et al. (2011), this procedure assumes
that farmers face the same prices and allows recovering implicit physical quantities for inputs
and outputs variables measured in value.
Table 4.1 Summary statistics for the main variables used
Mean Std. Dev.
Crop output (Euros) 99,659.06 73,981.25
Livestock output (Euros) 128,838 92,426.17
Capital(Euros) 253,919.1 160,041.2
Gross investment (Euros) 39,304.37 48,458.93
Intermediate consumption (Euros) 194,907.7 114,044.9
UAA (hectares) 187.87 99.73
Labour (AWU) 2.22 1.09
Subsidy per farm (Euros) 39,304.44 31,025.11
Subsidy per hectare 209.96 105.08
Debt to assets 0.39 0.63
MacSharry reform (dummy) 0.39 0.49
Agenda 2000 (dummy) 0.32 0.46
Luxembourg reform (dummy) 0.28 0.45
Number of observations 9,760
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4.5 Empirical results
Parameter estimates for the dynamic model are reported in table 4.2. As a baseline for com-
parisons, table 4.2 also reports parameter estimates for the static counterpart of the dynamic
model. The dynamic model differs from the static model mainly by accounting for investment
decisions. The first-order parameters for outputs, investments, and inputs are significant at the
1 percent level and have their expected sign. These parameters are estimated to be positive for
outputs and investments, and negative for inputs. These results suggest that the monotonicity
conditions of hyperbolic distance functions are fulfilled at the sample geometric mean (Cuesta
and Zofío, 2005). Furthermore, in the dynamic case, they indicate that, as expected, the dy-
namic hyperbolic distance functions is non-increasing in inputs and non-decreasing in outputs
and investments at the geometric mean of the data. Although the monotonicity properties of
hyperbolic distance functions are often evaluated at the geometric mean of the data (see Cuesta
and Zofío, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2009), here we also check it at all sample data point. We find
that the monotonicity properties are fulfilled at 98.3% of the sample for the outputs, 98.3% for
the investments, 62.8% for the utilised agricultural area (UAA), 100% for the labour and the
intermediate consumption, and 99% for the capital. Similar issues have been found in Vu and
Turnell (2012) and Henningsen et al. (2014). It is well known that regularity conditions can be
imposed in translog (hyperbolic) distance functions using Bayesian techniques (see Griﬃn and
Steel, 2007; Vu and Turnell, 2012). However, this is not straightforward here given the size of
our sample (about 10 000 observations).
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Table 4.2 Estimated parameter for the dynamic model and its static counterpart
Dynamic model Static model
Estimated value Std. Error Estimated value Std. Error
Distance function
Intercept 4.92E-02 *** 9.16E-04 1.10E-01 *** 2.45E-02
Output 1.59E-01 *** 1.06E-03 2.67E-01 *** 7.56E-04
Land -8.38E-03 *** 2.24E-03 -4.16E-02 *** 2.68E-03
Labour -1.92E-02 *** 1.16E-03 -1.28E-02 *** 1.82E-03
Intermediate inputs -3.37E-01 *** 3.46E-03 -5.88E-01 *** 3.18E-03
Capital -1.89E-01 *** 2.98E-03 -2.08E-03 1.44E-03
Investments 1.42E-01 *** 2.02E-03 / /
Output x output -7.94E-02 *** 1.93E-03 -1.06E-01 *** 1.31E-03
Output x land -1.40E-02 *** 3.45E-03 -5.63E-03 3.76E-03
Output x labour -2.25E-03 2.17E-03 -2.66E-03 2.68E-03
Output x intermediate inputs 7.22E-02 *** 3.22E-03 -7.35E-03 * 4.03E-03
Output x capital -2.71E-03 2.91E-03 -9.10E-05 1.41E-03
Output x investment 1.86E-02 *** 1.18E-03 / /
Land x land 3.68E-03 9.58E-03 8.92E-03 1.47E-02
Land x labour 1.15E-04 4.84E-03 1.83E-04 8.82E-03
Land x intermediate inputs 6.65E-02 *** 8.62E-03 -1.12E-02 1.42E-02
Land x capital -6.47E-02 *** 6.91E-03 -8.03E-03 5.34E-03
Land x investment 5.93E-02 *** 2.58E-03 / /
Labour x labour -7.88E-03 ** 3.27E-03 -9.23E-03 9.13E-03
Labour x intermediate input 5.18E-03 3.98E-03 4.33E-03 1.08E-02
Labour x capital -5.73E-03 * 3.13E-03 2.17E-03 4.03E-03
Labour x investment -9.06E-04 1.66E-03 / /
Intermediate input x intermediate input -5.11E-02 *** 7.93E-03 -3.54E-02 * 1.95E-02
Intermediate input x capital 1.70E-02 *** 4.97E-03 -9.35E-03 6.63E-03
Intermediate input x investment -2.98E-02 *** 2.05E-03 / /
Capital x capital 7.63E-03 ** 3.41E-03 6.46E-04 1.88E-03
Capital x investment 1.95E-02 *** 1.44E-03 / /
Investment x investment -3.64E-02 *** 7.39E-04 / /
Time trend 1.49E-03 *** 8.48E-05 2.51E-03 *** 4.12E-04
Inefficiency effects
Intercept -2.03 *** 3.91E-01 3.87E-02 *** 2.48E-02
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Subsidy per ha 7.90E-04 *** 2.51E-04 1.05E-04 *** 6.77E-06
Agenda 2000 x Subsidy per ha 1.17E-03 *** 1.64E-04 5.11E-05 *** 4.57E-06
Luxembourg reform x Subsidy per ha 2.43E-03 *** 3.45E-04 -1.03E-05 1.38E-05
Debt to assets 9.20E-02 *** 1.29E-02 4.45E-03 *** 1.03E-03
Time trend 2.11E-02 *** 5.61E-03 1.31E-03 *** 4.53E-04
Number of observations 9,760 9,760
Mean technical efficiency (TE) 0.97 0.93
LR test (no inefficiency vs inefficiency) 841.58 *** 940.76***
LR test (static model vs dynamic model) 4507 ***
Welch test comparing mean TE 194.19***
Correlation between the two TE vectors Pearson’s correlation: 0.27***; Spearman’s correlation: 0.38***
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%
The first likelihood ratio tests (LR tests: no ineﬃciency vs ineﬃciency) reject the null hypo-
thesis of no ineﬃciency at the 1% significance level. This suggests the existence of significant
technical ineﬃciency in production decisions of farmers in our sample. But, by comparing the
static eﬃciency model with the dynamic one, under the null hypothesis of their equivalence, a
further LR test confirms that the dynamic framework is more appropriate for analysing farm-
ers’ production. This confirms the relevance of the dynamic framework for analysing farmers’
production decisions.
The average estimated dynamic technical eﬃciency score is of 0.97 while the static one is of 0.93.
In the dynamic case, the estimated scores suggest that farmers, in our sample, could improve
their technical eﬃciency level by 3 percent on average. In the static case, the estimated scores
suggest that farmers could improve their technical eﬃciency level by 7 percent on average.
Although the estimated eﬃciency scores are relatively close, a Welch test, reported in table
4.2, indicates they are significantly different. This suggests that, in our sample, the static
model over-estimates the ineﬃciency scores. Similar results have been found in Dakpo and
Oude Lansink (2015) in a nonparametric framework. This finding is also supported by table
4.3 and figure 4.2. In what concerns the dynamic model, table 4.3 shows that for 25% of the
observations the eﬃciency scores are below 0.97 and that 75% of the observations have eﬃciency
scores below 0.98. As for the static model, table 3 shows that for 25% of the observations the
eﬃciency scores are below 0.91 and that 75% of the observations have eﬃciency scores below
0.94. On the other hand, the Spearman’s rank-order correlation coeﬃcients (0.38) and the
Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients (0.27), reported in table 4.2, show a quite weak positive link
between the dynamic and the static technical eﬃciency scores. This suggests that there are
considerable differences between the eﬃciency scores estimated by the the dynamic and the
static model.
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Table 4.3 Distribution and correlation of the two vectors of technical efficiency
Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max
Dynamic 0.70 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99
Static 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.96
Figure 4.2 indicates that the yearly averages of technical eﬃciency from the dynamic model
are higher than those from the static model. On the other hand, for the dynamic model, figure
4.2 shows that, in comparison with the MacSharry reform and the Luxembourg reform, the
estimated eﬃciency scores are lower for the Agenda 2000 reform. While for the MacSharry
reform6 and the Luxembourg reform the estimated eﬃciency scores are slightly different. A
similar pattern is observed for the static model. However, one should keep in mind that these
differences between the periods of policy reforms do not necessarily imply causal effects.
Figure 4.2 Yearly average of technical efficiency
Regarding the effects of the contextual drivers, a positive (negative) sign indicates a positive
(negative) association with technical ineﬃciency, and thus reveals a negative (positive) rela-
tionship with technical eﬃciency. In this respect, the estimation results for the dynamic model
indicate that public subsidies impact negatively farm technical eﬃciency. This may be due to
6Recall that the MacSharry reform has initiated a reduction in the price support scheme in favour of direct payments to
farmers, coupled to production decisions. The Agenda 2000 pursued the reduction of the guaranteed prices in favour of an increase
in the direct payments. The Luxembourg reform introduced a decoupling of the direct payments, but some payments are still linked
to production.
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sluggish adjustments which potentially result from the fact that public subsidies could distort
the timing of adjustment decisions. In a sense, this result supports the idea of Matthews (2013)
who argues that “subsidies could slow down the rate at which resources are reallocated to more
productive use in response to new technologies or market conditions”. As in the dynamic case,
the static model shows a negative link between public subsidies and farm technical eﬃciency.
This result is consistent with earlier findings (e.g. Zhu and Oude Lansink, 2010; Kumbhakar
et al., 2012; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2013; Sipiläinen et al., 2014). In this respect, our results
suggest that public subsidies could distort optimal input use in a dynamic setting as well as
in a static world. However, the marginal effects of public subsidies on the dynamic and the
static technical eﬃciency plotted in figure 4.3 highlight that the static framework overestimates
the effect of subsidies. However, it can be also seen from figure 4.3 that the marginal effect of
public subsidies is relatively low: it is of the order 10−6 in the dynamic model and 10−4 in the
static model. Using a dynamic data envelopment analysis (DEA), Skevas et al. (2012) have
also found relatively small marginal effects for public subsidies (of the order 10−4).
Simulation results, obtained from the estimated models, showed that the technical eﬃciency
scores remained unchanged when subsidies were set to zero. In the same vein, the contribution
of public subsidies to the variation of the estimated eﬃciency scores was found to be very
small. It is of the order 10−7 in the dynamic model and 10−5 in the static model. These results
highlight that the impact of subsidies on farm technical is negligible. This suggests that, in
future research, authors have to estimate the real impact of subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency
in the form of marginal effects instead of interpreting only the sign and the significance of the
effects, as it is common practice in the existing empirical literature.
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Figure 4.3 Marginal effects of public subsidies on farm technical efficiency
As for the agricultural policy reforms, the estimates reveal a significant negative effect of the
agenda 2000 reform and the decoupling on technical eﬃciency within the dynamic model. In
the static model a significant negative effect is found for the agenda 2000 reform, but the
effect of the decoupling is not statistically significant. The findings from the dynamic model
are confirmed by estimates for the time trend variable for which the estimated coeﬃcient
shows that technical eﬃciency decreases over time. Basically, this confirms the fact that even
decoupled, public subsidies could distort production decisions. However, concerning the static
model, although the effect of decoupling is not statistically significant, the estimates for the
time trend variable show that technical eﬃciency decreases over time.
The results regarding indebtedness signal that the higher the debt to assets ratio, the lower the
farm technical eﬃciency. Although the literature on the relationship between indebtedness and
technical eﬃciency is inconclusive (see Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; Mugera and Nyambane,
2014), the inverse association found in the current study could be interpreted within the agency
theory (Jensen and Mecklin, 1976). In fact, when establishing a loan contract, lenders often
charge borrowers an extra premium, given moral hazard and adverse selection issues. As a
result, farmers with high debt face high credit cost which may reduce their profitability. This
may induce technical ineﬃciency in the sense that highly indebted farmers may not have access
to more credit to finance intermediate inputs (see Davidova and Latruffe, 2007).
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4.6 Concluding remarks
The current chapter investigates the relationship between public subsidies and farm technical
eﬃciency using a dynamic stochastic framework. This framework allows accounting for the
stochastic and dynamic nature of the environment in which farms operate. But, for comparison
purpose, we also estimate a static frontier model. The dataset used for the estimations is a
sample of French farms located in the French Region Meuse over 19 years.
In the dynamic case, as well as in the static case, the estimation results show that public sub-
sidies impact negatively farm technical eﬃciency. In the static case, our results support previous
research which highlights that public subsidies are generally detrimental to farms’ technical ef-
ficiency. However, our dynamic model, which accounts for the stochastic and dynamic nature
of the agricultural production process, suggests that the static framework overestimates the
effect of public subsidies. This may be an interesting result for policy makers, since it reveals
that the impact of subsidies on technical eﬃciency is smaller when dynamic aspects are taken
into account. However, in our sample of French farms, the estimated marginal effects from the
static and the dynamic model are relatively small.
In this chapter, we use a stochastic frontier approach in which risk and uncertainty are con-
founded with statistical noises (see O’Donnell et al., 2010; Nauges et al., 2011). An alternative
approach could be the state-contingent production framework (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000),
which explicitly models uncertain production conditions through a set of states of nature.
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Chapter 5
The role of decoupled subsidies in a
multitasking agriculture providing
ecosystem services1
Abstract
This chapter proposes a new theoretical rationale for the possible incentive effect of de-
coupled subsidies. Using a multitasking agency model, we show that having recourse to
mixed payment, by introducing decoupled payments, could raise farmers’ incentives to
provide non-contractible environmental services. This model is then empirically tested
using French farm-level data. Our empirical results show that if “pay-for-performance”
payments through environmental contracts impact positively and significantly the adop-
tion of contractible services, e.g. permanent grass strip, they have no significant (or a
negative) effect on the adoption of non-contractible environmental services, e.g. crop di-
versification or mixed farming practices. In contrast, mixed payment through decoupled
subsidies helps balancing incentives for contractible and non-contractible environmental
services.
5.1 Introduction
From a socio-environmental point a view, agriculture is by its very nature multitasking. The
farmer is expected to produce food for society, but also preserves biological and landscape di-
versity. Both objectives may be conflicting since the dominant production mode in agriculture
generates negative externalities on the environment that may reduce both biological and land-
scape diversity. Decades of production-coupled subsidies have led to a substantive increase in
1This chapter has been written in collaboration with M’hand Fares (INRA, Unit AGIR, Toulouse, France).
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agricultural production and productivity, but also to a biased-technology toward chemical in-
puts (fertilisers and pesticides) that have harmful impact on environment (biological diversity)
but also animal and human health. To balance this effect and try to internalise the negative
externalities, some part of the subsidies became more conditioned and the farmer may get these
subsidies only if he is committed in an environmental contract that specifies the adoption of
environmentally friendly practices and inputs and the payment is contingent to this adoption.
However, farmers seem to be reluctant to these contingent or “pay-for-performance” contract
(Espinoza-Goded et al., 2013), and this may explain why the adoption rate of environmental
contracts is low.
The general literature on incentives recognises that selective payment for performance leads
to diﬃculties when there are many tasks expected of a supplier, as this is the case in agri-
culture (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge
of designing incentives to make appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired out-
comes for some tasks are more diﬃcult to measure than others (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Precise metrics for farmer actions that promote environmental quality are notoriously diﬃcult
to quantify. Furthermore, there are obviously many dimensions of quality for environmental
services provided by agriculture and the farmer.
Multitasking2 implies that the social planner or the government (providing subsidies) should
use pay-for-performance cautiously as long as environmental service is rewarded only partially
or metrics are imperfect. In general, the less precise the measure of performance, the less
pay-for-performance incentives should be used.
The simple model of agriculture multitasking developed in this chapter suggests an additional
implication: the problem of multitasking further strengthens the argument of mixed payment,
e.g. by introducing partial decoupling subsidies from production. Previous economic argu-
ments for decoupled subsidies and mixed payment center on reducing farmer risk’s aversion
(Hennessy, 1998) or relaxing credit constraints (Goodwin and Mishra, 2006). We show that
introducing decoupled subsidies may be socially eﬃcient since they can balance incentives for ef-
fort across contractible and non-contractible environmental services. This relationship between
both dimensions deserves attention, especially as more new environmental instruments and
contracts include measures of farmer performance in payment. Indeed, our main finding is
that mixed payment, through decoupled subsidies, lessens distortions in effort allocation when
pay-for-performance is imperfect, thus promoting non-contractible environmental services.
2The multi-functionality of agriculture is the generic term, but we want to depart from the usual literature
on multi-functionality in agricultural economics. In this literature, multi-functionality mainly refers to joint-
production analysis. In this chapter, we use the multitasking approach of incentive contract (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991) to deal with the different (ecosystem) services that agriculture may provide.
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What has not been shown in the previous literature on multitasking is the link between pay-for-
performance and mixed payment. Applying this idea to agricultural multitasking, we show that
moving away from coupled toward more decoupled subsidies (mixed payment) may promote
effort on environmental non-contractible services. This theoretical proposition has been empir-
ically tested using a French database and confirmed by the estimation of: (i) a reduced-form
of the model (an extended seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model), which accounts for
continuous, dichotomic and polytomic decision variables, and (ii) a structural model.
The remaining sections are organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 5.3 presents the theoretical model and in section 5.4 we test the empirical prediction of
our theoretical framework on the incentive effect of mixed payment and decoupled subsidies.
Section 5.5 brings some concluding remarks.
5.2 Related literature
Concerns about coherence between agricultural policies and the sustainability of the agricul-
tural sector have motivated a large body of literature on the influence of agricultural supports
on farmers’ production decisions, particularly in terms of optimal input use, acreage decisions,
agricultural production and environmental externalities. Today, production-related subsidies
(also named coupled subsidies), decoupled subsidies, and agri-environmental payments repres-
ent the main forms of agricultural support granted to farmers (OECD, 2014). The coupled
subsidies are given to maintain some specific crops in farming; the decoupled subsidies serve
mainly to stabilise farms’ revenue; and the agri-environmental payments are given to farm-
ers who voluntarily subscribe to a programme of environmentally friendly farming practices.
While the production specific payments (coupled subsidies) are known to induce distortions
in production decisions (Young and Westcott, 2000), the effect of decoupled subsidies on pro-
duction decisions is still under debate (Just and Kropp, 2013), and the uptake rate of the
agri-environmental schemes remains relatively low (Guillem and Barnes, 2013; Espinosa-Goded
et al., 2013).
Overall, initial research on decoupled subsidies supports that they do not provide incentives for
production intensification (see Just and Kropp, 2013). In this sense, they appear to be envir-
onmentally friendly since it is well known that intensification of agricultural production may
lead to environmental damages such as biodiversity loss, water pollution, and land degradation.
However, further research show that decoupled subsidies may increase production by reducing
farmers’ risk aversion to engaging in risky production activities (Hennessy, 1998, Sckokai and
Moro, 2006; Féménia et al, 2010) and by relaxing credit constraints (Goodwin and Mishra,
2006; Ciaian and Swinnen 2009). Nevertheless, in a review of literature, Bhaskar and Beghin
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(2009) highlight that the effects of decoupled subsidies on production decisions are likely to
be negligible. Additionally, Serra et al. (2011a) evidence that decoupled subsidies have only
negligible impacts on farmers’ production decisions. However, in a more recent study, Just
and Kropp (2013) argue that decoupled subsidies may be as production distorting as direct
production subsidies. The reasoning is that, to be entitled to support, farmers are constrained
to produce eligible crops even though the profits associated with these crops decline relative to
the profits of non-eligible crops. This may create production distortions, because in this case
producers are not encouraged to respond to market signals.
In what concerns farm productivity and technical eﬃciency, which can be seen as indicators of
input optimal use, theoretical studies predict mixed impacts of decoupled subsidies (see Rizov
et al, 2013; Kazukauskas et al., 2014; Serra et al. 2008; Kumbhakar and Lien, 2010). Although
empirical results are in line with the theoretical predictions, the most common finding is a
negative effect (see Minviel and Latruffe, 2014a). In addition, some of the positive effects
reported in the literature may result in artifactual modelling approaches (see Minviel and
Latruffe, 2014b). This suggests that, in essence, public subsidies involve non-optimal use of
production factors.
As for acreage decisions, Goodwin and Mishra (2006) find a positive association between de-
coupled subsidies and acreage for grain productions. However, they mention that a more general
evaluation of decoupled subsidies on acreage decisions has to include non-crop (pasture, follow,
and set-aside) use of farmland.
Regarding the issue of agri-environmental schemes, it is agreed that adoption of environmentally
friendly farming practices (EFFP) is strongly driven by the environmental attitudes (environ-
mental consciousness) and the ecological perceptions of the farmers (Wilson and Hart, 2000;
Morris et al, 2002; Guillem and Barnes, 2013). However, possible barriers to the adoption of
environmentally friendly practices include additional fixed costs and income foregone associated
with these practices (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2013; Europa, 2015). In this view, the decoupled
payments may potentially encourage EFFP since they serve mainly to flatten farmers’ revenue.
This coincides with the idea of Espinosa-Goded et al. (2013) who mention that lump sum
payments would be eﬃcient for the adoption of EFFP.
The previous discussion suggests that more theoretical and empirical work is needed to address
the coherence between agricultural policies and the sustainability of the agricultural sector. A
limitation of the above literature is that the description of the strategic decisions of farmers is
relatively poor. On the one hand, the productivity and eﬃciency analyses are insightful as they
reveal the extent to which public subsidies influence the optimal use of inputs. Nevertheless,
in a socio-environmental perspective, they provide only partial insights for policy makers. For
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instance, they do not provide specific information on the influence of subsidies on the eﬃciency
of land use and chemical input use, which may be relevant for policy makers. On the other
hand, the models of acreage decisions ignore the fact that, given decoupled subsidies, farmers
may adopt extensive production strategies by extending areas under cultivation while reducing
chemical input use per unit area (Boussemart et al., 2011). In essence, one important issue,
which is not explicitly addressed in the previous literature, is the multitasking nature of farmers’
production decisions. On this basis, this chapter develops an agency multitasking model to
address this issue.
5.3 The model
5.3.1 Set-up
In this section, we develop a simple model tailored to the agro-environmental setting. Con-
sider a farmer who contracts with the planner or the government (Ministry of Agriculture) to
provide multiple agricultural (ecosystem) services to society. Consumers are supposed to desire
various ecosystem services - e.g. quantity and quality of food, less pesticides and fertilisers
use, biological and landscape diversity preservation. Let Q represent the production of food
outputs in quantitative terms, and ei denote farmer’s effort on environmental service i. Social
benefits from ecosystem services, Vi(Q, ei), are increasing and concave in production and effort.
The social planner utility from ecosystem services is the sum of benefits from each individual
ecosystem service, i.e. V (Q, e) =
P
i Vi.
Assume that the farmer effort ei on environmental service i increases the social utility Vi(Q, ei)
for a given level of production, at a decreasing rate3. That is, ∂Vi(Q, ei)/∂ei > 0 and ∂
2Vi(Q, ei)/∂e
2
i <
0. Assume environmental effort increases the marginal benefit of each ecosystem service, i.e.
∂2Vi(Q, ei)/∂ei∂Q > 0, 8i. Environmental service effort vector e generates a disutility C(e) for
the farmer, where C(e) is increasing and convex in effort. Similarly, production of food gen-
erates a disutility C(Q) for the farmer, where C(Q) is increasing and convex in its argument.
We suppose also that increasing one environmental effort increases the marginal cost of other
efforts, i.e. ∂2C/∂ei∂ej > 0, 8j 6= i.
Some farmer environmental effort on providing ecosystem services may be contractible. For
example, the planner/government may decide to offer an environmental contract with a “quality
bonus” for specific ecosystem services that may improve quality of the environment, such as
3We do not add a production effort in our simple model since we are specifically interested in analysing the
impact of the optimal mix of production subsidies, coupled and decoupled, on the incentives to provide effort on
environmental services, whether they are contractible or not. In a more general model, it would be interesting
to introduce a production effort.
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introducing permanent grass strip, fallow ... Assume the government pays the farmer νj per
verifiable unit of effort ej, with j 6= i, and where νj can be seen as “pay-for-performance” or
“bonus payment”.
The revenue of the farmer is a three component compensation scheme. First, a market revenue
from the output Q sold on the market at a price P . Without loss of generality we suppose
that P = 1. Second, subsidies from a “production contract” with production coupled subsidies
(αQ) with 0 < α < 1 and decoupled subsidies (or fixed payments, F ). In Europe, this “produc-
tion contract” refers to the first pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). To ensure
the participation of the farmer to the contract, if the government decides to reduce coupled
subsidies (αQ), it needs to increase the decoupled subsidies (F ). Third, subsidies from an agri-
environmental contract with payments for some specific effort in ecosystem services that may
improve the environment (νiei). Taking into account the production cost (C(Q)) and disutility
of the environmental effort (C(e)), the profit Π of the farmer can be written as follows:
Π = F + (1 + α)Q− C(Q) +
X
i
νiei −
X
i
C(ei) (5.1)
We suppose that the farmer cares about the social environmental concerns V , as well as his
own profit Π from producing output and environmental services. His utility is then
U = U0 (Π) + λV (5.2)
The higher λ , the more “benevolent” the farmer is (see Daly and Giertz, 1972; Bergstrom,
1999). A farmer who equally values environmental concerns and his own profit would have λ
equal to one. We assume that farmers do care about environmental concerns (see Anderson,
1990; McCann et al., 1997; Karali et al., 2014), although the level of “benevolence” could be
quite limited. U0 denotes the private component of the farmer’s altruistic utility function U .
We also assume that farmer’s utility is strictly concave.
The government is supposed to be able to specify a payment for each environmental service
separately (such as a premium for fallow and one for permanent grass strip). Dimensions of
ecosystem performance that are not explicitly rewarded are implicitly assigned a “price” of zero
(ν = 0). That is, the effort distortions that arise in the model do not stem from inability to
target ecosystem services incentives on particular services.
5.3.2 Incentives with one environmental service
The government is supposed to maximise the net social surplus subject to a budget constraint:
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Max<Q,e> W = WC − T +WF s.t. F + αQ+ νe  S (5.3)
where WC denotes consumers’ surplus, T represents the taxes, and WF denotes farmers’ surplus,
which are given by:8>>><
>>>:
WC = λV (Q, e)−Q
T = F + αQ+ νe
WF = Π = Q+ F + αQ+ νe− C (Q)− C (e)
S denotes the total subsidy amount that can be spent by the regulator. Substituting WC , T
and WF in 5.3, the regulator’s programme becomes:
Max<Q,e>W = λV (Q, e)− C (Q)− C (V ) s.t. F + αQ+ νe  S (5.4)
The first order conditions (FOC) are given by:
8<
:
λVQ(Q
⇤, e⇤) = C 0(Q⇤) + µα
λVe(Q
⇤, e⇤) = C 0(e⇤) + µν
(5.5)
where µ represents the strength of the budget constraint, Q⇤ and e⇤ denote the first-best levels
of output and effort. Expression [5.5] indicates that the marginal value of the production Q,
and the marginal value of the environmental service are higher than their respective marginal
cost in the presence pay-for-performance in environmental quality effort ν and high-powered
production subsidies. This implies that the regulator can promote environmental quality effort
with high-powered pay-for-performance or with low-powered production subsidies, assuming
that Q and e are substitutable.
Suppose the regulator cannot reward environmental service effort (because e is non-contractible).
Then the regulator has only one instrument (α) to hit two targets (increasing production and
environmental services). Assuming Q and e are substitutable, the non-contractibility of en-
vironmental service presents a dilemma: a high production subsidy rate α ensures production
quantity provision but not environmental effort; low α promotes environmental service but also
low production quantity. A mixed form of payment is likely to be optimal, to balance produc-
tion output with environmental service. The regulator can solve the dilemma if e is contractible.
Then production subsidies parameter α can be set appropriately to increase production output,
while direct rewards for environmental service prevent production from adversely impacting en-
vironmental service.
121
5.3.3 Incentives with two environmental services
Consider now a two-environmental service model. The regulator contracts with a farmer to
provide two kinds of environmental services. The contract includes a fixed payment F (de-
coupled subsidies), a share payment αQ (coupled subsidies), as well as incentive payments ν1e1
and ν2e2 to motivate efforts in environmental services 1 and 2. In the two-service model where
C(e) = C(e1, e2), effort on service 1 competes for the farmer attention with effort on service 2,
so that a higher level of one effort increases the marginal cost of the other. Denoting partial de-
rivatives with a subscript, the assumptions are thus ∂C(e1, e2)/∂e1 = C1 > 0, ∂C(e1, e2)/∂e2 =
C2 > 0, ∂
2C(e1, e2)/∂e
2
1 = C11 > 0, ∂
2C(e1, e2)/∂e
2
2 = C22 > 0. Similar to the case of one
environmental service, the programme of the regulator is given by:
Max<Q,e1,e2>W = λV1(Q, e1)+λV2(Q, e2)−C (Q)−C (e1, e2) s.t. F+αQ+ν1e1+ν2e2  S
(5.6)
The FOCs of the social welfare maximisation for choice of production output and environmental
service efforts are
λ

∂V1(Q, e1)
∂Q
+
∂V2(Q, e2)
∂Q
]
= C 0(Q) + µα (5.7)
λ

∂V1(Q, e1)
∂e1
]
= C1(e1,e2) + µν1 (5.8)
λ

∂V2(Q, e2)
∂e2
]
= C2(e1, e2) + µν2 (5.9)
where µ represents the strength of the budget constraint.
Comparative statics show how the relationships between services lead to the multitasking prob-
lems and how mixed payment through decoupled subsidies can mitigate the adverse effects.
First, increasing the share payment for production (coupled subsidies) induces the farmer to
increase his production output (∂Q/∂α > 0). Increasing incentive payment for the first en-
vironment service (ν1) induces the farmer to exert more effort on that service (∂e1/∂ν1 > 0)
and to decrease effort on the other environmental service (∂e2/∂ν1 < 0). That is, our model
replicates standard results of the literature on multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
What has not been shown in the literature on multitasking, and the primary focus here, is the
trade-off between pay-for-performance (νi > 0) for some environmental service(s) and mixed-
payment (0 < α < 1). The following proposition articulates both results.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the first environmental service is non-contractible (ν1 is con-
strained to 0), whereas the second environmental service is contractible (ν2 > 0). We get two
results:
(i) classic multitasking effect: Incentive payments on the second service (ν2 > 0) causes
the multitasking problem, i.e. the farmer reallocates effort from the first service
(∂e1/∂ν2 < 0) to the second service (∂e2/∂ν2 > 0).
(ii) mixed-payment effect: Introducing mixed payment by decreasing the high-powered
incentives for production, through decoupled subsidies, can restore some incentive
for the first service (∂e1/∂α < 0). The underlying idea is that, as mentioned earlier,
to ensure the farmer’s participation to the production contract, if coupled subsidies
are reduced (by decreasing α), decoupled subsidies must be increased.
Proof. See appendix for the derivation of the results.
Proposition 1 implies that moving away from coupled subsidies toward more decoupled sub-
sidies, i.e. mixed payment by decreasing α, reduces the multitasking problem. That is, it is
possible to restore incentives for the non-contractible environmental service. In the example
that we consider in the empirical application below, the permanent grass strip environmental
service may be measurable, and thus contractible, while environmental service from mixed
farming (MF) and crop diversification (NC) may be more diﬃcult to measure. Then, using
high-powered pay-for-performance will distort farmer away form mixed farming or investment
in crop diversification toward permanent grass strip service. Using mixed payment, by decreas-
ing coupled subsidies and increasing the decoupled subsidies (F ) reduces the distortion.
5.4 Empirical analysis
To test the empirical prediction of our Proposition 1, we use a farm-level database that collected
from 2003 to 2011: (i) French farmers’ decisions on production and environmental practices;
and (ii) different components of the public subsidies received by these farmers. After a brief
presentation of the data and the two empirical models used [5.4.1], we discuss the results of the
econometric results [5.4.2].
5.4.1 Data and econometric models
Data and variables
We use an unbalanced panel dataset for French farms located in the French region Meuse over
two sub-periods of policy implementation: 2003-2005 and 2008-2011. This segmentation allows
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evaluating the incentive effect of decoupled payments as in a natural experiment framework. In
the period covered by the current study, direct payments to producers have become dominant
in the European Union (UE) CAP budget and the agri-environmental payments have been
strengthened. However, in the sub-period 2003-2005, all direct payments received by producers
were coupled to their production decisions (coupled payments) while in the sub-period 2008-
2011 the major part of the direct payments has been decoupled from production (decoupled
payments). Notice that, in France the implementation of the decoupled payment schemes
started in 2006. However, in our data set, no information is available on decoupled payments
for the years 2006 and 2007; that is why these years are excluded in our analysis. The total
number of observations is 1,049 for the sub-period 2003-2005 and 1,592 for the sub-period
2008-2011.
The data set is provided by a regional accounting oﬃce and contains information on farm
production structure, on farm financial results, and on agricultural subsidies. More precisely,
it contains information on crop areas, crop production in monetary values and in physical
quantities, implementation of permanent grass strip, total expenditures on pesticides, fertiliser
use in monetary values and in physical quantities, work hours and workloads, coupled and
decoupled payments, payment for permanent grassland, headage, and number of crops. It
also contains information on variables that may influence production decisions such as farmer’s
age (Age), the legal status of the farms (individual or company farms) (Indiv), and farm’s
indebtedness (Debt). For estimation purposes, the dataset was complemented with output
price, fertiliser price, pesticide price, and labour price. For the output, the fertilisers, and the
labour, the prices are computed by dividing monetary values by physical quantities. Farmers
produce several outputs and their prices are potentially correlated. To circumvent correlation
issues in the estimation procedure, the output price used in the regression is a mean price
computed from the individual prices. Since no information is available on physical quantities of
pesticides, we cannot compute their prices. Hence, as in Serra et al. (2011b) and Laukkanen and
Nauges, (2014), we consider the pesticide price index as a proxy for pesticide price. A statistical
summary for those variables is presented in table 5.1. All monetary values are expressed in
2003 constant Euros using the appropriate deflators.
Among the critical variables, we distinguish a set of decisions including production services
such as chemical input use (Fert and Pest) in cropping to increase the agricultural yield and
environmental services such as implementation of permanent grass strip (PG), crop diversity
(NC), and mixed farming adoption (MF). The dependent variables in expression [5.10, the
reduced-form model] concern therefore the use of chemical fertilisers (Fert), the use of chemical
pesticides (Pest), the implementation of permanent grass strip (PG), the number of crops
(NC), and mixed farming (MF ). The dependent variables are related to decoupled payment
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(SD), coupled payment (Sc), contract payment for permanent grassland (Spg) but also fertiliser
(Wf ) and pesticide price (Wp), total farm area (L), the ratio of wheat area to total farm area
(Shwheat), farmers’ age (Age), a binary indicator for individual farms (Indiv) versus partnership
farms, and farmers’ indebtedness (Debt) measured as the ratio of farmers’ debt and capital
assets. The control variable Shwheat is used to account for some induced effects of wheat. In
fact, wheat is a very profitable crop and it is very demanding in fertilisers and pesticides. It
may therefore influence the other choices of the producers.
The reduced-form approach
We first test Proposition 1 prediction by having recourse to a reduced-form approach. That
is, we estimate the impact of the compensation scheme (coupled and decoupled subsidies (SC
and SD), and pay-for-(environmental) performance (Spg) on the decision to adopt production
services (Fert and Pest) and contractible (PG) and non-contractible services (NC and MF ).
To do so, we estimate the following system of equations:
Fert = α0 + α1SD + α2Sc + α3Spg + α4X + ξ1
Pest = β0 + β1SD + β2Sc + β3Spg + β4X + ξ2
PG = γ0 + γ1SD + γ2Sc + γ3Spg + γ4X + ξ3
NC = δ0 + δ1SD + δ2Sc + δ3Spg + δ4X + ξ4
MF = θ0 + θ1SD + θ2Sc + θ3Spg + θ4X + ξ5
(5.10)
where X = {WF ,WP , L, Shwheat, Age, Indiv,Debt} is the vector of other exogenous variables.
In this setup, the system of equations [5.10] allows testing direct and indirect effects of different
incentives on farmers’ choices. For instance, the agri-environmental schemes serve mainly to
engage farmers in specific environmentally friendly farming practices such as implementation
of permanent grass strip, but they may also contribute to the production of ecologically sound
commodities by reducing fertiliser use at farm level, or by encouraging mixed farming. The
decoupled payments may balance incentives toward extensive farming and thus induce produc-
tion of ecologically sound commodities by reducing chemical input use and distortion toward
contractible environmental service (permanent grass strip).
The system of equations [5.10], in which some of the dependent variables are continuous (Fert,
Pest, PG) while others are ordered (NC) and binary (MF), can be estimated by the mixed-
process maximum likelihood procedure introduced by Roodman (2011). This procedure can
be seen as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner, 1962) with continuous and
discrete variables. In behavioural analysis, the SUR model combines a set of equations related
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to a set of individual decisions, assuming that equation residual errors may be correlated for
an individual given unobservable drivers that may influence his decisions. More precisely, the
SUR method estimates simultaneously a set of equations which share a common error structure
with non-zero covariance, so that the parameters of each single equation take into account
information provided by the order equations (Cadavez and Henningsen, 2012). The term SUR
is used in the sense that there is no reciprocal causation between endogenous variables and the
error terms are assumed to be correlated across equations. Each equation of the SUR model
could be consistently estimated separately; but a simultaneous estimation is generally more
eﬃcient since it uses information from full covariance structure of the model.
The structural-form approach
Besides the reduced-form approach, we also estimate a system of structural equations from
expression [5.1]. To derive this system of equations, which concerns only the continuous vari-
ables, we follow Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Laukkanen and Nauges (2014), by writing the
expression of the profit Π of the farmer as follows :
Π =
X
c
Lc(PcQc + Sc) + LpgSpg − wx+ SD (5.11)
Were Lc denotes land allocated to crop c; Pc stands for output production price; Qc denotes
output production per hectare; Sc and Spg represent per hectare subsidy rates for crops and
permanent grass strip (Lpg); x is vector of inputs and w represents their corresponding price;
and SD stands for the amount of decoupled payments. Maximising the profit function [5.11]
under the constraint of total land available, Lc + Lpg = L, yields optimal land, output, and
input decisions. The equations related to these decisions can be derived by applying Hoteling’s
lemma to a dual profit function (
Q
(Pc, w, Sc, Spg, SD, L)). To be theoretically valid, the profit
function has to be convex in prices, linearly homogeneous in prices, monotonic increasing in
output prices, monotonic decreasing in input prices. To impose these conditions as well as the
constraint on the available total land, the dual profit function is modelled using the normalised
quadratic form (Lau, 1976). As in Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Laukkanen and Nauges
(2014), the normalisation is done by dividing the profit, prices and subsidies by the price of one
input. For the purpose of our analysis, the inputs considered include fertiliser, pesticide, and
labour; and the price of labour is used to normalise the profit function. Hence, the quadratic
profit function is given by
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Π¯ = α0 + α1P¯c + α2S¯c + α3S¯pg + α4S¯D + α5W¯f + α6W¯p + α7P¯c ⇥ S¯c
+α8P¯c ⇥ S¯pg + α9P¯c ⇥ S¯D + α10P¯c ⇥ W¯f + α11P¯c ⇥ W¯p + α12S¯c ⇥ W¯f
+α13S¯c ⇥ W¯p + α14S¯pg ⇥ W¯f + α15S¯pg ⇥ W¯p + α16S¯D ⇥ W¯f
+α17S¯D ⇥ W¯p + 0.5α18P¯
2
c + 0.5α19S¯
2
c + 0.5α20S¯
2
pg + 0.5α21S¯
2
D
+0.5α22S¯c ⇥ S¯pg + 0.5α23S¯c ⇥ S¯D + 0.5α24S¯pg ⇥ S¯D + 0.5α25W¯
2
f
+0.5α26W¯
2
p + 0.5α27W¯f ⇥ W¯p + α28P¯c ⇥ L+ α29S¯c ⇥ L+ α30S¯pg ⇥ L
+α31W¯f ⇥ L+ α32W¯p ⇥ L
(5.12)
Differentiating with respect to prices and unit of subsidies yields
LcQc =
∂Π¯
∂P¯c
= α1 + α7S¯c + α8S¯pg + α9S¯D + α10W¯f + α11W¯p + α12P¯c + α28L (5.13)
Lc =
∂Π¯
∂S¯c
= α2 + α7P¯c + α12W¯f + α13W¯p + α19S¯c + α22S¯pg + α23S¯D + α29L (5.14)
Lpg =
∂Π¯
∂S¯pg
= α3 + α8P¯c + α14W¯f + α15W¯p + α20S¯pg + α12S¯c + α23S¯D + α30L (5.15)
−xf =
∂Π¯
∂W¯f
= α5 + α10P¯c + α12S¯c + α14S¯pg + α16S¯D + α25W¯f + α27W¯p + α31L(5.16)
−xp =
∂Π¯
∂W¯p
= α6 + α11P¯c + α13S¯c + α15S¯pg + α17S¯D + α26W¯p + α27W¯f + α32L (5.17)
where LcQc denotes output supply, Lc stands for land allocated to crop production, Lpg rep-
resents land allocated to permanent grassland, xf and xp denote fertiliser and pesticide uses
respectively. The upper bar indicates normalised profit, price, and subsidy variables. For the
purpose of our analysis, equations [5.12], [5.13], [5.14], [5.15], [5.16], and [5.17] form the system
of structural equations to be estimated after appending a disturbance term to each equation.
Equations [5.12 ] to [5.17] form the conceptual basis of the structural model. However, fol-
lowing Lau and Yotopoulos (1971), Khan and Maki (1979), and Dupraz and Latruffe (2015)
some contextual variables that condition the realisation of the profit could be included in the
structural model. On this basis, as in the expression [5.10], we consider the following contextual
variables: the ratio of wheat area to total area (Shwheat), farmers’ age (Age), a binary indicator
for individual farms (Indiv) versus company or partnership farms, and farmers’ indebtedness
(Debt) measured as the ratio of farmers’ debt and capital assets.
127
Table 5.1 Brief summary statistics of the main variables used
Variable 2003-2005 2008-2011
Name Abbreviation Mean SD Mean SD
Fertiliser input (Kg) Fert 7,638 5,153 4,354 3,343
Pesticide input (Euros) Pest 11,227 6,053 18,985 13,548
Permanent grassland (ha) PG 55.57 33.71 61.01 42.64
Coupled payment (Euros) Sc 43,734 19,780 5,236 6,870
Decoupled payment (Euros) SD / / 51,425 26,511
Payment for permanent grass strip (Euros) Spg 520.15 2,041 636.92 1,818
Total farm area (ha) L 131.49 51.68 187.70 96.91
Land allocated to crop (ha) Lc 75.91 42.56 126.68 86.66
Output price (Euros/tone) Pc 173.44 31.41 132.66 27.90
Share of area in wheat (%) Shwheat 24 11 27 9
Fertiliser price (Euros/Kg) WF 0.54 0.15 0.89 0.24
Pesticide price (index) WP 1.01 0.01 1.07 0.02
Number of crops NC 4.04 1.41 4.19 0.96
Labour price (Euros/hour) 5.26 2.97 7.07 4.68
Mixed farms (dummy) MF 0.87 0.33 0.88 0.32
Profit (Euros)
Q
121,937 55,551 122,996 81,783
Age (years) 40.46 9.52 44.24 8.58
Individual farm (dummy) Indiv 0.38 0.48 0.21 0.40
Debt (debt to capital assets) Debt 0.39 0.88 0.35 0.38
Number of observations 1,049 1,592
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5.4.2 Empirical results
The estimation results for the extended SUR model (expression 5.10) are reported in tables
5.2a and 5.2b, while the estimates for the main equations of interest from the structural model
are presented in table 5.3. We report results for the two sub-periods: 2003-2005 and 2008-2011;
as previously stated, this allows evaluating the possible incentive effect of decoupled payments
as in a natural experiment framework. Most of the regressors have a significant impact on
farmers’ decisions at the 1 or 5 percent level. As regard the main variables of interest and the
correlation coeﬃcients for the error terms by pair of equations (ρij), the estimates from the
reduced form and the structural form tell globally the same story and the results correspond
closely to our expectations. This feature is very interesting since the structural model has been
used to confirm some results provided by the reduced-form model (the extended SUR model).
The correlation coeﬃcients for the error terms by pair of equations (ρij) can be interpreted
as the effects of unobservables on the corresponding dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2010).
But, in a multitasking setting these correlation coeﬃcients may also be considered as indicators
of jointness in the decision making process (Ahearn et al., 2006), or as indicators of comple-
mentarity (in cases of positive signs) or substitutability (in cases of negative signs) between
pairs of equations (Baskaran et al., 2013). In our estimates, the high level of significance of
this coeﬃcient signals that several equations are highly interrelated and that the parameters of
each single equation take into account information provided by the other equations (Cadavez
and Henningsen, 2012).
In a multitasking perspective of production decisions, the signs of the correlation coeﬃcients
are globally as expected. For instance, the use of chemical inputs and implementation of per-
manent grassland appear to be negatively correlated. This suggests that the production service
provided by chemical input use (fertiliser, pesticides) and the environmental service provided
by permanent grass strip are substitute services. Otherwise, this negative association indicate
that ecosystem services provided by a reduction in chemical input use and those provided by
permanent grass strip are complementary.
Our main findings on the effect of subsidies confirm our theoretical prediction. They suggest
that payments for permanent grass strip impact positively and significantly the choice of per-
manent grass strip but these payments have no significant effect on the reduction of chemical
input use (production service). First, as expected, contract payments for permanent grass strip
is significantly positively associated with the choice of permanent grass strip practice. This
positive effect holds in the two sub-periods of policy implementation (see tables 5.2a, 5.2b and
5.3), even though in the period 2003-2005 environmentally friendly practices were not encour-
aged, given the coupled payment scheme. The estimates for contract payment for permanent
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grass strip also highlight the multitasking issue stated in proposition 1. Indeed, the estim-
ated coeﬃcients for contract payment for permanent grass strip (tables 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.3)
indicate that these payments do not imply a reduction of chemical input use or an increase in
non-contractible environmental services (crop diversification or mixed farming). In contrast,
mixed payment, through decoupled subsidies, induce a reduction in chemical input use, and a
significant and positive effect on some environmental services (crop diversification and mixed
farming adoption).
Importantly, the decoupled direct payments are estimated to have a significant negative impact
on chemical input (fertiliser and pesticide) use. The decoupled direct payments are lump sum
payments granted to farmers to stabilise their revenue, without production requirements. This
may explain why they do not encourage intensive use of fertiliser and pesticide. These results
are in line with Serra et al. (2006) and Kassoum and Lefer (2013). In addition, our findings
are in line with results obtained by Koundouri et al. (2009) from simulation exercises for
fertilisers. But they contrast with Koundouri et al.’s (2009) simulation results for pesticides
and the results obtained by Peckham and Kropp (2012). Another interesting finding is that our
estimates indicate that decoupled payments impact positively the implementation of permanent
grassland, mixed farming, and crop diversification. These results confirm partly our theoretical
prediction in the sense that they suggest that decoupled payment helps to balance incentives
for effort across ecosystem services (contractible and non-contractible). These results could
also be related to the cross-compliance measures required to be eligible for decoupled payments
(Jaraite and Kazukauskas, 2012). Jaraite and Kazukauskas (2012) argue that cross compliance
measures could reinforce farmers incentives to act in an environmentally friendly way.
In what concerns the coupled payments, the estimates indicate that they have a nonsignificant
effect on implementation of mixed farming in the sub-period 2003-2005, and that they influ-
ence positively the use of chemical input (fertiliser and pesticide) in the sub-period 2003-2005.
However, in the period 2008-2011, they impact positively the use of fertilisers, but their impact
on pesticides use is nonsignificant. Concerning the use of chemical inputs, our results are in
line with Laukkanen and Nauges (2014).
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Table 5.2a Empirical Estimates of the extended SUR model
for the period 2003-2005
Fertilizer Pesticide Permanent Grassland Nomber of Crops Mixed Farming
Fertiliser price -7,317***
(1,837)
-4,956**
(2,270)
50.27***
(12.82)
1.85 ***
(0.65)
2.43 ***
(0.81)
Pesticide price 3,290 **
(1208)
3,507**
(1493)
-24.11***
(8.43)
-0.62
(0.42)
-1.66***
(0.55)
Decoupled payment / / / / /
Coupled payment 4.08***
(1.38)
11.74***
(1.71)
-0.03***
(0.009)
0.004 ***
(0.0005)
-5E-04
(7E-04)
Payment for PG -3.68
(10.00)
-10.59
(12.36)
0.12 *
(0.07)
-0.008**
(0.03)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Farm area 52.63***
(1.95)
76.15***
(2.40)
0.33 ***
(0.01)
0.008 ***
(0.0007)
0.007 ***
(0.001)
Share wheat 26,923***
(859)
17,821***
(1062)
-147.8***
(6.00)
1.34 ***
(0.30)
-0.85 **
(0.41)
Age 0.43
(10.77)
42.45***
(13.31)
-0.13 *
(0.07)
0.009 ***
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.006)
Individual farms 822 ***
(231)
526 *
(294)
-2.95 *
(1.66)
0.16**
(0.08)
-0.25**
(0.12)
Debt -99.60
(107)
266 **
(132)
-0.53
(0.75)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.14 ***
(0.04)
Intercept -8,128***
(732)
-10,268***
(905)
55.19***
(5.11)
/ 1.07***
(0.38)
Number of observations 1,049
ρ12(Fert-Pest) 0.32 ***
ρ13(Fert-PG) -0.15 ***
ρ14(Fert-NC) 0.17 ***
ρ15 (Fert-MF) 0.05
ρ23 (Pest-PG) -0.61 ***
ρ24 (Pest-NC) 0.48 ***
ρ25 (Pest-MF) -0.12 ***
ρ34 (PG-NC) -0.45 ***
ρ35 (PG-MF) 0.29 ***
ρ45 (NC-MF) 0.45 ***
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%; ρij : correlation coefficient for
each pair of equations. Standard errors in brackets; PG:Permanent Grassland
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Table 5.2b Empirical Estimates of the extended SUR model
for the period 2008-2011
Fertilizer Pesticide Permanent Grassland Nomber of Crops Mixed Farming
Fertiliser price -1,856**
(734)
5218 *
(3005)
12.98
(13.33)
-1.31***
(0.49)
-0.07
(0.81)
Pesticide price 4215***
(870)
-3745
(3540)
-77.45***
(15.71)
-0.29
(0.58)
-2.49 **
(0.96)
Decoupled payment -0.08 ***
(0.01)
-0.11 **
(0.05)
0.003***
(0.0002)
3E-05 ***
(8.7E-06)
8E-05***
(1.7E-05)
Coupled payment 2.38**
(1.12)
5.67
(4.56)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.003 ***
(0.0007)
1.9E-03
(1.2E-03)
Payment for PG -0.13
(0.08)
-0.24
(0.32)
0.004***
(0.001)
-2E-04 ***
(5E-05)
- 8.5E-05
(9.2E-05)
Farm area 31.03 ***
(0.60)
118.44***
(2.45)
0.12***
(0.01)
0.003 ***
(0.0004)
-0.002***
(0.0007)
Share wheat 9838***
(426)
36,896 ***
(1732)
-215.2 ***
(7.68)
-0.05
(0.28)
-4.59***
(0.45)
Age 23.13***
(4.88)
41.36 ***
(19.88)
-0.29***
(0.09)
0.0004
(0.003)
-0.0006
(0.005)
Individual farms 138
(112)
667
(455)
-2.18
(2.02)
-0.12 *
(0.07)
-0.17
(0.11)
Debt 2.53 **
(106)
2967 ***
(431)
-14.57 ***
(1.91)
-0.34 ***
(0.07)
-0.83 ***
(0.11)
Intercept -5170 ***
(286)
-15,666***
(1,164)
106.35***
(5.16)
/ 3.14 ***
(0.33)
Number of observations 1,592
ρ12(Fert-Pest) 0.48 ***
ρ13(Fert-PG) -0.60 ***
ρ14(Fert-NC) -0.01
ρ15 (Fert-MF) -0.36 ***
ρ23 (Pest-PG) -0.50 ***
ρ24 (Pest-NC) 0.07 **
ρ25 (Pest-MF) -0.26***
ρ34 (PG-NC) -0.18 ***
ρ35 (PG-MF) 0.61 ***
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ρ45 (NC-MF) 0.31***
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%; ρij : correlation coefficient for
each pair of equations. Standard errors in brackets; PG:Permanent Grassland
Table 5.3 Estimation results of the structural model
2003-2005 2008-2011
Fert (1) Pest (2) PG (3) Lc (4) Fert (1) Pest (2) PG (3) Lc (4)
Output price 6.63 (9.19) -11.23
(12.41)
-0.27
(0.17)
-0.17
(0.11)
17.67 ***
(5.68)
36.20 *
(21.04)
-0.11
(0.09)
1.72 ***
(0.54)
Fertiliser
price
-5,080***
(1646)
-1400
(1441)
7.04
(9.62)
7.41*
(4.39)
-2,451 ***
(642)
1,856 *
(1016)
-0.12
(0.08)
(13.63 ***
(4.68)
Pesticide
price
-1,400
(1441)
996.24
(2203)
1.50
(11.68)
12.55 **
(5.30)
1856 *
(1016)
-9,791 ***
(2989)
-0.23
(0.32)
24.85
(16.66)
Decoupled
payment
/ / / / -0.12 ***
(0.01)
- 0.10 **
(0.05)
0.002 ***
(0.0003)
- 0.05 **
(0.02)
Coupled
payment
7.44 *
(4.39)
12.55 **
(5.30)
0.12
(0.08)
0.09 *
(0.05)
13.63 ***
(4.68)
24.85
(16.66)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.56)
Payment for
PG
7.04 (9.62) 1.50
(11.68)
0.29 *
(0.18)
0.12
(0.08)
-0.12
(0.08)
-0.23 (0.32) 0.05 **
(0.02)
0.05
(0.01)
Total farm
area
52.47 ***
(1.96)
77.1 5***
(2.52)
0.30 ***
(0.05)
0.57 ***
(0.03)
30.16 ***
(0.61)
112.70 ***
(2.36)
0.19 ***
(0.01)
0.99***
(0.08)
Share wheat 26,813 ***
(865)
18,013 ***
(1113)
-153 ***
( 22.68)
125 ***
(14.02)
9395 ***
(444)
34,659 ***
(1721)
-158 ***
(11.60)
371 ***
(66.65)
Individual
farm
847 ***
(240)
836 ***
(310)
-4.98
(6.27)
11.51 ***
(3.89)
69.81
(117.07)
470 (455) -2.15
(3.25)
-13.86
518.17)
Age -5.68
(10.87)
19.54
(13.79)
-0.07
(0.28)
0.07
(0.16)
16.65 ***
(4.93)
4.90 (18.88) 1.12 ***
(0.09)
4.23 ***
(0.56)
Debt -75.45
(108.07)
304**
(139)
-0.73
(2.86)
0.52
(1.78)
270.49 **
(110.82)
3,117 ***
(430)
-15.79 ***
(3.08)
13.36
(17.44)
Intercept -6,630 ***
(633)
-6,598 ***
(814)
51.21
(18.18)
-54.14***
(9.82)
-4,399
(275)
-11,532 ***
(1,054)
2.35 ***
(0.43)
-365 ***
(28.32)
Number of observations 1,049 1,592
ρ12(Fert-Pest) 0.32 *** 0.48 ***
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ρ13 (Fert-PG) - 0.15 *** -0.56 ***
ρ14 (Fert-Lc) 0.28 *** 0.29 ***
ρ23 (Pest-PG) -0.61 *** -0.48 ***
ρ24 (Pest-Lc) 0.73 *** 0.23 ***
ρ34 (PG-Lc) -0.82 *** -0.14 ***
* significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%; Lc: land allocated to crop; Fert: fertiliser; Pest: pesticide;
PG: permanent grassland; ρij : correlation coefficient for each pair of equations. Standard errors in brackets
Concerning the other (control) exogenous variables, the estimates in tables 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.3
provide many intuitive results. For instance, utilised agricultural area (total farm area) is
estimated to have a positive effect on chemical use and on establishment of permanent grass
strip. We find that debt influences positively the use of chemical inputs and negatively the of
permanent grass strip. This suggests that indebted farmers tend to adopt less environmentally
friendly practices. In addition, the positive effect of debt on chemical input use signals that
indebted farmers tend to use more chemical input to ensure their yield and avoid defaulting
on debt obligations. This result supports the findings by Peckham and Kropp (2012). As for
individuals farms and the control variable Age, the results are inconclusive. The results from
tables 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.3 also display that the share of land allocated to wheat is positively
associated to the use of chemical inputs. The estimates from the structural model (table 5.3)
indicate that land allocated to crop production is not influenced by output price in the period
of the coupled subsidies (2003-2005) while a positive association is found in the period of the
decoupled payments (2008-2011).
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a theoretical model is developed to study the possible incentive effect of de-
coupled subsidies. To the extent that some ecosystem services in agriculture cannot be written
into an environmental contract, multitasking problems will always plague farmer performance
measurement and thus reduce the development of such services. We show that this dilemma
of agricultural multitasking gives support in favour of mixed payment, through decoupled sub-
sidies.
The traditional argument for incentive effect of decoupled subsidies runs as follows: using
decoupled subsidies reduces the farmer’s aversion toward risky activities (Hennessy, 1998; Sck-
okai and Moro, 2006; Féménia et al, 2010) or relaxes credit constraint (Goodwin and Mishra,
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2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). This chapter adds the following argument: since pay-for-
performance incentives are imperfect for rewarding some specific services, using mixed payment
through decoupled subsidies helps to balance incentives for effort across ecosystem services.
First, mixed payment can reduce the negative externalities of production (through pesticide and
fertiliser use) by providing weaker incentives to produce. Second, when environmental services
are non-contractible and costly to provide (crop diversification and mixed farming practices),
pay-for-performance for contractible environmental services and mixed payment through de-
coupled subsidies should be used. This theoretical proposition has been empirically tested using
a French database and confirmed by the estimation of a reduced-form model and a structural
model.
In this chapter we do not consider risk and uncertainty aspects, while these aspects could be
vital for analysing farmers’ behaviours. For instance, they could influence agency relation-
ship (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). They could also be salient determinants of the use of
chemical inputs (fertilisers and pesticides), which are generally perceived as risk-increasing or
risk-decreasing inputs (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993, Rajsic, Weersink, and Gandorfer 2009,
Ramaswami,1992). A further research avenue is therefore to extend our theoretical model to
account for risk and uncertainty, or to include an indicator of risk aversion (defined as the
ratio of insurance cost to total expenditures) in our empirical model as in Goodwin and Mishra
(2006). Furthermore, we do not consider production effort in our simple model since we simply
aim at analysing the impact of the optimal mix of subsidies, coupled and decoupled, on the
incentives to provide effort on environmental services, whether they are contractible or not. In
a more general model, it would be interesting to introduce a production effort.
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5.6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
This appendix derives the comparative static results describing how farmer’s choices of output
and effort respond to the payment incentives of the underlying compensation scheme for pro-
duction output (αQ) and environmental services (ν1e1 and ν2e2). Recall that the regulator’s
objective consists in maximising the social welfare under a budget constraint:
Max<Q,e>W = λV1(Q, e1)+λV2(Q, e2)−C (Q)−C (e1, e2) s.t. F +αQ+ ν1e1+ ν2e2  S
(5.18)
The FOCs for choice of output and environmental efforts are given in the main text (equations
5.7 to 5.9). Strict concavity of regulator’s utility implies that the Hessian matrix H is negative
definite, where H is given by
H =
2
66664
λV 1QQ 0 λV
1
Qe 0
0 λV 2QQ 0 λV
2
Qe
λV 1Qe 0 λV
1
Qe − C11 −C12
0 λV 2Qe −C12 λV
1
ee − C22
3
77775
where λV 1QQ denotes
∂2V1
∂QQ
, λV 2Qe denotes
∂2V1
∂Qe
, and so forth.
We derive some inequalities that will be useful in the comparative statics. By assumption of
concavity, the Hessian determinant is positive (fulfilling the second-order condition for maxim-
isation), and the principal minors alternate in sign. This implies that λV 2QQ[λV
1
QQ(λV
1
ee−C11)−
[λV 1Qe]
2] < 0. Since V 2QQ < 0:
λV 1QQ(λV
1
ee − C11)− [λV
1
Qe]
2 > 0. (5.19)
Similarly, since environmental services 1 and 2 are perfectly symmetric, we have:
λV 2QQ(λV
2
ee − C22)− (λV
2
Qe)
2 > 0 (5.20)
Moreover, the Hessian could also be written as:
H2 =
2
66664
λV 1ee − C11 −C12 λV
1
Qe 0
−C12 λV
2
ee − C22 0 λV
2
Qe
λV 1Qe 0 λV
1
QQ 0
0 λV 2Qe 0 λV
2
ee
3
77775
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It follows from concavity that the principal minors of H2 also alternate in sign, so that the
following three inequalities hold:
[(λV 1ee − C11)(λV
2
ee − C22)− [C22]
2 > 0 (5.21)
λV 1QQ
⇥
(λV 1ee − C11)(λV
2
ee − C22)− (C12)
2
⇤
− (λV 2ee − C22)[λV
1
Qe]
2 < 0 (5.22)
λV 2QQ
⇥
(λV 1ee − C11)(λV
2
ee − C22)− (C12)
2
⇤
− (λV 2ee − C11)[λV
2
Qe]
2 < 0 (5.23)
by symmetry of services 1 and 2.
As regard the second part of proposition 1, consider the effect of introducing mixed payment by
decreasing the share payment for production (α ), through the increase of decoupled subsidies,
on the farmer’s choice of the first environmental service. From (5.20), we have
∂e1
∂α
=
−λV 1Qe
⇥
λV 2QQ)(λV
2
ee − C22)− (λV
2
Qe)
2
⇤
|H|
< 0 (5.24)
where the numerator is negative by (5.20) and the denominator is positive by strict concavity
of W (Q, e1, e2). The other comparative statics are derived analogously as follows:
∂Q
∂α
=
λV 1Qe
⇥
λV 2Qe)C12
⇤
|H|
> 0 (5.25)
∂e2
∂α
=
λV 1Qe
⇥
λV 2QQ)(−C22)
⇤
|H|
> 0 (5.26)
∂Q
∂ν1
=
λV 1Qe
⇥
(λV 2QQ)(λV
2
ee − C22)− (λV
2
Qe)
2
⇤
|H|
> 0 (5.27)
∂e1
∂ν1
=
−λV 1QQ
|H|
> 0 (5.28)
∂e2
∂ν1
=
λV 1QQ
⇥
λV 2QQ)(−C22)
⇤
|H|
< 0 (5.29)
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Chapter 6
General conclusions
6.1 Overview
The PhD thesis focuses on the impact of public subsidies on farmers’ production decisions.
Its specific objectives are twofold. First, the thesis endeavoured to improve the understanding
on how public subsidies impact production decisions with a special focus on farm technical
eﬃciency. Second, it intended to investigate the potential effects of decoupled subsidies on
farmers’ provision of productive and environmental services.
The impact of agricultural policies on farmers’ behaviour is regularly scrutinised. This res-
ults mainly from the need to continuously change agricultural support policies in response to
changes in economic, social and environmental conditions within which farms operate, and
changes in societal expectations. A second motivation for such analyses is to assess whether
policy instruments implemented achieve their goal, since they often generate unintended con-
sequences (Grant, 2007). A number of studies have addressed the impact of public subsidies on
farms’ performance (productivity and eﬃciency); the type and level of production; the use of
production factors, such as land and labour; investment decisions; and the allocation of family
labour to on- and off-farm activities.
In this thesis a particular attention was devoted to the impact of subsidies on farms’ technical
eﬃciency. The subsidy-eﬃciency link is of crucial interest for policy makers because it could
inform on the extent to which public subsidies influence eﬃcient use of production factors in
the agricultural sector, despite subsidies not being aimed at it explicitly. In this regard and
in the context of the successive changes in agricultural policies, there exists a growing body
of literature on the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus. A major issue of this stream of literature is the
existence of a plethora of models in which the effect of subsidies on technical eﬃciency is
treated in an ad hoc way, given the absence of clear conceptual guidance on how to incorporate
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subsidy in a production eﬃciency framework. Potentially, this may generate misleading results.
In this respect, the first question addressed in the thesis was whether there is unambiguous
evidence on the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus in the existing literature, and if not, whether there
are methodological aspects that can explain the discrepancies. The purpose was to investigate
the incidence of analytical choices made by authors (such as the way subsidies are modelled,
the type of subsidy considered, the variables used to proxy subsidies) on the effect (positive,
negative, or null) of public subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency. To answer this question, a
unique dataset was gathered from a systematic review of the existing literature on the subsidy-
eﬃciency link; and then, using this dataset, a meta-regression analysis was carried out in the
third chapter of the thesis.
The systematic review revealed that in the empirical literature, subsidies are commonly negat-
ively associated with farm technical eﬃciency. However, the meta-regression estimation results
showed that the direction (significantly negative, significantly positive or non-significant) of the
effects is sensitive to the way subsidies are modelled. For instance, when subsidies are modelled
as additional output in the eﬃciency calculation, their effect on technical eﬃciency is commonly
found to be positive. Using such a modelling approach may, however, give an erroneous view of
subsidies’ real influence on technical eﬃciency since there is no change in input associated with
the additional output. In addition, when subsidies received are proxied by the subsidy rate
(i.e., the ratio of subsidies to farm revenue), the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus is commonly found to
be negative. This approach may be artifactual, since econometrically it corresponds, in a sense,
to the regression of a given variable on its inverse. In fact, the variable that is generally used
as output in the subsidy-eﬃciency analysis is farm revenue. A methodological recommendation
drawn from this analysis is therefore that particular attention should be paid on how subsidies
are modelled and incorporated into the models so as to avoid erroneous conclusions.
A second issue of the literature on the subsidy-eﬃciency link is that it is almost exclusively
based on a static view of agricultural production decisions, while most agricultural production
decisions are dynamic in nature. The thesis hence examined whether there are any gains in
understanding the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus by moving from static to dynamic modelling. The
idea was to explore whether dynamic aspects associated with farmers’ investment decisions in
quasi-fixed inputs matter in analyses of how public subsidies impact farm technical eﬃciency.
To address this question, a dynamic stochastic frontier model was developed and estimated for
French data in the fourth chapter of the thesis; for comparison purposes, the static counterpart
of this model was also estimated. The dynamic model developed is an extension of the para-
metric hyperbolic distance function introduced by Cuesta et al. (2009) in which intertemporal
production decisions are modelled by accounting for farmers’ investment decisions.
The results from the dynamic stochastic analysis showed that there are some gains in under-
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standing the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus by moving from static to dynamic modelling. Overall, by
comparing the static eﬃciency model with the dynamic one, under the null hypothesis of their
equivalence, a likelihood ratio test suggested that the dynamic framework was more appropriate
for analysing the sampled farmers’ production decisions. As regards the estimated eﬃciency
scores, they were found to be higher within the dynamic model. Similar results have been
found in Dakpo and Oude Lansink (2015) in a nonparametric framework. In what concerns the
subsidy-eﬃciency nexus, the results suggested that the impact of subsidies on farm technical
eﬃciency was smaller when dynamic aspects were taken into account. However, in our sample,
the estimated marginal effects appeared to be relatively negligible, even though they were sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Additionally, simulation results showed that the technical eﬃciency
scores remained unchanged when subsidies were set to zero. In the same vein, the contribution
of public subsidies to the variation of the estimated eﬃciency scores was found to be negligible.
This suggests that, in future research, authors have to estimate the real impact of subsidies on
farm technical eﬃciency in the form of marginal effects instead of interpreting only the sign
and the significance of the effects, as it is common practice in the existing empirical literature.
Another element of the PhD thesis was to examine the role of decoupled subsidies in a mul-
titasking agriculture providing ecosystem services. Although decoupled subsidies became the
cornerstone of agricultural support policies, Just and Kropp (2013) pointed out that their (po-
tential) impact on farmers’ production decisions remains unclear. In fact, in the jargon of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), decoupled subsidies have been conceptualised as green-box
subsidies, i.e., as government payments that are production neutral. Nevertheless, theoretical
and empirical studies show that decoupled subsidies could have direct and indirect influence on
farmers’ behaviour. But, some studies report that their effect on farmers behaviour is relatively
small (see Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009, for a review of literature). In the debate over the impact
of decoupled subsidies on farmers’ production decisions, an area that has received little atten-
tion is the multitasking nature of farming activities. Based on this multitasking nature, the
thesis investigated whether decoupled subsidies could be useful in promoting farmers’ provision
of environmental services, despite these subsidies not being designed as such. This question
was addressed in the fifth chapter of the thesis, by developing a theoretical model based on
the multitasking agency theory. This model was then tested on French farm data, using an
extended version of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model and a structural model.
The basic agency theory focuses on the design of incentives with which one economic agent,
namely the “Principal”, seeks to motivate another, namely the “Agent”, to choose his activities
on the behalf of the principal (Macdonald, 1984). In contrast to the basic agency theory which
concentrates on the realisation of a single task, the multitasking agency theory assumes that
the Agent’s main task is multidimensional (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In this case, when
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effort on one task raises the cost of effort on other tasks, the Agent will focus his effort on
measurable and compensated tasks at the expense of others. This may induce the multitasking
issue which refers to a challenge for the Principal to design incentive systems that allow avoid-
ing this kind of substitution between tasks. The multitasking issue could appear in agricultural
production decisions. Farmers are expected to produce ecologically sound outputs and ecosys-
tem services. Therefore, if they are paid for a given measurable environmental service, they
would neglect the other services and the production of ecologically sound outputs given their
costs. In this sense, the thesis examined the possible incentive effect of decoupled subsidies in
a multitasking agriculture.
The theoretical model developed in the thesis is a multitasking agency model. In this model,
the Principal is a social planner (the government), that gives some incentives to an Agent
(the farmer) to choose some specific ecosystem services (production or environmental services)
through a contract. The Principal is assumed to maximise a social welfare function. The Agent
(the farmer) is assumed to maximise a strictly concave and continuously differentiable utility
function where the arguments are the profit generated by the production process, the subsidies,
and a parameter that captures farmer’s benevolence. In this model, we derive some testable pro-
positions on the optimal compensation scheme in the contract (subsidies structures, i.e. coupled
and decoupled) and the farmer choice regarding the different ecosystem services at the farm
level. The model highlighted that a mixed payment system (with more decoupled subsidies)
could reduce the multitasking issue in farming activities. In this sense, the thesis contributed to
the existing literature by proposing a new theoretical rationale for the possible incentive effect of
decoupled subsidies. The theoretical model was tested on French data using an extended SUR
model (Roodman, 2011) which accounted for continuous, dichotomic and polytomic decisions
variables. Furthermore, some aspects of the theoretical model were empirically tested using the
structural model developed by Lacroix and Thomas (2011) and Laukkanen and Nauges (2014).
The empirical results showed that decoupled subsidies could help balance farmers’ incentives
for effort across environmental services (contractible and non-contractible). More precisely, the
results showed that decoupled subsidies impacted positively the implementation of permanent
grass strip, crop diversification, and mixed farming. In addition, they suggested that decoupled
subsidies could contribute to decreasing the negative externalities of production through the
reduction of pesticide and fertiliser use.
6.2 Methodological and policy conclusions
As regard the provision of consistent information to policy-makers and various stakeholders on
the impact of public subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency, the thesis makes several methodo-
logical recommendations to improve future analysis on the issue:
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• Subsidies should not be modelled as additional outputs. One argument against the validity
of the approach that uses subsidy as an additional output is that it artificially inflates the
farm output and this output increase is not accompanied by a change in the use of inputs.
In this case, a subsidised farm will appear more technically eﬃcient than a non-subsidised
farm, everything else being equal, although the former farm does not effectively produce
more output. By contrast, it could be argued that subsidies are a proxy for non-market
output produced by farms. For example, for calculating total factor productivity of Swiss
farms, Jan et al. (2012) use agri-environmental subsidies to proxy environmental services
provided by farms. The authors explain that these subsidies are taken into account as
they ‘require an additional input usage in comparison with the sole act of production of
agricultural commodities’. However, the economic argument against the use of subsidies
as output is that they are not an output generated by the classic agricultural production
technology.
• Subsidies should not be modelled as additional inputs. In chapter 2 the thesis gathers
some proofs through the literature that demonstrate that subsidies may be used by farmers
to partly purchase conventional inputs (land, labour, capital, intermediate inputs) that
are generally included in an eﬃciency model. Thus modelling subsidies as inputs results
in double counting.
• Subsidies should not be proxied by the subsidy rate (i.e., the ratio between the total
subsidies received by farmers and farm revenue or farm output in value). This approach
generates misleading results because it corresponds, in a sense, to the regression of a given
variable on its inverse, since the variable generally used as output in the subsidy-eﬃciency
analysis is the farm revenue.
• Dynamic analysis may be more appropriate, since results provided in this thesis suggest
that the static analysis assimilates dynamic aspects to ineﬃciency.
• Marginal effects have to be estimated and interpreted. In fact, the common practice in the
subsidy-eﬃciency literature which consists in interpreting the sign and the significance of
the effects could be misleading. Indeed, the effects could appear to be highly statistically
significant although they are of negligible magnitude.
A policy implication that can be drawn from the thesis is that the mixed payment system
with more decoupled subsidies could ensure the coherence between agricultural policies and
the sustainability of the agricultural sector. Indeed, the results provided here indicate that
decoupled subsidies have the virtue to provide incentives to reduce the negative externalities
of production (through reduction of pesticide and fertiliser use). At the same time, they could
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encourage the implementation of permanent grass strip, crop diversification, and adoption of
mixed farming.
6.3 Limits of the thesis and suggestions for further
research
This PhD thesis provides some methodological and theoretical contributions to the literature
on the impact of public subsidies on farmers’ production decisions. However, additional work
has to be done to be more confident on the implication of these contributions. For instance,
our dynamic stochastic model developed in chapter 4 and our theoretical model developed in
chapter 5 have to be applied to other datasets. In a similar vein, other dynamic models, such
as the model of Serra et al. (2011), could be estimated for comparison purposes. In addition,
some shortcomings of this thesis should be underlined.
The simple theoretical model developed in chapter 5 could be extended to account for risk and
uncertainty, which are inherent to agricultural production. In addition, as regard the estima-
tion of the SUR model, there is no clear-cut consensus in the literature on the interpretation
of the correlation coeﬃcients for the error terms by pair of equations. Some authors interpret
them as the effects of unobservables on the corresponding dependent variables (Wooldridge,
2010), while others consider them as indicators of jointness (complementarity or substitutab-
ility) in the decision making process (Ahearn et al., 2006; Baskaran et al., 2013; Dupraz and
Latruffe, 2015). We believe that heterogeneity (effects of unobservables) has to be separated
from complementarity or substitutability. Furthermore, we do not consider production effort in
our simple model since we simply aim at analysing the impact of the optimal mix of subsidies,
coupled and decoupled, on the incentives to provide effort on environmental services, whether
they are contractible or not. In a more general model, it would be interesting to introduce a
production effort. Finally, the model could be reassessed assuming that production and envir-
onmental services are complement. We assume in our model that they are substitutable, but
some studies suggest that there may exist a degree of complementarity (e.g. Boussemart et al.,
2011).
In chapter 3, we claim that we undertook a systematic review of the existing literature. Al-
though it is practically impossible to avoid some omissions, we expect that we have accounted
for the vast majority of the existing papers on the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus. In addition, in
chapter 3 and chapter 4, the thesis provides methodological recommendations that can help
improve the understanding of the relationship between public subsidies and farm technical ef-
ficiency. These recommendations could serve as guidance for further empirical research on the
subsidy-eﬃciency nexus. However, it is well known that empirical studies have to be built
148
on sound theoretical grounds. In this sense, the thesis does not deal with a major issue in
the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus, since it does not provide any contributions to advance the exist-
ing theoretical framework. Indeed, theoretically predicting the impact of public subsidies on
technical eﬃciency remains a challenging task since the existing theoretical models are very
limited. There exist two theoretical models that are usually used to predict the impact of pub-
lic subsidies on farm technical eﬃciency (subsidy-eﬃciency nexus). These are the managerial
behaviour model introduced by Martin and Page (1983) for the industrial sector, and the static
optimisation model under risk aversion developed by Serra et al. (2008) for the agricultural
sector.
The model of Martin and Page (1983) is not really appropriate to predict the subsidy-eﬃciency
nexus for at least two reasons. First, technical ineﬃciency is generally thought as a failure
to optimise; it occurs as a consequence of managerial inability (or incapacity) due to lack of
knowledge, imperfect anticipation, uncertainty, or high adjustment costs. The X-ineﬃciency
essentially reflects the labour-leisure decision of the producer, but not his ability to use a
production technology eﬃciently. It is based on the idea of non-optimising behaviours (i.e., it
is not rooted in the neoclassical formalism); it occurs as a consequence of lack of motivation to
work which involves managerial deficiencies (see Leibenstein, 1977, 1978; Button and Weyman-
Jones, 1994). Second, if one assimilates X-ineﬃciency to technical ineﬃciency, under certain
conditions, the model of Martin and Page (1983) predicts an inverse relationship between
subsidies and technical eﬃciency, while empirical studies find mixed effects. The model of
Serra et al. (2008) presents an apparent advantage over Martin and Page’s (1983) model, as
it includes risk and uncertainty in the analytical framework. Furthermore, it predicts mixed
effects, which is consistent with what is observed empirically. However, Serra et al.’s (2008)
model is a little unrealistic. In fact, while farms operate in a multivariate context, the model
developed by Serra et al. (2008) is available only for a simple case of a single output and a
single risk decreasing input. Additionally, a general critical issue in the eﬃciency literature is
that technical eﬃciency and X-eﬃciency are empirically measured using the same tools (Data
Envelopment Analysis or Stochastic Frontier Analysis). In this sense, in the empirical analyses,
there is no clear idea on what is really measured. On this basis, there is a real need to refine
the existing theoretical framework.
One of the main findings of the thesis is that decoupled subsidies could provide to farmers
incentives for the provision of environmental services. This finding is at odds with literature
results from the technical eﬃciency framework which commonly report that public subsidies are
detrimental to the agricultural sector’s performance. To shed more light on this issue, a question
to be deeply investigated is the influence of public subsidies (particularly decoupled subsidies)
on the eﬃcient use of inputs having environmental impacts (such as chemical fertilisers and
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chemical pesticides). One possible framework to do that is the multi-directional conditional
eﬃciency analytical (conditional MEA) framework1 introduced by Baležentis and De Witte
(2015). The traditional eﬃciency measures (Farell, 1957; Banker et al., 1984; Aigner et al.,
1977; Meeusen, van den Broeck, 1977) provide aggregated technical eﬃciency scores, while
the basic nonparametric MEA (Bogetoft and Hougaard, 1999) allows decomposing aggregated
technical eﬃciency scores into input-specific eﬃciency scores. The conditional MEA framework
(Baležentis and De Witte, 2015) further allows investigating input specific eﬃciencies from
aggregated eﬃciency scores, and at the same time accounting for the influence of contextual
drivers on these scores. The analysis of the subsidy-eﬃciency nexus with aggregated technical
eﬃciency scores may mask some relevant virtues of agricultural subsidies. For instance, a
subsidy-eﬃciency analysis may reveal that subsidies are detrimental to the agricultural sector
only because of overcapitalisation. In contrast, the conditional MEA may allow investigating the
influence of public subsidies on the eﬃcient use of a particular input. Particularly, it may enable
analysing the effects of public subsidies on the eﬃcient use of inputs having environmental
impacts (such as chemical fertilisers and chemical pesticides).
In chapter 4 the thesis has tried to detect if there is a link between changes in agricultural
policies and the evolution of farm technical eﬃciency. In such an analysis, it may be interest-
ing to distinguish between persistent (time-invariant) technical ineﬃciency and residual (time-
varying) technical ineﬃciency (see Kumbhakar et al., 2014). Indeed, as argued in Kumbhakar
et al. (2014) and Kumbhakar et al. (2015), residual ineﬃciency could change over time even
in the absence of changes in farm management practices. In contrast, if there are no changes
in factors, such as government policies or public subsidies, which may alter farm management
practices, persistent ineﬃciency would not be changed. In this sense, it may be very inform-
ative to investigate whether changes in agricultural policies induce changes in farm persistent
ineﬃciency.
Finally, it is recognised that risk and uncertainty are inherent to agricultural production and
that subsidies may influence farmer’s behaviour under uncertain production conditions. How-
ever, in chapter 4 the thesis used a stochastic production frontier in which risk and uncertainty
are confounded with statistical noise (see O’Donnell et al., 2010; Nauges et al., 2011). The
state-contingent production theory, which explicitly models uncertain production conditions
through a set of states of nature, appears to be a very promising avenue (see Chambers and
Quiggin, 2000, 2002; Quiggin and Chambers, 2006). More importantly, this framework may
allow investigating how subsidised farmers actually act under uncertain conditions. Addition-
ally, it may facilitate differentiating ineﬃciency from effects due to heterogeneous production
environments (Chambers et al., 2015).
1The stochastic efficiency decomposition model introduced by Bravo-Ureta and Rieger (1991) could be also
used.
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La thèse s’intéresse à l’impact des subventions publiques sur les 
décisions de production des agriculteurs. Elle analyse d’abord le 
OLHQ HQWUH VXEYHQWLRQV HW HIÀFDFLWp WHFKQLTXH GHV H[SORLWDWLRQV
puis examine les effets des subventions découplées sur la fourni-
ture de services écosystémiques par les agriculteurs.     
/·LQÁXHQFHGHVVXEYHQWLRQVVXUOHFRPSRUWHPHQWGHVDJULFXOWHXUV
est une question importante dans le contexte de réformes suc-
cessives des politiques agricoles. Il existe une vaste littérature sur 
cette question, mais celle-là présente trois limites majeures. D’une 
SDUWODOLWWpUDWXUHVXUOHVXMHWVSpFLÀTXHGXOLHQHQWUHVXEYHQWLRQV
HWHIÀFDFLWpWHFKQLTXHUHSRVHVXUXQHSOpWKRUHGHPRGqOHVHPSL
riques qui traitent les subventions de façon ad hoc. De plus, cette 
littérature est presqu’exclusivement basée sur des modèles sta-
tiques, alors que les décisions de production sont essentiellement 
dynamiques. D’autre part, peu de travaux analysent le rôle des 
subventions découplées en considérant la nature multitâche de 
l’agriculture.    
C’est pourquoi la thèse réalise tout d’abord une méta-analyse 
des résultats empiriques existants sur le lien entre subventions 
HWHIÀFDFLWpWHFKQLTXHDÀQGHFRQWU{OHUOHVHIIHWVTXLVHUDLHQWGXV
aux méthodes utilisées. Les résultats indiquent que la modélisa-
tion des subventions comme outputs, ou l’utilisation du ratio sub-
ventions/revenu comme proxy, pourraient générer des résultats 
trompeurs. Ensuite, la thèse développe et estime un modèle de 
frontière dynamique ainsi qu’un modèle similaire mais statique. 
Les résultats montrent que le cadre statique surestime l’effet 
QpJDWLIGHVVXEYHQWLRQVVXUO·HIÀFDFLWpWHFKQLTXH(QÀQODWKqVH
développe et teste un modèle d’agence multitâche indiquant que 
les aides découplées peuvent inciter les agriculteurs à fournir des 
services écosystémiques.  
Public Subsidies and Farmers’ Production Decisions : A Micro-
economic Analysis
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GHFLVLRQV DUH G\QDPLF LQ QDWXUH )LQDOO\ LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ WKH
LQFHQWLYHHIIHFWVRIGHFRXSOHGVXEVLGLHVWKHPXOWLWDVNLQJQDWXUH
RIIDUPLQJDFWLYLWLHVKDVUHFHLYHGOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQ
7KH WKHVLVDGGUHVVHV WKHVH LVVXHVÀUVWE\XQGHUWDNLQJDPHWD
DQDO\VLVRIWKHH[LVWLQJHPSLULFDOÀQGLQJVRQWKHVXEVLG\HIÀFLHQF\
QH[XVLQRUGHUWRFRQWUROIRUHIIHFWVDULVLQJIURPWKHYDULRXVPHWKR
GRORJLHVXVHG7KHUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWPRGHOOLQJVXEVLGLHVDVRXW
SXWVRUXVLQJWKHUDWLRRIVXEVLGLHVWRIDUPUHYHQXHDVDVXEVLG\
SUR[\FRXOGOHDGWRPLVOHDGLQJUHVXOWV7KHQWKHWKHVLVGHYHORSV
DQGHVWLPDWHVDG\QDPLFIURQWLHUPRGHOIRUFRPSDULVRQSXUSRVHV
the static counterpart of this model is also estimated. The results 
LQGLFDWHWKDWWKHVWDWLFIUDPHZRUNRYHUHVWLPDWHVWKHGHWULPHQWDO
HIIHFWRIVXEVLGLHVRQIDUPWHFKQLFDOHIÀFLHQF\)LQDOO\WKHWKHVLV
GHYHORSV DQG WHVWV D PXOWLWDVNLQJ DJHQF\ PRGHO LQGLFDWLQJ WKDW
GHFRXSOHG VXEVLGLHV FRXOG UDLVH IDUPHUV· LQFHQWLYHV WR SURYLGH
HQYLURQPHQWDOVHUYLFHVDQGHFRORJLFDOO\VRXQGSURGXFWLRQ
Mots-clés : Politiques agricoles ; subventions publiques ;  exploi-
WDWLRQVGpFLVLRQVGHSURGXFWLRQHIÀFDFLWpG\QDPQLTXHWKpRULH
de l’agence multitâches.
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GHFLVLRQV WHFKQLFDO HIÀFLHQF\ G\QDPLF HIÀFLHQF\ PXOWLWDVNLQJ
DJHQF\WKHRU\
